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This dissertation is about an abstract form of computer network that has recently earned a 
new physical incarnation called ―the Internet of Things.‖ It surveys the ontological 
transformations that have occurred over recent decades to the computational components of this 
network, objects—initially designed as abstract algorithmic agents in a source code of computer 
programing but now transplanted into real-world objects. Embodying the ideal of modularity, 
objects have provided computer programmers with more intuitive means to construct a software 
application with lots of simple and reusable functional building blocks. Their capability of being 
reassembled into many different networks for a variety of applications has also embodied 
another ideal of computing machines, namely general-purposiveness. In the algorithmic cultures 
of the past century, these objects existed as mere abstractions to help humans to understand 
electromagnetic signals that had infiltrated every corner of automatized spaces from private to 
public. As an instrumental means to domesticate these elusive signals into programmable 
architectures according to the goals imposed by professional programmers and amateur end-
users, objects promised a universal language for any computable human activities. This utopian 
vision for the object-oriented domestication of the digital has had enough traction for the growth 
of the software industry as it has provided an alibi to hide another process of colonization 
occurring on the flipside of their interfacing between humans and machines: making 
programmable the highest number of online and offline human activities possible. A more recent 
media age, which this dissertation calls the age of the Internet of Things, refers to the second 
phase of this colonization of human cultures by the algorithmic objects, no longer trapped in the 
hard-wired circuit boards of personal computer, but now residing in real-life objects with new 
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wireless communicability. Chapters of this dissertation examine each different computer 
application—a navigation system in a smart car, smart home, open-world videogames, and 
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This study is about an abstract form of computer network that has recently earned a new 
physical incarnation called ―the Internet of Things.‖ It surveys the ontological transformations 
that have occurred over recent decades to the computational components of this network, 
objects—initially designed as abstract algorithmic agents in a source code of computer 
programing but now transplanted into real-world objects. Embodying the ideal of modularity, 
objects have provided computer programmers with more intuitive means to construct a software 
application with lots of simple and reusable functional building blocks. Their capability of being 
reassembled into many different networks for a variety of applications has also embodied 
another ideal of computing machines, general-purposiveness. In the algorithmic cultures of the 
past century, these objects mostly existed as mere abstractions to help humans understand 
electromagnetic signals, which had infiltrated every corner of automatized spaces from private to 
public. As an instrumental means to domesticate these elusive signals into programmable 
architectures designed by professional programmers and amateur end-users, objects promised a 
universal language for any computable human activities. This utopian vision for the object-
oriented domestication of the digital had enough traction for the growth of the software industry 
as it provided an alibi to hide another process of colonization occurring on the flipside of their 
interfacing between humans and machines. Computer algorithms have, as Ed Finn says in What 
Algorithms Want, expanded their fields of application to generalize their ―desire for effective 
computability‖ further to any sorts of ―working systems of actual computers, humans, and social 
structures‖ (2017, p.47), and have made programmable the highest number of online and offline 
human activities possible—the desire that Jonathan Beller terms ―the full colonization of the life-
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world by computational capital‖ (2018, p.72). A more recent media age, which this dissertation 
calls the age of the Internet of Things, refers to the second phase of this colonization of human 
cultures by algorithmic objects, no longer trapped in the hard-wired circuit boards of personal 
computers, but residing in real-life objects with new wireless communicability. 
The adjective ―smart‖ has become applicable to any social spaces in different scales 
through the recent achievement in miniaturizing sensor, processor, actuator technologies to the 
size tiny enough to be embedded in any object. This has also redefined the meaning of smartness 
in the current age. Our smart life now stems from the awareness of our very standing at the 
interlocked edges of these spaces, re-divided into each hardware infrastructure in the low and 
software application in the high. Think of one‘s physiological body, domestic space, and urban 
neighborhood tracked by different sets of sensors embedded in the lower layers of a smart cloth, 
smart home, and smart city, under the governances of software applications in the high. 
Augmented by the wireless communicability of these computational agents, the natural and 
technological objects otherwise isolated in different contexts are communicable through their 
algorithmic doubles in the digital networks. From the periodic movements of human organs 
under wearable sensors to the seemingly unpredictable patterns in people‘s collective behaviors 
under citywide environmental sensors, the ontological boundaries of subject/object are no longer 
determinant for their legitimate place of existence because these boundaries are resolved into the 
intensive object-to-object communications resumed in the networks. Any dynamics in culture, 
from habitual patterns of our everyday practices in smart home/office/city to the irregular 
patterns of insurgents under the surveillance of military drone swarms, are now potentially 
translated into the digital signals exchanged by their digital avatars. In these networks, the 
problems once believed to be isolable in each particular context would appear not to belong to 
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that single domain but straddle several or, potentially, all domains digitally simulated and put 
together in the network. For instance, your heartbeat under the 24/7 monitoring of your smart 
watch is also an efficiency problem in the task to find the most optimal behaviors in your 
house/office/city as much as detecting terrorists becomes a problem to find irregular shopping 
behaviors online.  
Referred to by different names, such as Ubiquitous Computing (Wieser & Brown, 1997), 
Pervasive Computing (Satyanarayanan, 2001), Amorphous Computing (Abelson et al., 2009), 
the Internet of Things (Ashton, 2009, June), and consisting of various technological and 
theoretical incarnations of ―smart objects‖ (Kortuem et al., 2010), ―computational particles‖ 
(Abelson et al., 2009), ―smart dust‖ (Kahn et al., 1999), and so forth, these networks redefine 
their operational environment as a topological continuum which can be folded and filtered in 
many different ways through the sensors and actuators embedded. One working metaphor to 
describe these algorithmic objects is to think of their wireless networks as flexible and temporary 
reflex arcs for an artificial nervous system (Hayles, 2016; Hill, 2008). As the quasi neurological 
units embedded in a space, they function to foreground the manifold sensor-actuator responses 
hidden in the space; such as drivers‘ collective and otherwise unrecognizable responses to the 
traffic congestion in an intersection that a network of smart traffic lights foregrounds (Xie et al., 
2012; Xie and Wang, 2018), or your pace of running as a habitual and nonconscious response to 
your heartbeat that your smart watch visualizes. This Big Data-driven control of social and 
biological spaces is often based on the speculation about a space‘s hidden orders or its implicate 
orders,
1
 whose presences are hardly felt by humans until translated into certain sensor-actuator 
                                                 
1
 David Bohm (1980) calls this excess of orders enfolded in the wholeness of a space the ―implicate 




relations between smart objects. A space remapped by these objects is thus constantly folded 
into the multiple algorithmic arcs, drawn by their intensive sensor-actuator interoperations to 
detect hidden parameters of the space. These parameters, currently unspecifiable but ready to be 
discovered by the networks of smart objects, are the hidden resources in which the recent media 
industry speculatively invests its venture capital for its utopian future of the ever-repeatable 
commodification. The Internet of Things (IoT), which this dissertation defines as the internet‘s 
new phase of physical infiltration, should in this respect be understood as more than a simple 
change in technical means to extract data, which Kevin Ashton originally intended this term to 
mean. For him (2009, June), the IoT was most of all the change in the data entry method for the 
internet‘s information economy, from the entry performed entirely by human labors such as 
―typing, pressing a record button, taking a digital picture or scanning a bar code‖ to the 
environmental sensing of autonomous smart objects. On the other hand, the Internet of Things in 
this dissertation rather signals an ontological shift in our understanding of everything—from our 
body, home, office, vehicle, to our city, potentially folded into the networks of these 
miniaturized algorithmic agents. It also signifies our consequent rediscovery of everything as 
problematic topological objects with lots of hidden parameters inaccessible by our too-human 
approaches to the problems.  
The ―things‖ in the IoT encompass not only smart sensors and actuators (which Chapter 
1 and 2 of this dissertation discuss as functional elements in a smart car and home), but  
algorithmic and graphical objects in virtual reality (such as videogame objects in Chapter 3), and 
those of organic matters digitally augmented (such as primate and human neurons in Chapter 4). 
This list is expandable even to any unknown beings insofar as our speculations about their secret 
networks are justifiable. The condition in which these speculations would be more than just 
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paranoid can be fulfilled as we deepen our speculation further to the consequences that our 
ignorance of them would possibly bring to our lives. As much as our groundless speculations 
about unknown terrorist activities or pathogenic networks are somewhat justifiable given the 
possible consequences of their actual existence by any chance, to build invisible networks of 
things that counter these invisible dangers would also be justifiable. In my definition, the 
lowercase ―o‖ in the IoT stands for many small ontologies about these unknown consequences, 
which the objects communicate not so much to help us incorporate them into our big Ontology as 
to persuade us that our too-human world view is not enough to manage these problematic tiny 
ontologies within our lives.  
 
Speculative Economy of Media 
The Internet of Things is not just an abstract form of technical network, but descriptive 
of a speculative economy of the current software industry, which capitalizes people‘s 
speculations about hidden problems as the means to justify their speculative consumption of the 
IoT-driven smart solutions. Speculation—as a new form of cognitive labor through which we 
overvalue the significance of problems and eventually overpay for their IoT solutions—also 
redefines the meaning of alienated labor in the new digital economy: where the human 
speculators are the only smart beings excluded from the problems that their speculation creates, 
whereas other smart beings, such as smart objects and IoT service providers, could access these 
problems through their constant data mining and data analysis. If the attention economy, 
characterizing the internet of the previous era, has been constructed upon a specific form of 
cognitive labor called attention, the value-giving process of human brains modeled after manual 
labor in industrial capitalism (Beller, 2006, p.9), the speculative economy, which this dissertation 
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discusses as what characterizes the Internet of Things, is built upon the cognitive process that we 
often employ to make up our failure to pay proper attention to the hidden problems, namely 
speculation, and it overvalues the problems.  
From this new economy of the internet, coincident with the mode of value production in 
the late capitalism, this study derives a new regime of surveillance in our smart everyday lives. 
For Foucault, the inaccessibility to the observing eyes in the central tower of Panopticon was the 
source for the hallucinatory omnipresence of the surveilling gaze, which the inmates gradually 
internalize as they respond to these hidden eyes by displaying normative behaviors the whole 
time (1995). The panoptics realized instead through actual physical sensors in various scales 
today are however not enough alone to justify their 24/7 surveillance as the necessary to prevent 
the problems from happening, because the problems are no longer measurable by the mere sum 
of sensors. The ideal of a panopticon as ―an all-seeing vantage point‖ is not achievable simply by 
wiring multiple sensors insofar as their interconnections inevitably leave many gaps between 
sensors. Their network would, at best, just be an oligopticon as ―partial vantage points with 
limited view sheds‖ unless proper software applications ―integrate and bind data streams together, 
work to move the various oligopticon systems into a single, panoptic vantage point‖ (Kitchin, 
2014, p.11). The urgency of problems is thus defined not so much as their degree of deviation 
from the normative responses to the hidden sensors any longer, but by their degree of deviation 
unable to redirect further to another measure in a continuous and seamless manner. For example, 
traffic congestions would be urgent problems not simply because they overrun the average but 
because they tend to be difficult to re-distribute through the nearby smart traffic lights. Your 
excessive heartbeat would likewise appear to be urgent when a smart watch detects it but cannot 
transmit to the health app, fitness app, sleep app, and so forth. Too widely distributed to be 
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perceived at any local posts, these anomalies necessitate more flexible surveillance networks, 
and for their partial detection by local devices to be analyzed further by other devices, these 
loosely interconnected smart devices should constantly re-make their network structures every 
moment.  
The nature of these problems, constantly withdrawing from the mere sum of local 
observations, also provides the rationale for our voluntary subjection to the new surveillance 
networks. In the recent trend of panoptics which democratizes the ―placeless and faceless‖ 
position of the observer in Foucault‘s to whoever has access to the public or private webcams 
and other sensor devices (or what Mark Andrejevic calls ―synopticism‖ characterized as ―the 
many watching the few‖ (2004, p.13)), our willingness for the ―deliberate exposal of the self‖ 
involves no longer our strategic response to the inaccessibility of the sensors (Koskela, 2006, 
pp.175-6). Rather, what we are blocked from accessing in smart environments is the control of 
ubiquitous actuators, such as the motors of security cameras whose secret motion tracking is 
black-boxed beneath the dark surfaces, the functions of smart objects to activate themselves or 
others, or their direct intervention in a space by transmitting imperceptible cues. These actuators 
become smart as their proactive distribution of machine-readable signals and human responding 
cues (or ―nudges‖) gradually foregrounds the hidden orders of a space, or hidden patterns of 
human behaviors in that space (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008; Zuboff, 2019). On the other hand, our 
inability to control these actuators, or our exclusion from the pankinetics of ubiquitous actuators 
that unfolds the hidden orders of a space along their algorithmic arcs, is why we still feel helpless 
despite our new accessibility to lots of local sensors within our lives. The recent Big Data 
visualization aestheticizes this asymmetry of human beings between ubiquitous sensors and 
actuators through the sheer Bigness of data. Whereas its visual complexity translates the scale 
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and multidimensionality of Big Data into a two-dimensional aesthetic presentation, a subjective 
form of reception that audiences would easily bring up to this complexity is still the 
―mathematical sublime‖: the awe-inspiring feeling in response to the manifold orders and 
dimensions supposedly embedded in Big Data, not accessible by audiences who do not have 
enough means to intervene in these hidden levels (McCosker & Wilken, 2014).
2
 Inasmuch as the 
safe aesthetic distance is not tenable in the audiences‘ actual immersion in environments, their 
sublime could easily be convertible into the terror of something out of their reach. ―Their 
awareness of their environment diminishes in line with their ability to do something about it‖ 
(Hill, 2013). From this terror-leading sublime, data fetishism or data ―solutionism‖ (Mattern, 
2013; Morozov 2013) would emerge as people internalize the ubiquitous gazes and cues from the 
sensors and actuators everywhere as the solution for hidden, supposedly ubiquitous, problems. 
From our bodies enclosed by multiple wearable devices to a smart city operationalized by the 
Internet of Things, the spaces under panoptics—whose ideal of 24/7 omnipresent surveillance is 
realized by recent technological achievements—appear to be possessed by something 
problematic once again. Under the lens of data fetishism, the full visibility of a space is not 
                                                 
2
 One machine-learning based approach to these hidden levels could be described as a process to draw an 
algorithmic arc of sensor-actuator relations across a database. For instance, to detect certain correlations 
between different types of data, or to extract proper metadata to classify data, a supervised or non-
supervised artificial neural network (ANN) filters a database through its algorithmic neurons loosely 
interconnected along their exchanges of inputs and outputs. These neurons are programmed to constantly 
reassemble their input-output relations until their improvised network fits into a hidden order embedded 
in the database, and thus, through having enough training with sufficient sample data, an ANN evolves 
into a trustworthy network of algorithmic sensors and actuators to map the given database. But, after its 
individuation is done and black-boxed as a working network, its inner process to fold the database is 




produced by the mere sum of sensors, but only realizable through the full interoperability of the 
actuators to unfold all of its implicate orders from the space‘s constant transformations. In the 
recent smart spaces, this asymmetry of human beings between sensors and actuators is what their 
surveillance networks need to reproduce at each node since this new human condition—
overwhelmed by manifold sensors but inaccessible to their actuator counterparts—would be 
what push us to delegate our natural right to control our surroundings to the smart objects.  
Transforming their operational environments—from a body to city—into a topological 
continuum, the networks of smart objects have developed a new governmentality for the 
problems supposedly lurking in each different level of the same continuum. Alongside this 
topological speculation about the problems infinitely implicated in a space, a new strategy of 
market penetration has also been invented by software companies, representing what Shoshana 
Zuboff calls ―surveillance capitalism‖ (2019). For the past two decades, these companies have 
dispatched their algorithmic agents to a variety of human domains, both physical and virtual, in 
order to translate human behaviors transpiring there into their privately owned Big Data, 
potentially open to any future attempts at data mining to unfold new service domains of the IoT. 
Our asymmetry to the problems embedded in surroundings is where these political and economic 
powers find the justifications for their infiltration of our everyday life.  
It is a thesis of this dissertation: powers now exploit our generalized concern about the 







Life Digitalized, and its Predictability 
Throughout the conceptual development of the Internet of Things, what has first been 
redefined as a topological object would be the elementary sense of the term life as it has 
appeared to be the foremost domain for smart objects to be embedded. The ―re-emergence‖ of 
vitalism in recent media theories or the concept of agencies democratized even to the inorganic 
and non-technological matters has coincided with this trend (Fraser et al., 2005; Olma & 
Koukouzelis, 2007; Bennett, 2009). Defined paradoxically as ―what escape exact definition and 
representation,‖ life, according to the Western materialist thought since the nineteenth century, 
has often been mystified as something felt only by its withdrawal from any attempts at scientific 
measurement and technological intervention. Especially after the concept of ―vital force‖ was 
dissipated by the early research in reflexology that re-embedded a physiological system of an 
organism within the outside world of the thermodynamic (Olma & Koukouzelis, 2007, p.2; 
Patton, 2018, §4.1), the reactionary mystification of life has just functioned to preserve the 
smallest niche for the anti-materialist discourses of life at the peripheries of biological, 
neurological, and pharmaceutical discourses. This tendency of life to escape to its unknown 
terrain is now, conversely, repurposed as the ideological justification for the networks‘ further 
expansion to the finer-grained materialities of our sociobiological life. It happens when life‘s 
infinite withdrawals to the ungraspable territories ironically demonstrate the new frontiers for the 
sensors and actuators with smaller sizes and higher resolutions to be embedded in order to 
redirect its elusive fluctuations as novel resources to intensify the networks. The wireless 
networks of smart objects, flexible enough to encompass any life activities around their finer-
grained sensor-actuator arcs, seem to re-summon the ghost of vitalism, which the hardwired 
sensors and actuators in the early physiology experiments such as Helmholtz‘s myograph once 
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drove out to the peripheries of the scientific discourses (Ahn, 2013). The vitalism today instead 
reappears anywhere machines fail to grasp ―a vital materiality‖ as ―the swarm of activity 
subsisting below and within formed bodies and recalcitrant things‖ (Bennett, 2009, p.50). Both 
as the return of the repressed and the ideological justification for the networks‘ expansionism, its 
resurgence redefines life as an object with lots of hidden territories, never exhaustible by its 
sensor-actuator relations to the existing technological networks, and thus guaranteeing the ever-
expansion of the networks (Harman, 2009, p.132), from a local network of experimental 
apparatuses in biology labs to the citywide environmental and behavioral sensors for the 
communal level of life activities. 
In his study of the twenty-first century‘s ―politics of life,‖ Nikolas Rose says that life as 
a medical and pharmaceutical phenomenon is now populating ―a ‗flattened‘ world, a world of 
surfaces rather than depths‖ (2007, p.130). Since molecular biology appeared in the late 
twentieth century as the protocol to communicate this natural phenomenon along the 
assemblages of biotech and pharmaceutical companies, doctors, genetic counselors, genomics 
researchers, biobankers, and patient groups, life has been re-considered as a boundary-object, 
whose elusiveness is never fully graspable by any single apparatus, but examinable infinitely 
through the new communicability between various individual and organizational actors 
converged at this common level of molecules. At the same time, these actors‘ collective and 
ethical concerns about life, namely its optimizations at multiple levels of individual healthcare, 
medical research, and pharmaceutical product, have begun to be discussed within a continuum 
of molecules, that is ―only one set of relays in complex, ramifying, and nonhierarchical 
networks, filiations, and connections‖ (p.130). Ceased to be ―a deep ontological reality‖ 
interpretable only from the symptoms on surfaces, life and its mythical depth have been 
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relocated in multilevel databases with lots of embedded orders and disorders. For its further 
optimization along these medico-pharmaceutical assemblages, individuals, as potential hosts of 
disorders, have also become responsible for subjecting their molecular compositions of bodies 
to the screening of ―pre-symptomatic diagnoses‖ before the disorders erupt with visible 
symptoms. Their genetic variations, potentially involved in unknown diseases lurking in their 
bodies, become manageable by the ―preventive interventions on a scale previously 
unimaginable‖ (p.89).  
The advent of wearable and implantable healthcare technologies has accelerated this 
molecularization of life by providing human hosts with digital shortcuts for their bioethical 
responsibility of reframing a body as a continuum of molecules. Any anomalous fluctuations of 
this continuum can now be automatically reported to doctors or genetic counselors as the smart 
healthcare devices successfully replace the healthcarers‘ task of monitoring ―physiological 
parameter and environmental conditions,‖ often ―manually executed by nursing staff‖ or patients 
themselves ―represent[ing], de facto, an efficiency bottleneck, which could be a cause of even 
tragic errors in practices‖ (Catarinucci et al., 2015, p.515). In a future scenario of smart 
healthcare (Stantchev et al., 2015), the smart objects embedded in a patient‘s body and room 
have been suggested to form a local network termed ―fog computing‖; whose early detection and 
transfer of elusive symptoms to ―the cloud‖ of Big Data for a bigger medical network would 
enable the better prediction of critical states of the patient even before actual interventions from 
human doctors.  
On the other hand, what the recent smart cities aim to digitalize through their distributed 
behavior tracking technologies is the more communal form of life, whose hosts can be termed 
―insurgent citizens.‖ The optimal future scenarios of the new urbanity that these citywide IoT 
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projects promise seem to arrive opportunely after the failure of the modernist urban planning, 
and seem to amend its once purely ―idealist project of alternative futures‖ (Holston, 1998, p.38). 
James Holston says that the modernist planning‘s top-down approach to an imaginary city, 
―present nowhere in the world but existing only in plans,‖ has failed as it has encountered the 
insurgent and nonconforming heterogeneity of what had already populated the city. In his 
―project of rethinking the social in planning,‖ this insurgence, however, also means a revelatory 
moment for ―a realm of the possible that is rooted in the heterogeneity of lived experience, which 
is to say, in the ethnographic present and not in utopian futures‖ (p.41, 53). For nonmodern 
planning, he says, it is necessary that the planners‘ ―ethnographic investigation‖ not only 
―establish[es] the terms by which residents participate in the planning of their communities‖ but 
extracts the most optimal option of possible futures already embedded in the heterogeneity of a 
city‘s material composition (p.53). The futurity of urban civilization and its pursuit of 
sustainability, after the failure of modernist planning, are, in this respect, also planned from a 
sort of flattened world: where the optimal near futures are not imposable by the verticality of 
planning, but emergent from the heterogeneous materiality of urban infrastructures, where all 
―the insurgent forms of the social‖ from the grassroots should be redirected and preempted by 
the planners‘ data-driven scenarios. Recently, the wireless sensor and actuator networks of smart 
cities have provided both planners and citizens with the digital shortcut for this ethnographic 
responsibility for ―tracing, observing, decoding, and tagging‖ everyday activities. In doing so, 
our sustainable future has become a problem of optimization by means of predicting and 
preventing possible negative incidents lurking in the grassroots. The recent research on the 
convertibility of smart cities into the military infrastructures for counterinsurgency (Michaelis, 
2018; Pradhan et al., 2018) can be in this context understood as an alibi which hides the 
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following fact: the optimal futures that the smart cities promise have always and already been 
based on a certain militarized understanding of urbanity under constant alternations between 
insurgent problems and counterinsurgent IoT solutions.   
From molecular to urban, the processes of life, neither hidden under surfaces nor 
programmed from above, have been relocated in a digital continuum. The multiple levels of our 
life-world have also been redefined from this continuum as software applications re-demarcate 
the digital domains of our smart clothes, home, office, vehicle, and city from the vital signals 
collected at multiple levels of molecular-physiological, individual-psychological, and collective-
statistical. This continuum lying between micro and macrosocial flows of life has accumulated a 
multitude of human and nonhuman histories within its flat and ever-expendable surface of Big 
Data, including individual records of medical history, people‘s online and offline behaviors, 
various indices for global and national economies, and records of environmental changes. The 
machine learning algorithms, which have appeared to be the most reliable oracles to extrapolate 
the possible near futures from these traces of the past in various durations, have also embedded 
lots of virtual objects in the continuum to excavate unknown correlations between these records. 
No matter how believable this assumption on a multitude of human domains overlapped at this 
digital substratum and correlated with each other, for the recent software industry, their 
convergence upon a continuum has been a sort of commercial necessity. It is because the Big 
Data-driven solutions of human problems the software industry has promised could have indeed 
attracted venture capital as the following assumption has been persuasive so far: any domains of 
human activities, seemingly discontinuous with each other, might be in fact correlated through 
certain parameters currently hidden from our understanding but able to be discovered sooner or 
later by data-mining; their being together in the world could therefore be optimized further. 
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Under this assumption, a discontinuity between human domains has been re-problematized by 
the industry‘s attempt to find their hidden correlations to figure out the optimal way to put them 
together on a continuum. However, as the best of all possible worlds of Big Data where these 
hidden correlations are all discovered and perfectly calibrated has ever been delayed to come 
(since it is just an utopian future), the continuum—as the multiplicity of domains complicatedly 
interrelated—has also been predicted, by the same industrial assumption, to be subject to the 
recurrent problems in various scales, from temporal information overloads and heavy traffics to 
cyber-terrorism and global climate change. Eventually, it becomes our common speculation: the 
future will be catastrophic unless the preemptive interventions of smart networks remove the 
trigger of this insurgency on the physical side before it really happens.  
The Oxford philosopher Nick Bostrom thus warns: ―there is some level of technology at 
which civilization almost certainly gets destroyed unless quite extraordinary and historically 
unprecedented degrees of preventive policing and/or global governance are implemented‖ (2019, 
p.3). Even though it sounds a little paranoid, his Vulnerable World Hypothesis would be still 
persuasive if we accept that being paranoid is the most certain way to be properly prepared for 
this catastrophic future, especially when any single incident could be potentially correlated with 
anything else on this continuum.  
 
Algorithmic Preemption of Futures 
Our life-world is now smarter than ever before and will only get smarter. Smartness is 
ever-renewable inasmuch as its conceptual counterpart, ubiquity of problems embedded in the 
material reality, is potentially inexhaustible too. Imagined to be full of pattern-recognition 
problems, this world is, Chris Anderson in Wired says, hardly representable by the ―obsolete‖ 
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scientific method of ―coherent models, unified theories, or really any mechanistic explanation at 
all.‖ Scientific representation may even be unnecessary as ―statistical algorithms [are able to] 
find patterns where science cannot,‖ without having any pre-given theoretical models (2008, 
June). Technology was once merely instrumental in knowledge production to demonstrate given 
premises, but it currently occupies a sort of transcendental position as its unsupervised learning 
can extract hidden features of data and reconstruct its operational environments, databases, into 
the intuitive form for the further algorithmic reasoning. This ―transcendental instrumentality‖ of 
technology redefines the current post-Kantian epistemology by making our subjective ends of 
knowledge production constantly renewed from ―procedural or algorithmic reasoning‖ of 
technological means. Some scholars such as Luciana Parisi thus suggest an optimistic view that 
we can take this ―as a chance [for humanities] to re-ally instrumentality with a political 
renaissance of media critique‖ (2020, p.121). However, reprogrammed by the capitalist ends of 
market penetration/expansion, this machine-driven knowledge production, ever-renewable 
through data-mining, seems to function as the new engine of software industry, whose primary 
goal is to discover a greater number of hidden problems to expand its service domains. As this 
technoscientific reconstruction of reality with machine-readable but human-inaccessible 
problems gradually expropriates our transcendental position in Kantianism, paranoiac 
speculation about these hidden problems would gradually remain as the only available mode of 
knowledge production for ordinary human users. 
In the now-common usages of the term smartness, sustainability and efficiency are the 
two most important criteria to measure how smart a network is at individuating urgent problems 
of a space and at reassembling optimal sensor-actuator interoperations as the proper solutions 
(Mohanty et al., 2016, August; Gabrys, 2014). Understanding these criteria differently, the smart 
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objects temporarily assembled into working sensor-actuator arcs for a given goal should preserve, 
within the transformed network, a large enough number of alternative sensor-actuator 
interoperations ready to be mobilized for the other functions. This balance between sustainability 
and efficiency—also what smart citizens need to internalize as the criteria for their everyday 
lives—is necessitated by the following assumption: any simple interactions of objects we trigger 
could be in hidden correlations with all the others either directly or indirectly because they share 
the same users and operational environments. According to this assumption, an object‘s 
activation that changes the states of its users and environments could changes the probabilities of 
all other objects‘ activations. If we can redefine smartness in the current context as the capability 
of finding the most efficient route to given goals out of the ecological complexity of correlations, 
the only smart decision we can make for the urgent needs in our daily life would be to put our 
life-world under the 24/7 surveillance of smart networks. It is because the non-linear 
consequences of the choices we make, potentially disruptive to the ecological diversity of other 
choices available in smart environments, are not recognizable to the naked eye. The smart futures 
constantly brought forth from these machinic routes chosen as the most efficient for the urgent 
needs should be simulated first by machine learning in advance to preempt its possible 
consequence on the ecological diversity of the networks. 
 In other words, for the sustainable future of our life, its physical stratum needs to be 
coupled with a digital double that preempts the near future of the original. Since we first agreed 
with the ―terms of use‖ about the smart objects tracking our daily practices, our everyday life has 
eventually begun to be overshadowed by this digital double. On the other hand, what the recent 
virtual assistant applications—such as Apple‘s Siri, Google Assistant, Amazon‘s Alexa, and 
other smart advisors for health, fitness, driving—aim to add to this digital continuum is an actual 
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dimension of time, which no longer just underlies but intrudes into our phenomenological 
experiences (Dawar, 2018). Their autonomous suggestions for the most optimal way to prepare 
for the future seem to push us to choose between two different responses to the passage of time, 
namely human protention and algorithmic preemption. And the rational answer to this either-or 
question would always be the latter given the asymmetry between humans and artificial 
intelligences: while the machine learning can analyze even human intentionality as a series of 
stochastic processes and integrate it into the digital continuum, humans are, unfortunately, 
blocked to access this continuum.  
 
Optimization of Human Worlds 
For Rose and Holston, the recent enterprises of life were descriptive of the circulation of 
this elusive and inexhaustible signal called life along the assemblages of loosely interconnected 
actors in various scales, and this circulation was supposed to bifurcate many temporal networks 
as each circuit to optimize life for individual healthcare, corporate expansion, academic research, 
and governmental control. For the constant innovation to happen and recreate these embedded 
networks in the assemblages, individuals were deemed to be responsible for molecularizing or 
digitalizing their own lives according to the protocols of pharmaceutical industries or urban 
ethnography. In the age of the Internet of Things, we witness that this bioethical responsibility—
to communicate life through the networks—provides an alibi to hide an exploitive mode of smart 
objects as their operation to extract behavioral data from people‘s everyday lives pretends to 
serve for people‘s smart citizenship. These devices‘ secret transmission of user data, or people‘s 
quantified-selves (Ruckenstein & Pantzar, 2017), to commercial networks seeks for ethical 
excuses from the fact that to minimize delays in data transmission is a prerequisite for optimizing 
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people‘s life in smart environments. The camouflaged forms of protocols for the devices‘ access 
to people‘s quantified-selves may provide another excuse as it is now simplified along people‘s 
everyday practices, such as wearing smart clothes, watches, glasses, using smart plugs for every 
home appliance, and agreeing with terms of use for these gadgets.  
However, the necessity to put our everyday lives under the surveillance of smart objects 
is not something merely fabricated by consumerist campaigns for the optimal future around the 
corner. This necessity is rather internalized through our speculation about the changed condition 
of subjectivity after the revelation of humans‘ asymmetrical engagement in the world full of non-
linear problems beyond their understanding. For instance, under multiple wearable sensors 
embedded in our surroundings, what reappear foremost to be populated by these sorts of 
problems would be our own secret selves, inaccessible by the wearer‘s intentional self-
understanding. The ethical issue concerning the recent quantified-self may, in this respect, not be 
simply about its possibility to be sold to the outside parties without user consents. The more 
significant issue could involve corporates‘ possible exploitation of the concerns of audiences 
about their inaccessibility to their own nonconscious and quantifiable selves. As Cellary and 
Rykowski point out, one important purpose of service providers in collecting user data is 
―identifying the susceptibility of a person to arguments and proposals‖ about his/her unknown 
needs and problems, which ―an aggressive marketing attack‖ of software industry says their 
algorithms has already detected (2015, p.S19). The primary goal of the recent data-driven 
behavioral economics is most of all to target this ―consumer vulnerability‖ (Nadlere & 
McGuigan, 2017). No matter how ―annoying and unwanted‖ their suggestions of life-changing 
solutions seem to be, to ignore them would be no easy if our consciousness can recognize our 
own needs only with a significant delay, at least several milliseconds or a ―missing half-second,‖ 
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the missing time where what Mark Hansen calls ―twenty-first-century media‖ (2015) found its 
most functional niche for its early warning system for lurking problems. 
For the Internet of Things to expand its service domains to a greater variety of people‘s 
everyday activities, it is thus necessary to draw their participations in the network by asking their 
voluntary delegation of the control over their surroundings. This paradoxical form of user 
engagement becomes plausible in a certain discursive practice users perform: speculation about 
the world full of hidden problems beyond their accessibility and subsequent speculative 
investment in the preemptive power of smart objects. This discursive and economic process of 
speculation has recently been internalized and intensified by the following questions the smart 
technologies seem to ask. Do you still have control over the technologies? Can you still put your 
surroundings under the changes that you can predict? In short, are you still media users? If we 
can still say yes to all these questions, it would be only because we have already delegated our 
rights as tool users, which we have unfairly monopolized for a long time, to the media objects 
themselves who are smart enough to employ each other for their predictions of our needs (Kahn 
et al., 1999, §4.2). The modernist planners of life may finally be at home when its smart interior 
is automatically transformed into the optimal future states that the modernists wanted to bring 
into reality without having actual physical contact with worldly objects. The personalization of 
media interfaces has recently realized this modernist dream of spatial optimization by displaying 
the most probable futures their registered users would purchase or ―Like,‖ such as the promise 
for the constant lifestyle improvement that the consumer goods Amazon recommends would 
bring in your life, or your imagined future neighbors gathered around a similar political 
inclination by Facebook and Twitter. It has however been done through dragging the modernist 
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planner down to the material bottom where his transcendental subject is dissolved into a multi-
dimensional dataset called quantified-self.  
Embedded in its social network pages as well as potentially any external webpages, 
Facebook‘s recent Social Plugins, such buttons as ―Like,‖ ―Share,‖ ―Send,‖ and ―Quote,‖ expand 
its domain for web-personalization even to a person‘s online activities outside the platform. 
Modularizing the Web 2.0-style user participation, these virtual objects on the current internet 
afford more engaged user experiences through a simple motor activity of clicking. However, 
what Facebook really intends through this generalized participatory web would be not simply to 
make the web more democratic, but to train its personalization algorithm further for an 
imaginary future it has dreamt of: the future where Facebook‘s background operation to filter 
and redisplay the entire web on behalf of its users would eventually substitute for connection-
making practices in a Web 1.0 fashion, once performed all by conscious decisions of individual 
users along the hyperlinks individual web designers created. In other words, ―beyond the 
hyperlink,‖ the new fabric of the web would be written not so much by actual links formed by 
user performances but the algorithmic calculation of the probability that the links happen (Gerlitz 
& Helmond, 2013, p.1358). If this object-oriented approach to personalization has secretly been 
experimented on the web using virtual objects called Social Plugins, the recent miniaturization of 
smart sensors, processors, actuators, and their attachment to physical objects such as the ―things‖ 
in the Internet of Things make this approach applicable to a physical domain too. In a new 
domestic space called smart home, our idealized smart life would be unfolded by the 
autonomous interoperations of manifold smart devices, which would substitute for a linear 
trajectory of a tenant‘s roaming around a space for manually turning them on and off. The smart 
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appliances‘ algorithmic preemption of our intention to interact with them would rewrite the 
fabric of our lives.  
Eli Pariser (2011) says the ―filter bubble‖ now encapsulates each media user in one‘s 
new domestic setting. Passing through its filtering, the non-linear continuum of digital signals in 
the web reappears to be continuous again to the linear trajectory of our online and offline 
behaviors. In return for this customized enclave in which our still-too-modern projection of 
futures seems to be compensated, we are responsible for making our everyday activities tracked 
by flexible rearrangements of smart objects around us. Our degree of freedom is believed to be 
guaranteed most in this customized inside. However, the freedom measured in quantifiable 
degrees is inevitably proportional to the number of algorithmic objects available for our 
interactions. These objects are often hidden in the peripheries of our attention in order to more 
secretly activate each other according to their prediction of our urgent needs, but, when needed, 
they pop up in the user-friendly interfaces to sample our novel responses from our fingertip or 
mouse pointer, drawing a new trajectory as an index of our novel intention as yet unregistered. 
Our ―free will‖ is constantly displayed into these network figures and fed-back as new inputs to 
train machine-learning algorithms for their better prediction of our more desired near futures. 
 
Three Sets of Questions 
Re-enfolding our everyday routines around their flexible sensor-actuator networks, the 
smart objects therefore redefine the spatiality of our smart lives. As these networks constantly 
unravel a thread of optimal near futures out of the non-linear fluctuations of a digital continuum 
(or the digital footprints of the ubiquitous human-to-machine and machine-to-machine 
interactions transpiring in a space), the temporality of our smart lives is also redefined. From this 
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diagnosis of the current state of humanity in the new regime of surveillance and governmentality, 
this dissertation infers the following sets of critical questions.  
 
1. Questions on the state of the object as an intersection of intellectual histories of the 
West: How has the object-oriented modeling of environments, first suggested as a new 
paradigm of computer programming in the 1970s, been applied to the real-world through 
the distribution of smart objects? How has it been chosen by capitalism as a new strategy 
of market penetration? What is the meaning of its coincidence with the recent 
philosophical discourses on the object-oriented ontologies? 
 
Object as the conceptual counterpart of subject has multiple genealogies. Two symbolic 
moments in its philosophical history can be recalled to elucidate computer science‘s recent 
appropriation of object in such concepts of object-oriented programming and semantic web 
(Knublauch et al., 2006). Kantian bifurcation between noumenon and phenomenon, or the thing-
in-itself and thing-to-human, was the moment in the history of Western intellectuality that the 
human subject officially earned its exclusive right to define objects as subjective constructions. 
As Daston and Galison point out, since the post-Kantian application of subject/object binary in 
the eighteenth-century‘s scientific practices, objectivity has been understood as something ready 
to respond to human interventions no matter how many degrees of freedom have been allowed 
for ―a scientific subject‖—throughout its changed personae from the ―sage‖ who selects and 
synthesizes reasoned images of objects, to the ―worker‖ who transfers mechanical images of 
objects according to automatized protocols, to an ―expert‖ trained for pattern recognition to 
create interpreted images of objects (2007, p.371). On the other hand, Heideggerian distinction 
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between thing and object represents an inflection point in this genealogy, from which the objects, 
once considered mere building blocks in a subjective construction, eventually reveal their 
thingness or their own way of being in the world to the audiences, who keep an aesthetic distance 
to the objects ceasing to be instrumentalist of objects (Heidegger, 1967).  
Since computer science in the 1970s took object as the name for the algorithmic building 
block of computer programming, the operational closure of a software application (or its 
execution for a given problem and turning back to the initial state ready for another problem) has 
seemed to follow a Kantian tradition. This is shown through the fact that a program‘s successful 
operation has depended on the programmer‘s coherent categorization of the objects in a source 
code in a way that their operations, initiated by their exposure to the environments, namely user 
inputs or databases, are seamlessly interconnected in the intended order. As the digital avatars of 
Kantian categories, objects have, in this sense, projected human reason over a digital continuum 
that was localizable in each hardwired circuit board of a personal computer. On the other hand, 
the recent liberation of the objects from a hardwired application and their autonomous 
networking along the semantic web and other IoT protocols seem to operationalize the 
Heideggerian thingness. It has been raised as an important goal in the recent computer 
engineering to redefine each object by its own beliefs, desires, and intentions ―at its core,‖ or by 
its singular ―attempt to achieve its individual objectives without being forced to perform 
potentially distracting actions simply because they are requested by some external entity‖ 
(Jennings, 2000, pp.282-4). For instance, the semantic web-based programming aims to design 
the protocols for the algorithmic agents to ―collect, filter and process information found on the 
Web‖ to accomplish their own goals ―sometimes with the help of other agents‖ but ―without 
direct human control or constant supervision‖ (Berners-Lee et al., 2002, p.27). This signifies a 
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sort of Heideggerian turn in computer science‘s ontological modeling of the digital continuum 
underlying algorithmic culture. Our digitally augmented reality is now constructed not only by 
the projection of human reason but by the ―interobjective relations‖ generated through the 
queries and answers the smart objects exchange with one another (Hui, 2016, p.160).  
Contrary to the aesthetic disinterestedness of Heideggerian art viewers, this engineering 
concern for each object‘s way of being in the digital world is, however, still instrumentalist as it 
represents the software industry‘s tendency to expand its field of application beyond its previous 
domain once preprogrammed all by humans. In order to discover more domains, which can be 
concretized and managed better through the autonomous interoperations of objects, we should 
beware of impatiently projecting our limited goals upon the networks. In this dissertation‘s quest 
for contextualizing the coincidence of these autonomous objects both in the recent engineering 
and philosophical discourses, their autonomy in constructing inter-objective realities would turn 
out to be resonant with the desire of the new media and software industries: the expansion of 
their service domains even to the hidden realities of objects hitherto thought to be the domains of 
disinterested and philosophical speculation.  
 
2. Questions on the topological definition of a space and its problematic hidden levels: 
How do the object-oriented systems transform their operational environments into the 
world of ubiquitous problems, inaccessible by humans and thus necessitating the 
preemptive interventions of the networked smart objects? What is the rational decision 
for humans to deal with this sort of asymmetry? What kind of techniques do they need 




It is now a topological issue how the spaces never fully enclosed by any human efforts 
(of modernist urban planners, ethnographers, transcendental subjects, and so forth) can, on the 
other hand, be transformed into many different states as each different set of smart objects 
constantly re-folds the spaces. As a study on the invariant properties of a space under certain 
transformations, topology, repurposed as a media theory, focuses on the hidden levels of 
functional relations a continuum embeds among its elements, and examines what kinds of 
transformations the sensor-actuator arcs of smart objects bring in the continuum to unfold these 
hidden levels. In this framework, the latency of problems, which the IoT advertises as what its 
ubiquitous computing could manage most optimally, can be understood as the embeddedness of 
the problems in mutually incommensurable levels of the same continuum, or database. Put 
differently, each lurking problem can be foregrounded as something invariant or orderly-variant 
under a certain sensor-actuator arc assembled by a specific software application.  
The American philosopher Robert Nozick defines objectivity as ―a property or 
relationship … invariant under the appropriate transformations.‖ In his topological view, the 
reality is not constructed by any a priori and ―independent criterion to specify which 
transformations something must be invariant under in order to be objective‖ (2001, p.79). For 
Nozick, the ―stepwise process‖ that science protocolized for the last century was the process to 
update or renew the list of more fundamental and ―admissible transformations‖ of reality in 
laboratories, only the properties observed invariant under which could be survived as still 
objective. The evolutionary history of science for him is thus the approach to a general set of 
transformations to survive and be selected as defining the objectiveness in a given scientific 
paradigm. On the other hand, the current state of scientific methods ―better suited to a narrower 
variety of worlds‖ seems to break down a single and universal reality, once believed to be bound 
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by a single general set of transformations, into lots of incommensurable levels, each of which is 
invariant only under a separate set of admissible transformations in different disciplines (p.80, 
115-16). From one level of invariance to another, the actual world stratified by these scientific 
methods in turn appears to be ―linked by manageable problems,‖ which are ―partitionable into 
separate topics‖ and thus representable as ―questions that can be answered separately‖ (p.116). 
This feature of space potentially differentiable into a multitude of problem spaces is what the 
Internet of Things recently commodifies through its wireless sensor and actuator networks. As a 
technique to manage ubiquitous problems, the IoT fathoms a space along each different 
transformation it transmits to make each problem appear invariant and manageable separately. In 
this sense, humans‘ inaccessibility to these kinds of embedded problems is not due to an excess 
of problems for humans to manage but because humans cannot live all different and 
incommensurable levels of the space simultaneously.  
For a human user of smart wearable health devices, it may no longer be enough to think 
of her body as a physiological continuum with a single molecular level. She also needs to allow 
the software applications to access both her body and social networks to re-differentiate the 
continuum of her body into multiple levels of her nonconscious, conscious, and social habits, 
accessible exclusively by each different smart application. She needs to assume that there always 
remains something problematic in the boundary-breaking or symmetry-breaking relations 
between these incommensurable levels (DeLanda, 2002). In order to be prepared properly for 
these invisible and ubiquitous risks, she needs to imagine her own body and its surroundings as 
topological objects with lots of hidden levels that can be constantly re-bifurcated and thus always 




3. Questions on the translation between human and nonhuman: How do the user-friendly 
interfaces for these smart objects redefine our cultural and everyday activities as the 
processes through which we reassemble the algorithmic objects available in the 
surroundings into the networks to achieve our temporal goals, as videogamers habitually 
do? How does it become a human responsibility to rethink every goal-oriented behavior 
in terms of networking strategies as actor-network theory teaches us? How does this 
responsibility, also functioning as the protocol for human-object communications, 
translate our intentional or purposeless activities into the computational problems of 
pattern recognition?  
 
This last set of questions is about the state of cultures embedded within a digital 
continuum. The recent popularization of the intuitive and interactive interface designs is 
characterized by the proliferation of virtual objects on a screen. Representing each modular 
function of algorithms, these objects ready-to-hand for our convenient manipulation function to 
interface the digital continuum beyond our reach back into a local platform for our present goals. 
However, the self-empowerment that the users experience in an interface is (especially in the 
recent videogame genre termed open-world in Chapter 3 of this dissertation) not realized simply 
by the huge number of available objects for their instrumental needs but, more importantly, 
through the potentially unrestricted ways to network and re-network them for different goals. As 
much as their flexible networkability formally guarantees the end-users‘ creative repurposing of 
assemblages, the actual networks assembled among the objects by user activities also provide the 
machine learning algorithms with an effective means to translate various goal-oriented user 
behaviors into recognizable patterns.  
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These ready-to-hand graphical objects are, as a user attends to them on a screen and 
responds with input devices such as a mouse, also embedded habitually in the neurophysiological 
continuum of the user: the continuum black-boxed in-between his/her field of perception and 
motor responses. The user behaviors these objects afford are, as Lury and Day say, thus 
inevitably transitive since they are the ―activities in which objects are repeatedly attached to 
persons,‖ just as it happens even in the simplest communicative act of ―Like,‖ initiated from 
perceiving an interactive object on a screen and terminated by clicking it (2019, p.28). Through 
these objects‘ embedment in a user‘s somatic sensors and actuators, a person‘s 
neurophysiological continuum in the middle is gradually differentiated into a multiplicity of 
sensor-actuator arcs in different levels; such as reflexive, intentional, cultural, political, and 
consumerist levels of one‘s behavioral responses to the stimuli and information. As the centers of 
indetermination at each local fold of the digital continuum, humans are in this sense responsible 
for re-differentiating their own neurophysiological continua constantly into various sub-domains 
compatible with digital networks. 
 
In this dissertation, the above questions on the objects‘ mode of being in different 
domains—such as source codes of computer programing, a speculative reality in philosophy, and 
user-interfaces of software industry—are converging upon a common ground called the Internet 
of Things. From these resurgent and coincident interests in objects, this study rediscovers the 
recent post-humanist theorization of nonhumans, and rearticulates it as a new capitalist ideology 
in the age of its finer-grained extraction of vitality.  
After the wane of the grand-narrative of the Enlightenment and its self-reflexive turn to 
its own epistemological limit, the reality as a Kantian concept has reached an impasse where its 
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ideal for the self-closure falls in the constant ruptures and sutures around a slippery object called 
totality—Object with a capital ―O,‖ never fully graspable by any subjective discourses. The 
autonomy of nonhumans, meaning their own ways of being in the world by constructing their 
own inter-objective reality, seems to have in this sense been soft-landed as the next big thing in 
the critical theories, at the end of the post-modernist conclusion on the fate of humanity doomed 
to be alienated in monadic universes communicating one another only through their failed 
cognitive mapping (Jameson, 1992; Luhmann, 1992). In this context, humanities‘ recent concern 
for the autonomy of objects, such as the actants in actor-network theory, vibrant matters in 
Bennet‘s new materialism, and objects in object-oriented ontology, could be understood as an 
apologetic gesture to the nonhumans about our arrogance of having reduced them to mere 
building blocks for our subjective construction of reality. However, as Andrejevic acutely points 
out, what these theories hide under their humbleness is the resonance of their emphasis on ―the 
agency of things‖ with the current popularity of conspiracy theory; in that both provide a 
convenient shortcut for thinking about the totality beyond human understanding in the time when 
the inaccessibility to the truth becomes our natural condition for the politics of ―post-
referenciality‖ (2013, p.268).  
Drawing new attention to another resonance that these theories exert to the object-
oriented ontology as the protocol for the IoT, this dissertation instead examines how this 
deadlock of the Enlightenment is actually what many ―smart‖ projects today need to enlighten 
their consumers and citizens about. Making us believe that our attempt to enlighten surroundings 
would be inevitably failed is what these smart projects may need to do first in order to divert our 
attention from epistemology to ontology. From one field, which the past century of the western 
intellectuality demonstrated as guaranteeing nothing sure about our knowledge on the world and 
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self, to another, which begins to be re-written by the intensive machine-to-machine 
communications suggestive of lots of unknown problems beyond our reach. In short, ideology is 
no longer something to believe, but something to speculate. Speculation about the agency of 
things is more than an easy answer to the totality beyond human referenciality. It is rather an 
urgent need, or a rational wager to keep our subjective reality sustainable against hidden dangers 
asymmetrical to human reason. The object-oriented ontology in the recent humanities discourses 
has been in this sense popularized most of all as the ideological means to justify the urgency of 
our rational decision to hand over the right to manage our own body, home, office, and city to 




This dissertation addresses these genealogical, ontological, and ethical issues of smart 
objects through four different media examples: an IoT-based intelligent navigation system, smart 
home, open-world videogame, and a neuro-prosthetic apparatus.  
Chapter 1 discusses a smart navigation system AIDA (Affective Intelligent Driving 
Agent), which MIT‘s Senseable City Lab and Audi co-developed, as an intersection of various 
object-oriented ideas appearing in the recent trends in engineering, philosophical, and 
consumerist modeling of reality. The Internet of Things in this chapter is examined as the 
operationalization of what some recent realist philosophers call a flat ontology. Departing from 
the anthropocentric correlationism that stipulates objects only as building blocks for the 
subjective construction of reality, these philosophers suggest another way of modeling reality in 
which every object stands on a same ontological footing with equal right not to be ―treated as 
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constructed by another object‖ and ―contribute to collectives or assemblages to a greater and 
lesser degree‖ (Bryant, 2012, p.19). As Galloway points out (2013), these philosophical 
discourses coincide with the recent trend in the automation of algorithmic systems, which drag 
humans down to a material platform as the hosts of vital signals that machines communicate. 
This chapter focuses on the Internet of Things as a peculiar commodity form where these 
nonhuman realities for philosophical speculation and computer engineering intersect.   
Chapter 2 searches for the way to redirect topology as a tool to describe the spaces 
enmeshed by the networks of smart objects. Media studies‘ recent interest in topology focuses on 
how today‘s networked infrastructures transform our places of cultural practices into a 
continuum of digital signals. Interconnecting various physical entities and smart devices in a 
regional domain, the smart home also transforms today‘s domestic interior into a topological 
continuum. This chapter appropriates the mathematical concept of manifold from Bernhard 
Riemann‘s differential geometry and Henri Poincaré‘s group theory to examine how this 
topological continuum redefines today‘s domestic interior as full of problematic relations that 
can be commodified into the form of smart applications.  
Chapter 3 examines the recent videogame genre called open-world as a prototype of the 
cultural interface in the age of the Internet of Things. A game space in this genre is built up of 
manifold algorithmic objects, from non-playable human characters (NPC) to environmental 
objects such as animals, trees, rocks and other items. These objects, distributed over a world map 
and interconnected according to their own way of responding to the surroundings, redefine the 
rules of videogaming by providing gamers with a greater degree of freedom to network and 
repurpose nearby objects for their own goals with minimal restrictions from above. An open-
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world gamer is thus responsible for operationalizing his/her cultural interests such as narrative or 
ludic experiences of gaming into a form of network strategy. 
Chapter 4 continues the discussion on the state of human subjectivity and responsibility 
in network culture, but with an unorthodox example of a primate videogamer in a laboratory. 
Brain-Machine Interface (BMI) is a neuroprosthetic apparatus developed by the Nicolelis Lab at 
Duke University. As a machine to translate the neural signals collected from the electrodes 
embedded in a brain into machine-readable motor intentions, BMI as a local laboratory network 
consists of several human and nonhuman actors: brain cells, electrodes, filtering and pattern 
recognition algorithms, gaming devices, biological limbs, robotic limbs, and human 
researchers/trainers. Long before its public debut with a human user in the opening ceremony of 
2017 FIFA World Cup in Brazil, the Nicolelis Lab has experimented the adaptability of their 
brain-machine interfaces to various designs of gaming devices and robotic limbs, not only to 
translate the more variety of motor intentions from brains into machine-readable signals, but also 
to translate various interests of social actors outside the lab—such as the patient groups, 
scientists in multiple disciplines, governments, robot industries, and medical institutions—into 
the things that would be serviceable through this laboratorial Internet of Things in the near future. 
As an actor-network analysis of an experimental case of the IoT, Chapter 4 focuses on 
the uncertainties that characterized the actual relations between the nonhuman actors right before 
they eventually have formed a working network. The public demonstrations of BMI as ―ready-
made‖ should have concealed or black-boxed these moments of uncertainty. But the expansion 
of its intra-lab and inter-lab networks for the last two decades have also been repeatedly haunted 
by uncertainties as the lab has attempted to integrate a greater number of not-yet-ready actors, 
both humans and nonhumans, into its experimental Internet of Things. Many expected or 
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unexpected disjunctions have occurred within this laboratorial network, and, for its ―economy of 
hope‖ to expand to the more variety of its future applications (Novas, 2006), the disjunctions 
should be properly managed and re-wired constantly.  
Taking these disjunctions or intervals between actors—their sensors and actuators—also 
as what assemble this dissertation, the somewhat arbitrary order of Chapters could be seen as 
organized along its implicit narrative to follow the discovery of these disjunctions in a smart car, 
their commodification in a smart home, their being a constructive principle of the open-world in 
virtual reality, and their becoming building-blocks for our smart future. As Chapter 1 will discuss, 
the Internet of Things is most of all a network of these ubiquitous intervals, whose open-ended 
re-assemblages provide the media industries with a utopian platform for their instable hope for 















CHAPTER 1: HOW ONTOLOGY IS WRITTEN  
IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET OF THINGS 
 
The wide distribution of microsensors, processors, and actuators into our environments 
during the last decade has changed the information economy of the Internet. According to Kevin 
Ashton, who coined the term Internet of Things (IoT), before the intervention of these small 
machines, the Internet was ―almost wholly dependent on‖ the data ―first captured and created by 
human beings—by typing, pressing a record button, taking a digital picture or scanning a bar 
code.‖ Replacing humans‘ ―limited time, attention and accuracy,‖ which are ―not very good at 
capturing data about things in the real world,‖ the IoT has been developed as a platform for these 
things to expand their online presence by overcoming ―the limitation of human-entered data‖ 
with thing-generated data, communicated in frequencies inaudible to humans (Ashton, 2009, 
June). Through their further miniaturization and attachment to various natural and technical 
objects, thing-generated data becomes extractable not only from smart appliances such as 
refrigerators and smartphones responding to users and environments, but from the 
territorial/migratory behaviors of animals (Gabrys, 2016a) and physiological patterns of human 
organs (Parisi, 2009). Just as the digital remediates the incompatibility of analog signals through 
its binary codes (Bolter & Grusin, 1999), the attachment of these smart entities relocates objects 
from different contexts to the same communicational platform.  
At the same time, actor-network theory (ANT) has been introduced in media studies as a 
critical tool to rethink the conventional boundaries of subject/object, human/nonhuman, 
cultural/natural, social/technological categories. Actor-network theory has taught us that these 
categories are not higher orders or contexts that define the legitimate places of things in 
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hierarchies, and showed us how the categories can be resolved back into each thing‘s way of 
influencing others or their mutual engagements. The IoT‘s ―new sensor/processor/actuator 
affiliations‖ (Crandall, 2010, pp.83-4) expose hidden actor-networks of objects in our life world, 
once black-boxed by the habitual contexts of our uses of them as the only definitive typology of 
their use values. As these objects are now enrolled in a non-hierarchal communication structure 
of the IoT, the contexts of their human uses are also ―unboxed‖ and their usefulness is re-
measured in a digital network, not so much for their contribution to our self-imposed goals, but 
for the network‘s prediction of human purposes.  
Marx thought of the use value of commodities as realizable only through their 
consumption for human needs at ―a terminal point‖ of exchange (1993, p.89), such as one‘s non-
smart home. But in the IoT and its domestic application called smart home, value is conversely 
concretized by the exchange of thing-generated signals between the smart objects, whose 
smartness is often advertised as the ability to detect the urgent needs of users even before the 
users recognize their own needs. John Law says that a black box can be reopened only by the 
appearance of ―a stronger adversary, one better able to associate elements‖ (2012, p.111). 
According to this ―principle of symmetry,‖ the IoT would also unbox the previous contexts of 
the human uses of nonhuman beings, or their monopoly of the right to define the functionality of 
objects, since the IoT is more capable than humans of associating smart objects together into 
networks that address human needs. The human consumption of commodities ―not only as a 
terminal point but also as an end-in-itself‖ was for Marx something easily put aside as ―outside 
economics except in so far as it [what they reproduce namely living labor] reacts in turn upon the 
point of departure and initiates the whole process anew‖ in the labor market (1993, p.89). This 
reductionist interpretation of use value based entirely on human ―needs as biologically given and 
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the natural (Dant, 1996, p.501) has been denaturalized by cultural critics such as Baudrillard, 
whose unboxing of human needs and desires out of ―pure, natural, asocial‖ cocoons has relocated 
the concept of use value to ―a system of relations of difference with other objects‖ (p.504; 
Baudrillard, 1981). While this revisionist view of use value as ―a fetishized social relation just as 
much as exchange-value‖ (504) still defines the social exclusively as human construction,
3
 the 
IoT—as one of the most advanced commodity forms today—pushes its users to agree with its 
―terms of use,‖ which suggest why humans should delegate their right to use objects for their 
needs to smart objects better at activating themselves in the most customized way to human 
needs. If outside economics in the Marxian sense has been preserved in domestic space for our 
inalienable right as tool users, this delegation of human right reopens and reconnects these 
spaces, renamed ―smart homes,‖ to the economy of digital signals. Humans are the only smart 
beings whose access to this hidden economy is denied; other smart objects freely exchange 
queries and answers about their not-smart-enough human hosts. 
This actor-network description of the IoT and its reversed user-object relation lead us to 
a ―structure of ontological systems‖ characterized by the radical liquidation of any hierarchies 
among things: a world-view that recent realist philosophers, or speculative realists such as 
                                                 
3
 Fetishism in this Marxian context has been consistently defined as the misimposed value of object-in-
itself, which can be analyzed as the social relations congealed around the object. Arjun Appadurai instead 
takes fetishism as his methodology for ―a corrective to the tendency to excessively sociologize 
transactions in things‖ (1986, p.5). But even in his ―methodological fetishism,‖ the values of objects are 
subject to a multitude of local contexts of symbolic transactions, despite their irreducibility to the global 
capitalist economy.  
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Quentin Meillassoux, Graham Harman, and Levi Bryant, call flat ontology.
4
 This chapter 
instead examines this ontology of objects as something resonant with the recent media industry‘s 
attempt to expand its domains even to the speculative realities of autonomous objects. Despite 
these philosophers‘ inattentiveness to software businesses, the use of the term ontology in 
computer science as the protocol for machine-to-machine communication
5
 indicates a sort of 
commercial necessity for objects to be defined not by human use and access, but through their 
mutual nonhuman uses and inter-operations. For these philosophers, the autonomy of objects is 
required for ―absolute truth‖ and reality to be redeemed from their subjective construction in 
anthropocentric ―correlationism‖ (Meillassoux, 2008, p.5). But for the IoT, the autonomy of 
objects is required for problems inaccessible to humans to be managed instead by their 
environment-sensitive operations. The Internet of Things in this sense provides a starting point 
for a critical inquiry into the question Galloway once posed about ―a coincidence between the 
structure of ontological systems and the structure of the most highly evolved technologies of 
post-Fordist capitalism‖ (2013, p.347).  
To re-contextualize this coincidence, this chapter focuses on how the architectures of 
algorithmic systems have changed over the past few decades as programmers and users have 
                                                 
4
 For ―flat ontology‖ in their speculative realism see Bryant, 2011; Bogost, 2012. For Galloway‘s 
criticism of flat ontology as the ―structure of ontological systems‖ in the recent software businesses, see 
Galloway, 2013, p.347. 
5
 Gruber suggests ontology as an engineering term for ―knowledge-level protocols‖ between AI systems, 
each of which is distinguished by its own ―symbolic-level‖ of representation about their own 
environments. The role of ontology is not to organize a single globally shared theory for all different 
representations to adjust. It rather aims to provide the languages for an output of a system to be translated 
into the input for another to maximize the interoperability and communicability between the systems 
(1991). See Intermission 1 of this dissertation. 
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delegated more control over a system‘s operational environments to its algorithmic objects, 
which are better able to associate themselves into a more optimal collective state to respond to 
their environment. It then discusses two cases of algorithmic systems that concern this change: 
Herman Melville‘s Bartleby, the Scrivener: A Story of Wall-street and the MIT Sensible City 
Lab‘s Affective Intelligent Driving Agent. The justification for this unorthodox comparison of a 
literary work and a media application can be found in the story‘s problematic character, Bartleby. 
In Marxist criticism of the last century, Bartleby has been understood as the ―perfect exemplum‖ 
of dehumanized workers under industrial capitalism, whose existence as living labor has no other 
choice for realization than to participate in commodity exchange. The story restages this through 
its algorithmic distribution of ―speculative-conditional‖ statements or the ―logic of the ‗if…then‘ 
statement‖ to define his possible uses in certain conditions of an office (Reed, 2004, p.258). 
Bartleby‘s famous response, ―I would prefer not to,‖ has been interpreted in this context as a 
gesture ―to get out of circulation entirely‖ to the ―space outside or beyond circulation,‖ never 
achievable ―except, of course, through death‖ (p.266). However, what this reading of his gesture, 
delayed by one-and-half centuries, focuses not on his suicidal exit to the ―humanity‖ outside 
commodity exchange, but on his sneaking into the edges of an employer‘s algorithmic human 
resource distribution. Put differently, Bartleby‘s withdrawal to the peripheries of commodity 
exchange is interpreted ―in the era of computerized capitalism‖ as a gesture 
to nonhumanize himself as an office object not ontologically superior to other office supplies 
with which he persists in creating a secret network of nonhumans unseen by the employer 
(Galloway, 2013, p.362). Redefined as one of these objects whose inter-operations retrieve the 
office from the human employer‘s exclusive use of nonhumans, Bartleby reminds us of the 
objects that prevail in recent smart offices. As I will discuss in the following section, these 
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objects are the building blocks of today‘s algorithmic culture, which construct both ontologies 
for those nonhumans and the most customized interface for humans under digital capitalism. 
 
From Determination to Agencies 
As digital infrastructures become increasingly networked, media studies‘ focus on their 
ability to re-organize media environments has also shifted. Affordance in media studies was once 
descriptive of media‘s function to program ―the possibilities in the world for how an agent (a 
person, animal, or machine) can interact with something‖ (Norman, 1988, p.18), but it seems 
more important now to study the way undetermined actions afforded to such agents can update 
and contribute to the functionality of a network. For instance, in 1986, Friedrich Kittler 
anticipated that the IF-THEN commands in computer languages would substitute for the 
symbolic order of human discourses as these ―conditional jump instructions‖ would translate 
one‘s free will into a cybernetic servo-mechanism. For Kittler, the IF-THEN command 
represents the computational logic of the early cybernetics, which analyzed human behaviors, 
including language, as ―cruise missile‖-like variables whose linear trajectories are conditioned by 
simple feedback loops executable in a linear manner (1999, p.258). In contrast, what Katherine 
Hayles calls ―a cognitive assemblage‖ describes how today‘s technical infrastructures consist of 
many autonomous ―technical cognizers‖ controlling the objects that behave like ―highly mobile 
and flexible insurgents and ‗terrorists‘‖ (2017, p.132).
6
 Distributed in a swarm-like state, the 
                                                 
6
 These objects and object-like users may be modeled best as the actor in the term actor-network, not an 
―individual atom‖ hyphenated to a network in a deterministic way, but a ―circulating entity‖ that draws 
many hyphens to ―hook up with‖ each other for both specifying its local agency and organizing global 
structure (Latour, 1999, pp.17-8). For these actors, ―a substrata: something upon which something else 
‗runs‘ or ‗operates‘‖ is no longer a proper metaphor for infrastructures; rather, technological 
infrastructures are installed as communication protocols for these circulating entities to modularize their 
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modularity of these interoperable agents is designed to form an assemblage flexible enough not 
only to adapt to the changeable environments—like the US military ―drone swarms‖ targeting 
actual human guerillas—but also to cultivate the things enmeshed by its environmental sensors 
into the nodes of a potential network. In Frans van der Helm‘s media performance MeMachine, 
for instance, a human body in ―a high-tech data suit outfitted with sensors‖ such as 
electrocardiography (ECG), electromyography (EMG), and electroencephalography (EEG) is 
transformed into an object as a source of manifold vital signals that organize these technical 
cognizers into a network (ARlab, 2013, August 13; Hayles, 2017, pp.129-30). This change in the 
character of media affordance over recent decades, also coincident with the relocation of humans 
in digital infrastructures from outside-facing (facing the user) to inside-facing (as hosts for 
machine-readable signals), has been spurred not simply by the users and objects becoming too 
elusive to be caught in IF-THEN commands. It rather reflects the media industry‘s need to 
disturb the traditional boundaries between human-subject and nonhuman-object in order to 
dispatch their machinic cognizers into a larger number of still-unexcavated human problems, and 
to market their possible solutions through the interoperations of these cognizers. As much as the 
ubiquitous dangers of guerilla-like intelligences have presented problems to which a military 
network can respond, smart clothes have conversely transformed wearers‘ bodies into things full 
of ubiquitous problems manageable only through the network computing of microprocessors 
under their fabrics (Andrejevic, 2005). This twofold goal in engineering, namely to redefine 
problems to justify algorithmic solutions, has transformed human bodies and behaviors into 
research objects in the same communicational layer with smart objects and appliances. A 
                                                                                                                                                             
―local practices afforded by a larger-scale technology‖ into the functions ―which can then be used in a 
natural, ready-to-hand fashion‖ by others (Star & Ruhleder, 1996, pp.113-4). 
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peculiar commodity-form called IoT generalizes this engineering scenario even in our everyday 
practices in order to maximize its use value proportional to the number of ubiquitous risks 
properly manageable only by the networks of nonhuman cognizers. 
The algorithm has been marketed as the commodification of efficient and automatized 
circuit-change technologies that can be applied to any goal-oriented processes from industrial 
production to domestic reproduction. Modeled as cybernetic servomechanisms, both human 
bodies and nonhuman objects were previously thought to be functional units that could be 
distributed most optimally by the discursive protocols or hard-wired circuits of IF-THEN logic, 
which controlled their sites of consumption and employment, such as a workplace for bodies to 
be exploited as the hosts of living labor and a house for objects to be used for reproducing labor 
power. As part of the IoT‘s sensor/processor/actuator relations, on the other hand, they can now 
be placed in the same digital network, which affords their autonomous operations in swarm-like 
states rather than assigning them to predefined positions for the programmed goals. This design 
decision to give higher degrees of freedom to objects may entail inefficiencies in the case of 
simple goal-oriented processes, which were the most important tasks for the IF-THEN based 
systems, but its long-term advantage, the versatility of a network, is enough to compensate for 
these problems. In a typical IoT system such as a smart home, software applications newly added 
to the system usually reach their full functionality only after certain environmental parameters 
are detected as changing relative to the interoperation of smart objects. This necessary mapping 
period conversely promises more possible uses of the network in the long run insofar as more 
parameters are still assumed to hide in the environment, waiting to be detected by different 
combinations of smart objects for the applications marketed and purchased in the near future. 
From sequential computing to ubiquitous computing, the method of realizing the use value of an 
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algorithmic system or of operationalizing the meaning of its efficiency has changed from hard-
wiring to autonomous networking. This has also been paralleled by the changing understanding 
of the problems assumed to be embedded in the operational environments of algorithmic systems, 
from something re-constructible as a cruise-missile-like object in the linear reasoning of IF-
THEN sequences to another that can be concretized only through its simultaneous and nonlinear 
interactions with distributed others. 
In computational environments, this change can be described in terms of the shift from 
the correlationist modeling of early cybernetics to ubiquitous computing‘s pan-
correlationist modeling, which also distinguishes Hayles‘s emphasis on technical agency from 
Kittler‘s technological determinism. Galloway uses the term pan-correlationism to describe how 
Graham Harman‘s object-oriented ontology (OOO) ―democratizes‖ the concept of relation from 
its monopolized uses in the human construction of reality ―by disseminating it to all entities‖ 
(2014, November). For Harman, a disciple of Bruno Latour, object-orientation is a philosophical 
method that restores the speculative autonomy of objects in the world represented by actor-
network theory, in which the only definitive evidence for the presence of actors is their 
mobilizing or being mobilized by each other. For this redemptive mission, Harman instead takes 
as definitive for its becoming an object each entity‘s withdrawal into its own core, which 
―contains unknown realities never touched by any or all of its relations.‖ By doing so he achieves 
two goals. First, he liberates objects from any correlationist others, both humans and nonhumans, 
who attempt to monopolize all the relations between objects for constructing and expanding their 
subjective reality or networks of technoscience, because ―relations do not exhaust a thing‖ 
insofar as it always preserves hidden realities to withdraw further into. At the same time, insofar 
as relations conversely ―rely on‖ the traces of the thing‘s withdrawals, there always remain more 
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relations to be further extracted between the objects that constantly withdraw from each other 
(2009, p.132). Galloway chooses the term pan-correlationism to expose how vulnerable this 
endeavor of OOO (to cut all relations away from the speculative inner realities of objects) is to 
the ideological reprogramming of capitalist relationism. In his reframing, Harman‘s assumption 
of the inexhaustible inside preserved for the objects‘ further withdrawals ironically turns out to 
be what guarantees the inexhaustible correlations ever extractable from the exteriors of the 
objects as a result of their constant withdrawals from one another. In object-oriented ontology, 
there always remains ―the sensual skin of exchange value‖ to be excavated from between any 
interacting objects (Galloway, 2012, June).  
As ―the structure of the most highly evolved technologies of post-Fordist capitalism‖ 
(Galloway, 2013, p.347), ubiquitous computing can be understood as what operationalizes this 
capitalist repurposing of speculative reality into the reservoir for ubiquitous correlations. In 
computer science, the object-orientation is a ―computational logic‖ (Kowalski, 2006) that defines 
each algorithmic agent by its own ―beliefs (what the agent knows), desires (what the agent 
wants) and intentions (what the agent is doing) at its core‖ (Jennings, 2000, p.288). Re-
operationalized through ubiquitous computing, which affords more autonomous and unexpected 
encounters between these objects, the logic of object-orientation in turn redefines its shared 
environments as full of hidden data that can be extracted through any objects under interaction, 
transmitted as inputs to any others, and thus never fully bound by any attempt of linear modeling 
from a single object, but only concretizable through the constant relation-making between 
distributed objects. In this sense, the term pan-correlationism suggests how resonant the anti-
correlationism of the speculative realists is, in fact, with the recent use of the term ―correlation‖ 
by tech-savvy gurus such as Chris Anderson in Wired magazine. For Anderson, correlation is 
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what manifests the end of ―causation‖ as the human means for ―crude approximations of the 
truth‖ (2008, June). Correlation for him is anything that can be data-mined between any 
interactive objects except subject-object relations. If the recent software industry believes in the 
inexhaustible and ubiquitous problems always preserved for further excavation and 
commodification, the pan-correlationist modeling of reality promises this ever-exploitable future 
of the IoT. As the gear-shifting undertaken by contemporary capitalism for its finer-grained 
value extraction, the concept of object-orientation updates the ontology of previous industrial 
capitalism, which Heidegger once analyzed by the term ―challenging-forth‖ as the process to 
reveal ―the world, nature, culture, etc. as available for extraction, processing and storing as 
standing reserve‖; the new ontology of software capitalism is, David Berry says, now unveiled 
by the capital‘s ―streaming-forth,‖ to reveal everything as available for data-mining insofar as 
everything is potentially correlated with everything else (2014, p.96).  
For the formal architecture to accommodate this coincidence between the structures of 
ontological systems and the most advanced commodity form of today, we may need to first 
examine a programming paradigm called object-oriented programming. As Alan Kay, the 
architect of the early OOP language Smalltalk, writes, ―Its semantics are a bit like having 
thousands and thousands of computers all hooked together by a very fast network‖ (1993, p.70). 
OOP is characterized by its ―behavioral building blocks,‖ objects that ―have much in common 
with the monads of Leibniz‖ (p.70), as each object enfolds the definitions of its own constituents, 
data structures, and possible interoperations with others. Put differently, an object envelops its 
own ―tiny ontology,‖ stating its selective exposures and responses to environments (Bogost, 
2012, p.21). To build an algorithmic system for object-oriented programmers is thus to design 
the recursive inter-operations of these objects to replace cumbersome IF-THEN sequences in the 
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obsolete procedural programming. In the source code of a program, the objects are distributed as 
autonomous behavioral units but held in a metastable state or in the ―initial absence of 
interactive communication‖ until after its execution or compiling for ―a subsequent 
communication between orders of magnitude and stabilization‖ (Simondon, 1992, p.304). The 
compiling of a source code begins as its exposure to an environment, namely, a set of user inputs 
or a database, triggers the response of the object assigned in the beginning, whose behavioral 
outputs in turn trigger further responses from the others until the intended set of states is singled 
out from, created in, or removed from their shared environment. Despite their seemingly 
autonomous becoming as a collective, the inter-operations of the objects during the compiling is 
designed as a sort of pre-established harmony, as a human programmer puts them in designated 
locations in a source code to make their environmental exposure happen in a predetermined order. 
On the other hand, the recent achievements in the miniaturization of digital 
sensors/processors/actuators to a size attachable to any scale enables these purely algorithmic 
objects to be transplanted into natural/technical entities in the real world. In OOP, each object 
undergoes a process of individuation as its interactions with others gradually adjust the 
parameters in its data structure to niche values. The physical objects in ubiquitous computing 
undergo a similar process as they are enrolled in its sensor/processor/actuator affiliations. 
However, their new niches in the networks are not pre-established by human assumptions of 
harmony, but concretized through corporeal interactions with other sensor-augmented objects in 
environments. Just as a drone swarm constantly updates its flying formation using the 
aerodynamic data extracted from each drone‘s interactions with others, the operational 
environment of an algorithmic system is no longer simply a metaphor for ―human-entered data‖ 
but also for the ubiquity of data that can be extracted from any physically distributed interacting 
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objects. These objects are virtually all re-locatable to a digital network from their own natural 
and technical contexts. And insofar as each of these contexts is what today‘s commodification of 
ubiquitous computing advertises as the problem that can be more efficiently managed by its 
unboxing and tracing the objects‘ relation-making in an actor-network-like manner, it is 
inevitable that the objects once stabilized in their own context will resume the individuation to 
find their new functional niches in the algorithmic cultures. For instance, one‘s heart, muscles, 
and brain, already stabilized in a psychosomatic context, are now relocated to a digital network 
under a ―smart cloth‖ outfitted with ECG, EMG, and EEG. Their resumed individuations to the 
digital niches are not based on the pre-established harmony between bodies and minds under 
one‘s conscious or reflexive control. Rather, they can be harmonized further with other digital 
objects capable of sneaking under the cloth as new members of the affiliation, such as the Apple 
Watch or Fitbit. These gadgets, ―better able to associate‖ the organic and machinic elements into 
more optimal states for different situations, such as workin out, sleeping, working, or shopping, 
begin to teach us what to do, much as the fitness app in your Apple Watch commands you to 
slow down or speed up. Human organs are no longer particular organs employed in a 
servomechanism but constantly re-individuate themselves for their temporal niches and uses 
within the nonhuman networks with which they are newly affiliated. From this changed use of 
human bodies, Bartleby‘s gesture to disconnect himself from any capitalist uses of human beings 
by saying ―I would prefer not to‖ do anything assigned by the human employer earns a new 
meaning. His gesture can be reinterpreted as a prophecy of recent smart objects and their 





Bartleby, the Scrivener 
Melville‘s narrator devotes the first quarter of this story of a Wall Street law office in the 
1850s to describing the functional relations between his employees, which also define the end 
state for the rest of the story to restore after the disturbance caused by Bartleby. Nonhuman 
nicknames, Turkey, Nippers, and Ginger Nut, are ―mutually conferred upon each other‖ because 
they are ―deemed expressive of their respective persons or characters‖ (par.6). It is Ginger Nut‘s 
job to deliver ―ginger-cake‖ to Turkey and Nippers, whose performances of ―copying law 
papers‖ are complementary to each other because the former is reliable only in the morning 
whereas the latter works well only in the afternoon. For the lawyer confident in reorganizing 
their different responses, to make the office operational for his own goal is to distribute these 
workers along a procedural sequence: ―it being morning, Turkey‘s answer is couched in polite 
and tranquil terms, but Nippers replies in ill-tempered ones … to repeat a previous sentence, 
Nippers‘s ugly mood was on duty, and Turkey‘s off‖ (par.45); to repeat in an object-oriented 
pseudo-code, IF it is morning THEN call Turkey or ELSE call Nipper. The lawyer‘s ―doctrine of 
assumptions‖ is applied everywhere in the office and enables him to predict how the actors will 
respond in certain conditions and to mobilize their conditional responses ―to enlist the smallest 
suffrage in [his] behalf‖ (par.155, 46). Following a pre-established harmony assumed by the 
lawyer, Ginger Nut claims his contribution by circulating ginger-cake, which in turn 
demonstrates its functionality through ―probable effects upon the human constitution‖ of Turkey 
and Nippers (par.52), whose functions as scriveners alternate in the morning and afternoon. 
However, the lawyer‘s confidence in mobilizing these switching circuits faces a crisis in 
Bartleby, a new scrivener. As ―more a man of preferences than assumptions,‖ his becoming a 
meticulous actor in the office is defined at first by his highly selective response of ―prefer[ing] 
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not to do‖ any tasks other than transcribing law papers ―at the usual rate of four cent a folio‖ 
(par.83). In the middle of the story, Bartleby begins to narrow this response further to the extent 
of preferring not to answer any queries from the lawyer and finally ceasing to produce any 
readable texts. At this point, the lawyer (as a system builder) has the following conversation with 
Bartleby:   
 
―Now what sort of business would you like to engage in? Would you like to re-engage in 
copying for some one?‖ 
―No; I would prefer not to make any change.‖ 
―Would you like a clerkship in a dry-goods store?‖ …  
―I would prefer not to take a clerkship,‖ he rejoined, as if to settle that little item at once. 
―How would a bar-tender‘s business suit you? There is no trying of the eyesight in that.‖ 
―I would not like it at all; though, as I said before, I am not particular.‖ … 
―Well then, would you like to travel through the country collecting bills for the merchants? 
That would improve your health.‖ 
―No, I would prefer to be doing something else.‖ 
―How then would going as a companion to Europe, to entertain some young gentleman with 
your conversation,—how would that suit you?‖ 
―Not at all. It does not strike me that there is anything definite about that. I like to be 
stationary. But I am not particular‖ (par.197-209). 
 
ANT‘s principle of symmetry states that ―all the elements that go to make up a 
heterogeneous network, whether these elements are devices, natural forces, or social groups,‖ 
can make themselves present as actors only ―by influencing the structure of the network in a 
noticeable and individual way‖ (Law, 2012, pp.124-6). Conversely, the same principle implies 
that any actors withdrawing from their current network should enroll in another that is ―better 
able to associate elements‖ (p.111),  unless they prefer not to return any noticeable responses and 
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thus not to be present any longer to others. Bartleby‘s preference not to do something 
else expresses his fatigue over being this kind of element unable to be present at all if not 
assigned to a new functional niche in the office or in an outside labor market according to the 
lawyer‘s ―doctrine of assumptions.‖
7
 Bartleby‘s strategy to respond to the queries by saying that 
he prefers not to suggests the minimum that an actor should do to stay in a current state. As 
a dehumanized object stuck within the algorithmic human resource management, Bartleby‘s 
gesture to postpone his assignment to particular uses thus unboxes the apparently seamless 
commodity exchange in the labor market. The lawyer‘s subsequent and never-ending IF-THEN 
questions, ―would you like to re-engage in …? Well then, would you …? How then would …?,‖ 
reveal the maximum that the employer needs to do to black-box again the formal symmetry of 
the capitalist uses of human beings. 
The lawyer‘s efforts to find a new niche for Bartleby, however, always turn out to be 
undertaken too late, after Bartleby has already declared his preference not to do that work. And 
when Bartleby is proved not to be handled by the servo-mechanical ―logic of the ‗if…then‘ 
statement,‖ the lawyer discovers a secret network of nonhumans in which Bartleby‘s withdrawal 
finds the smallest niche for his presence: a ―bachelor‘s hall‖ that ―Bartleby has been making‖ 
with things hidden at the peripheries of the lawyer‘s attention, such as ―a blanket‖ under his desk 
rolled away, ―blacking box and brush‖ under the empty grate, ―a tin basin, with soap and a 
                                                 
7
 It is noteworthy that David Kuebrich relates this ―doctrine of assumption‖ of the lawyer on the niche 
positions for each actor in his design of the fully operational office to ―the larger culture that there is no 
inherent contradiction between the dedicated pursuit of self-interest, even when it involves the 
exploitation of others, and devotion to traditional Christian values‖ (1996, p.396). According to him, the 
doctrine ―exemplifies the values and attitudes of the Protestant entrepreneur who fused his Christian 
faith,‖ such as the faith in the ―Starvation and wretchedness … by Heavenly appointment,‖ with 
―emerging economic practices in such a way as to legitimate inequality and class privilege‖ (p.383, 386).  
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ragged towel‖ on a chair, ―a few crumbs of ginger-nuts and a morsel of cheese‖ in a 
newspaper (par.88). Shortly after Bartleby declares his presence in the office despite his refusal 
to accept any of the new positions the lawyer recommends, these objects, once supposedly 
governed under the lawyer‘s ―doctrine of assumptions,‖ appear to converge instead upon an 
alternative network. In this flat network, each thing‘s presence is concretized not through the 
lawyer‘s monopoly of (non)human resources, but through their mutual engagement at the 
peripheries of capitalist resource distribution. Contrary to the traditional interpretations of 
Bartleby‘s gesture as a suicidal disconnect from any social ties, what he really achieves through 
his withdrawal is not the redemption of humanity ―through death‖ (Reed, 2004, p.266) but the 
retrieval of social ties among nonhumans from capital‘s dehumanizing correlationism, which 
defines every object, including human labor, as exchange or use value to preserve or increase 
capital. The withdrawal of objects into their inner realities ―never touched by any or all of [their] 
relations‖ is enough for these objects to be present without necessarily being engaged in the 
businesses of others (Harman, 2009, p.132); at the same time, for Harman, this withdrawal also 
suffices to enable the ubiquitous distances between these objects to be filled with finer-grained 
relations as ―the joints and glue that hold the universe together‖ (2005, p.20). Bartleby‘s 
disappearance into the peripheries of commodity exchange likewise finds a hidden society of 
nonhumans in which his presence in the world stands on an equal footing with everything else. 
Through the lawyer‘s lost confidence in his assumption as to the possible uses of Bartleby, 
Melville‘s story dramatizes a conflict between two ontologies: the correlationist modeling of 
reality through a human employer in the center as the avatar of old capitalism, and the pan-
correlationist through the distributed nonhumans and their mutual engagements. However, there 
are also things his story fails to anticipate, such as how vulnerable these nonhumans are to the 
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finer-grained resource management algorithms under advanced capitalism, and how the new 
avatar of capitalism will, 150 years later, appear in the form of these distributed nonhumans 
called smart objects. 
 
Ontic Principle of Ubiquitous Computing 
Mark Weiser defines ubiquitous computing as the withdrawal of microprocessors from 
the center of users‘ attention towards the peripheries, where they are more correlated with other 
microprocessor-augmented things such as smart appliances (Weiser & Brown, 1997). Once they 
stop competing for human attentions to be chosen as indispensable units dragged to a narrow 
Graphical User Interface (GUI), the devices become more functional to each other in their 
exchange of the data secretly extracted from humans. Information technologies before ubiquitous 
computing such as ―pagers, cellphones, newservices, the World-Wide-Web, email, TV, and 
radio‖ were designed to ―bombard us frenetically‖ to draw our attention and claim their 
increasing presence in a human-centered network (p.79). Like Turkey claiming his functionality 
to the lawyer even in the afternoon when he malfunctions by asking ―if his services in the 
morning were useful, how indispensible, then, in the afternoon?‖ (par. 6), these machines once 
appealed for their usefulness to human users who monopolized what ANT calls the ―Obligatory 
Passage Point (OPP)‖ of the network, through which all actors must pass to be assigned and 
specified as the actors appropriate for the goal of a system (Callon, 1986, pp.205-6). On the other 
hand, objects in the Ubiquitous Computing (UC) era prefer not to respond to queries from users. 
Like Bartleby, they stay ―calm‖ in the periphery of attention and maintain the slightest presence 
in ―a confederacy of ‗smart‘ objects,‖ which ―whisper information to one another in inaudible 
frequencies,‖ not in order to reoccupy the center of attention at the most timely moment for our 
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needs (as Weiser‘s original design intended), but to ―conspire to sell us products‖ in a timely 
manner (Andrejevic, 2005, pp.113-4).  
In their withdrawal to the peripheries where they awaken each other to avoid awakening 
users, devices spend most of their time performing the minimum for their enrollment as sensors, 
namely scrivening ‖unmodulated digital data‖ from their operational environments. As actuators 
influencing others, the devices also undergo a constant and creative process of individuation to 
find the functional niches within their temporal inter-operations (Clemens & Nash, 2015). Unlike 
the lawyer‘s algorithmic IF-THEN instructions, ubiquitous computing as the global intelligence 
of these distributed devices is capable of and patient with performing this task of never-ending 
resource distribution to transduce all non-particular objects in metastable states into each 
individual in situ. It does this by calculating the optimal way to weave the devices‘ autonomous 
and oft-conflicting operations and goals into a collective that can be mobilized for a problem at 
the system level. In this sense, what become ubiquitous in the UC era are not only the 
symmetrical edges of the network for the smart devices‘ horizontal communications but their 
asymmetries to a collective intelligence that seems to replace successfully the lawyer in 
Melville‘s story and intervene in the stabilization of conflicting devices into the reciprocal and 
modular functions of the network. As Galloway writes, ―no arbiter impedes‖ these symmetrical 
individuations of smart objects into the actors influencing each other along the edges of a 
network, but for their autonomous responses to each other to be gradually realigned in the most 
efficient and harmonious way to reach collective goals, a sort of ―ultimate mystical medium‖ is 
still assumed to operate as an invisible hand (2012, June). In the Personal Computing (PC) era, 
human users performed this arbiter by monopolizing the obligatory passage point represented by 
intuitive user interfaces that enabled them to design the harmonious interoperations of 
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algorithmic agents for their conscious goals. In the UC era, the mystical arbiters are rather 
omnipresent in the form of microprocessors that may attach anywhere, more ethereal in 
infiltration into every edge of the networks; the operations of these smart arbiters are as 
immanent as marketplaces that have also infiltrated into every corner of our lives, augmented by 
the so-called smart applications. Harmony is no longer pre-established by the assumptions of 
human designers but, like the flying formation of a drone swarm, must be constantly gathered 
and updated from lots of minute discrepancies between each object‘s expectation of its 
environment and its actual operation within the data extracted from others.  
Whitehead‘s philosophy of actual entities, in this regard, provides another ontological 
model of ―the universe of things‖ in the UC era that, as Steven Shaviro notes, supplements the 
―countless tiny vacuums‖ between objects mutually withdrawing in Harman‘s object-oriented 
ontology with ―a finely articulated plenum‖ of data left by each object‘s becoming (Shaviro, 
2014, p.39). For Galloway, in my interpretation, the coincidence between OOO and OOP implies 
the former‘s vulnerability to ideological reprogramming; the ―unknown realities‖ preserved and 
inexhaustible inside each object ironically promise the constant extraction of correlations from 
any objects under interactions, whose exteriors, or ―sensual skin[s] of exchange value‖ 
(Galloway, 2012, June), are thus able to create ever-regenerative inter-objective realities. As a 
critical approach to demystify these worldly relations supposedly waiting to be excavated for 
ubicomp solutions, we can examine how Whitehead brings the problematic realities that OOO 
hides inside each object back to the platform for inter-objective communications. Whereas an 
object for Harman preserves its speculative presence through constant withdrawals, an actual 
entity for Whitehead lives only for its process of becoming called ―concrescence.‖ Through this 
process, an entity prehends the universe as a ―multifold datum‖ left by the already finished 
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becoming of all others until the process is completed with the satisfaction of its ―subjective aim‖ 
and turned into just another datum for the genesis of others (Whitehead, 1978, p.19, 185). The 
resources for creations are not hidden inside but scattered all over the world, revealed to be a 
large data set accumulated from the finished processes of concrescences and given for further 
data-mining by new actors to come. In this respect, the speculative presence of actual entities in 
Whitehead provides a philosophical analogy for the algorithmic objects in a source code, which 
also live only during their exposure to shared environments for processing input data and are 
then left just as what they processed, namely the changed state of these environments for others 
to process further. However, in that each actual entity‘s concrescence is not determined by any 
others but performed according to its own assumption on the ―harmony‖ between its ―subjective 
forms‖ and the objective data it feels (p.27), the source code as the nexus of objects in this 
analogy should not be based in the hardwired electromagnetic circuits of personal computers. 
Rather, the technical incarnation of Whiteheadian actual entities is found in the smart objects in 
the Internet of Things as they constantly re-individuate themselves within their data-intensive 
environments without predefined orders. Besides this structural similarity, Whitehead‘s 
―secularization of the concept of God‖ (p.207) as no other than one of these entities provides 
another rationale for the appropriateness of the analogy. Contrary to those whose concrescences 
are temporal and short-lived, the Whiteheadian God is characterized by its never-completed 
concrescence. This God‘s subjective aim is ―the ultimate unity‖ between the entire multiplicity 
of actual entities it senses and its conceptual prehension of their ideal harmony ―in such a perfect 
system‖ (p.346), and this is inevitably an ever-delayed goal insofar as God cannot determine the 
courses of other entities‘ becoming but only induces them to adjust their subjective aims. Taking 
the position of this global but not omnipotent agent in the analogy, the aim of an ubicomp 
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system—the algorithmic calculation of the optimal way for the smart objects to inter-operate for 
systemic goals—is also a never-completed process that must be constantly updated from each 
object‘s actual operation without any pre-given harmony.  
This secularized understanding of God is decisive in order to preserve the symmetry that 
Harman‘s OOO sees in a flat ontology. Shaviro emphasizes that ―all actual entities in the 
universe stand on the same ontological footing,‖ and even God for Whitehead has ―no special 
ontological privileges‖ over the most trivial entities ―in spite of‖ the asymmetrical ―gradations of 
importance, and diversities of function,‖ among entities (Shaviro, 2014, p.29). However, in the 
emerging universe of things called IoT, these gradations of importance and functionality 
relocated and persisting in a flat ontology are in fact what make Whiteheadian philosophy a 
better analogy for the recent smart environments than Harman‘s, and also make media studies‘ 
recent interest in Whitehead (Gabrys, 2016a; Parisi, 2009; Hansen, 2015a) more coincident with 
―the structure of the most highly evolved technologies‖ of today. The particular entity standing at 
the apex of these gradations was once called God, but now reappears in the form of ubiquitous 
computing, and its never-ending concresence as a global intelligence intervenes in all the other 
entities‘ temporal concresence as the nodes of its network. Rather than assigning each entity one-
by-one to a specific place already prepared—what Melville‘s lawyer attempted but failed—
ubiquitous computing encourages the entities to find their own bachelor’s hall within the 
multifold data transmitted from the actual world by letting them interact according to their 
preferred responses to environments and in turn enabling their data structures to be coupled 
optimally to each niche in the ubiquitous thing-generated data. It is not in spite but because of 
these asymmetrical interventions of omnipresent microprocessors that all other less important but 
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still functional entities are relocated and ―rethingified‖ upon a flat and symmetrical platform of 
smart objects (Gabrys, 2016b, p.192).  
The ―ontic principle‖ of speculative realism often promotes itself as a democratic 
principle for nonhumans in opposition to ―the vertical ontologies of ontotheology or a 
humanism‖ that ―trace back and relate all beings to either God, humans, language, culture or any 
of the other princes.‖ It suggests ―a flat ontology, one made exclusively of unique, singular 
individuals, differing in spatio-temporal scale but not ontological status‖ (Bryant, 2011, pp.268-
9). The Internet of Things as the commodification of ubiquitous computing seems to 
operationalize this principle by liberating digital objects from their previous obligation to pass 
through the mediations of human princes. However, its blatant attempts to diversify the problems 
that can be detected and marketed along the networks of these liberated objects reveal the 
ideological undertone of the societal metaphors for objects such as Bryant‘s ―democracy of 
objects‖ (2012), applied to today‘s media systems without mention of the primary asymmetry of 
the network (Hoffman & Novak, 2018, p.1198; Lindley et al., 2017; Mitew, 2014). The ubiquity 
of smart objects and their autonomous operations translate and integrate each singular reality 
they locally perceive into a larger data set as a shared environment in which all of them are 
interoperable no matter how different their narrow world views are from one another. These 
ubiquitous symmetries for the ubiquitous accumulation of sharable data are, however, also 
asymmetrically engaged in the quasi-theological individuation of a global intelligence. The 
pastoral power as the archē of Foucaultian governmentality now employs the IoT as the 
technological means to justify its exclusive accesses to the confessions of people‘s private lives 
in the form of user data they volunteer to report to the AI. Its ―humanly incomprehensible divine 
sovereignty‖ is now distributed over the accumulated datasets—data-minable only by the ―quasi-
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transcendental power‖ of algorithms (Cooper, 2020, p.37, 45). As the following section will 
exemplify by examining a scenario involving a smart navigation system, Bartleby‘s gesture to 
non-humanize himself as one of many office objects in a flat and invisible network does not 
mean his or its liberation from capitalist resource management. This instead forms the condition 
for a global intelligence system to emerge from its asymmetrical interventions in each 
symmetrical edge of the network.  
 
AIDA: A New Bachelor’s Hall 
AIDA (Affective Intelligent Driving Agent) is an in-dash navigation system developed 
by MIT‘s SENSEable City Lab, Media Lab, and the Volkswagen‘s Electronics Research Lab. 
Equipped with several projectors that display a 3D map on the dashboard, AIDA visualizes the 
most efficient route to a destination as a solution to the possible need of a registered driver 
(Figure 1.1). Unlike non-smart systems, ―AIDA analyses the driver‘s mobility patterns, keeping 
track of common routes and destinations‖ to ―identify the set of goals the driver would like to 
achieve‖ (MIT Sensible City Lab, 2009). To provide the driver with the most customized niche 
not only in a vehicle but in the traffic networks and points of interest (POI) in neighboring areas, 
AIDA interfaces sensor-generated driver data concerning her implicit needs with the data 
―pertaining to various aspects of the city including traffic, seasonal information, environmental 
conditions, commercial offerings, and events‖ (Lorenzo et al., 2009).  
An ordinary object-oriented navigation simply receives the data packets from outside 
sources, such as GPS and traffic information, in order to remodel its surroundings with 
algorithmic objects such as a street, intersection, or geo-tagged landmarks, whose functional 
relations as nodes in a graph individuate the shortest route on the map to solve the problem of the 
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―human-entered‖ destination. On the other hand, as a prophet-like agent smart enough to direct 
the driver to where she must go to fulfill her current need, what AIDA should individuate 
foremost is not the shortest route but the most urgent problem of the driver, which has yet to 
surface but is lurking in the peripheries of her attention as the ubiquitous symptoms filling the 
car. AIDA‘s ubiquitous computing individuates the problem preemptively and puts it in a 
navigable form that would be solved progressively as she drives the car along the route to a spot 
it recommended on the map. As an IoT system counterinsurgent to this guerilla-like problem—
namely, a human driver demoted to a host of machine-readable vital signals—AIDA populates 
not only the interior network of the Audi full of interconnected sensors for facial expressions, 
voices, galvanic skin response, braking/acceleration pressures, seat position, and steering (Figure 
1.2), but ―a multitude of tags, sensors, locationing devices, telecommunications networks, online 








Figure 1.2: A network of sensor-augmented things in AIDA 1.0 
 
Suppose that Bartleby, hired as a test driver, found his new bachelor’s hall in this Audi. 
After the first week, long enough for the sensor network to be trained to relate the behavioral 
signals collected from the distributed body parts to his current affective state, AIDA would begin 
to figure out his ―home and work location‖ and ―be able to direct‖ him to the grocery store that 
he is likely to prefer. After a month, AIDA could detect his hunger from the signals collected and 
analyzed through the ―historical behavioral collector (HBC)‖ and ―historical route collector 
(HRC),‖ and then recommend the restaurant rated highest by Yellow Pages users with similar 
social networking service (SNS) profiles (Lorenzo et al., 2009). Bartleby may find that he is 
aware of his hunger only several minutes after the distributed symptoms were identified by 
AIDA, but may not seriously care about this delay even though it is always long enough to pass 
the restaurant most customized to his taste. However, after he learns that his too-human 
consciousness is, as Hayles warns, always behind the non-conscious responses of his body by at 
least several hundred milliseconds, so-called ―missing half-second,‖ long enough to be hijacked 
by other non-conscious cues from ―the advent of affective capitalism and computational media‖ 
(Hayles, 2017, p.191; Hansen, 2015a, p.190), even hunger would become a crisis that should be 
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preempted by AIDA and immediately visualized as a red route to the restaurant on the map. He 
is now responsible for eliminating this route by driving his Audi corner to corner according to 
AIDA‘s instructions (Figure 1.3). What has occurred in this local network of smart sensors after 
a month of test driving is Bartleby‘s individuation as a registered driver. But, on the other side of 
the interface, where his current physiological and behavioral states are ceaselessly translated into 
the red route heading somewhere to be resolved, his individuation appears to have been driven 
entirely by another individuation of AIDA into a prophet-like intelligence, ceaselessly weaving a 
flat ontology out of many different types of sensor data—such as GPS data, a city‘s Points of 
Interest and their rankings in Yellow Page, lots of geotagged images of the city, the driver‘s and 
his neighbors‘ social network profiles, and his historical route and behavior data—by folding 
them into the pathway he draws (Lury & Day, 2019, p.30). 
After these reciprocal individuations, Bartleby on the day of his public demonstration 
would see something reminiscent of the compulsive questions of the lawyer in Melville‘s story 
haunting the dashboard, tuned up for the maximum functionality of AIDA. On the way to the 
destination that AIDA would already have predicted from his route histories, Bartleby would 
encounter many small pop-up windows and tags on the map referring to places for entertainment, 
social events, and other sensor-augmented commodities, claiming to concretize his unknown 
desires distributed across his facial expressions, voice, galvanic responses, butt position, 
accelerating and braking foot pressures (Figure 1.4). Just like the lawyer in the story, AIDA asks, 
―would you like to …? Well then, would you …? How then would …?‖ Contrary to the lawyer 
who failed to keep enumerating all possible niches for Bartleby due to his too-human managerial 
skill, AIDA‘s recommendation is ever-extendable. Only this global intelligence can access the 
problem called ubiquity, and it does not ask him to share his preferences out loud. Bartleby may 
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already find himself in his most customized bachelor‘s hall, which eliminates any possible 
disturbances even before they actually occur. Now he needs to accept the ―terms of use‖ for 
AIDA, but what pushes him to agree with these terms—which describe his new human condition 
as the host of digitalized vital signals—is the dormancy of problems whose symptoms are too 
widely distributed to be cognized by any single object except AIDA. 
 
    
Figure 1.3: Recommending a POI Figure 1.4: Advertising a social event 
 
In critical theories after 9/11, these sorts of omnipresent agents and their asymmetrical 
interventions in the life of local actors have been justified by the ubiquity of problems. The 
latency of these problems in the peripheries of each actor‘s narrow attention has justified the 
local actors‘ commitments to a collective intelligence that preempts problems before they 
actually occur. Hardt and Negri claim that ―the gray zone of war and peace,‖ in permanent 
danger of insurgency and terrorism, justifies the ―total mobilization of social forces‖ for the 
preemptive strike of a military power that is ―in asymmetrical conflicts‖ over unpredictable 
―guerrilla attacks‖ (2004, p.13, 51-2). Massumi also writes that civilian life in this ―crisis-prone 
environment‖ falls ―onto a continuum with war‖ in which a preemptive power‘s intervention 
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should be ―as ubiquitously irruptible as the indiscriminate threats it seeks to counter‖ (2015, 
pp.27-8). It is noteworthy that, after 9/11, the effectiveness of the international law has gradually 
decreased in distinguishing civilians from combatants, based on the latter‘s notable feature ―of 
having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance,‖ ―of carrying arms openly,‖ and ―of 
conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war‖ (Wilke, 2017, 
p.1042). As Wilke points out in the cases of NATO‘s 2009 operation in Afghanistan and the 
recent ―police violence against Black civilians in the US‖ (p.1050), the new binary of 
civilians/militants or civilians/insurgents is redefined by the ambiguous distinction between the 
uninvolved and involved. The domain of the cybernetic counterinsurgency, a city or battlefield, 
is in turn transformed into a sociopolitical continuum of suspects with varying degrees of 
involvement: (almost impossible) pure innocents—potentially involved—(completely) known 
terrorists. Relocated in the wide spectrum of the middle in this continuum, anyone can be 
potentially involved with ―the imminent threat‖ that must be preempted. The ―sweeping 
techniques of post- 9/11 surveillance and data gathering‖ are often conceived ―of a scale 
appropriate to wholesale calamities like terror attacks and natural disasters, not to ordinary crime 
or protest,‖ but, as Frank Pasquale quotes from one state official, after it is taken for granted that 
your enemies have invisible networks,  
 
You can make an easy kind of a link that, if you have a protest group protesting a war where 
the cause that‘s being fought against is international terrorism, you might have terrorism at 
that protest. You can almost argue that a protest against [the war] is a terrorist act. … violent 
extremists could also be identified by bumper stickers on their cars indicating support for 




Not necessarily based on the wide spaces reminiscent of battlefields, or 
necessarily generalizing these military environments to the scales of human bodies to be covered 
by wearable devices and home/office for smart appliances, the Internet of Things invents a novel 
strategy for its market penetration from this tension between the insurgency of ubiquitous 
problems and the counterinsurgency of an intelligent system. In a domestic space or as to a 
human body that the local IoT application redefines as a continuum embedded with small sensors, 
or ―threat matrix‖ (Pasquale, 2015, p.48), you can still imagine a hidden link of a sensor‘s 
detection of a tiny anomaly, as trivial as ―bumper stickers,‖ to a bigger problem latent in the 
space. In Melville‘s fiction, Bartleby‘s symmetry-breaking insurgency was never preventable by 
the lawyer‘s linear management programmed in IF-THEN statements. But, as I re-fictionalized 
through Bartleby in AIDA, this human inaccessibility to the problem called ubiquity is also the 
justification for the humans‘ participation in the IoT as the non-humanized hosts of vital signals. 
For its becoming as a collective intelligence from the concrescence of these vital signals with 
other thing-generated data, the ubiquity of lurking problems should be advertised as the reason 
why it is time for humans to relinquish their right to the uses of objects that they have unfairly 
held for a long time and why it is time to hand it right over to the IoT, which can use them more 









INTERMISSION 1: ONTOLOGY, OPERATIONALIZED 
 
The IoT represents a new paradigm of algorithmic objects that poses a quasi-theological 
question on the artificial intelligence: what would enable the artificial intelligence, once a 
material being akin to the ―initial neuronal structure in new-born infants,‖ to evolve finally into 
something called artificial super-intelligence (ASI)? The followings have seemed to be taken for 
granted to continue its evolution: Moore‘s law, which guarantees the increase of processing 
power of digital computers enough to develop a super-intelligence; and the enough supply of 
―the input and output channels‖ from existing knowledge systems focused on each separable task, 
which would train the AI into a general intelligence (Bostrom, 1997). As Nick Bostrom 
anticipated in the 1990s, the competitive investments of the hardware industry have increased the 
processing power of computers in accordance with Moore‘s law. On the other hand, various 
input-output channels—enough for the AI‘s continuous machine learning—have been supplied 
through the software industry‘s infiltration of people‘s everyday lives. Throughout the 
commercial use of AI for providing customized services to almost every aspect of human users, a 
super-intelligence would eventually emerge from the concrescence of every piece of input-
output data that each singular IoT subscriber generates in his/her conscious and nonconscious 
interactions with smart objects along everyday routine. In other words, its becoming (almost) 
omniscient about and transcendent from any local training data is no longer simply granted but 
negotiated through human users‘ agreement on data sharing. Just as Whiteheadean God could 
intervene in the others‘ decision-making only by luring them to his goal, the IoT needs to 
persuade its users of supplying their local data to its global intelligence. In doing so, it persuades 
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people of the lurking state of problems, which any narrow viewpoint of a single observer never 
fully clarifies, but which provide inexhaustible resources for smart objects to communicate.  
Harman‘s object-oriented ontology somewhat reduces these sources of communicability 
between objects to a secret core of each object. According to its doctrine of fundamental 
incommunicability, these cores, never fully graspable by each other but constantly withdrawing, 
are ironically what intensify this universe with partial communications between objects, 
constructing their own inter-objective realities. As an ideological refraction of this philosophical 
doctrine, the Internet of Things reprograms the unknown realities of objects, such as human 
bodies for instance, into the engineering problems, never completely resolvable but able to be 
optimized over and over again. Generalized as a computational logic for the IoT-driven everyday 
life, the object-oriented programming calculates this optimizability of the universe by 
―decomposing problems in terms of autonomous agents that can engage in flexible, high-level 
interactions‖ (Jennings, 2000, p.283). The ―complex real-world problems,‖ or the real-worlds 
represented as full of hidden problems, are in this sense both the scientific discovery and 
capitalist modeling of reality through which the intelligent system justifies its governmentality. 
This ontological re-modeling of reality is necessary for the IoT‘s development as the 
everyday infrastructure for two reasons. First, for its ubiquitous computing to be the most 
optimal approach to the various real-world scenarios, the world should be imagined to be 
embedded with manifold unknown problems. Second, to diversify and expand its service 
domains even within a limited physical area, such as a smart home and car, where everything is 
already replaced with smart objects, the problems the IoT handle should be such things as are 
constantly withdrawing from the current makeshift solutions. This sort of speculation about the 
abundance of unknown problems also justifies another sort of speculation about the ―democracy 
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of objects,‖ an IoT ideology suggestive of a belief that these problems would be gradually 
discernible through the interoperations of smart objects. As a cooperative system of autonomous 
decision makers, this object-oriented democracy is especially useful not so much to a certain 
number of known problems already registered to the system, but to the unknown problems, 
simply speculated to be many until identified as associated with certain interoperations of these 
autonomous agents. In other words, for the more use-values of the IoT to be realized in actual 
applications, the more degree of freedom should be given to its objects‘ interoperations without 
asking permission from their human users. For their democracy, each local algorithmic agent 
thus ―has beliefs (what the agent knows), desires (what the agent wants) and intentions (what the 
agent is doing) at its core‖ and ―the agent can attempt to achieve its individual objectives without 
being forced to perform potentially distracting actions simply because they are requested by 
some external entity.‖ As ―decisions about what actions should be performed are devolved to 
autonomous entities‖ (Jennings, 2000, pp.282-4), their shared environments change into a 
continuum embedded with lots of problem-spaces, defined by each singular problem 
communicated by a singular algorithmic agent.  
From OOP to ubicomp, the relation between global and local in algorithmic systems has 
changed in a way in which local agents have gradually retrieved more autonomy from a system, 
of which they were once just functional parts. The totality of system functions has also been 
redefined as what would be constantly updated as the sum of re-traceable interactions of local 
agents out of all other yet-to-be-re-traceable interactions. The classical conceptualization of 
totality as more than a mere sum is no longer true in this sense. Conversely, individual elements 
are always in an abundance of interactions not able to be summed into coherent system functions 
because they are too arbitrary to be yet registered as the units consistently engaged with the 
68 
 
currently known environmental parameters. The heterogeneity of these not-yet-integrated 
interactions characterizes an ubicomp system and its ontological modeling of operational 
environments. For this system, Ontology always ―comes later‖ only after some of these manifold 
interactions are gradually stabilized as the registered and re-traceable interactions (Hansen, 
2015b, p.42).  
In Alien Phenomenology, Ian Bogost suggests this operationalizing view of ontology 
with a neologism ontography. In his version of speculative realism, derived from the engineering 
concept of object-orientation, things in general are defined by their ontographic operation, ―a 
general inscriptive strategy‖ (2012, p.38) to record ―random, anonymous meeting one has in 
modern environments‖ into its own ―compact modes of representation‖ that he calls ―tiny 
ontology‖ (2006, p.73). Ontology for him is not something written in ―a treatise or tome‖ but a 
modular and recursive function of ontography as a thing‘s way of engaging with environments as 
well as its becoming ―the basic ontological apparatus needed to describe existence‖ (2012, 
pp.19-21). Even if a huge Ontology comprehensive enough to encompass any tiny ontologies is 
still imaginable in Bogost‘s alien phenomenology, it could not be bigger than mere sum any 
longer. A big ontology would be rather the loosest and partial sum of manifold tiny ontologies if 
what it could incorporate within its formal compilation of the most common facts for every 
singular objective worldview would inevitably be very trivial facts commensurable with any 
particular local ontologies. Put differently, tiny ontology is prior as each object‘s autonomous 
mode of existence through which they ―perceive and engage their worlds‖ (p.29). The multitude 
of these tiny ontologies forms a background from which a huge Ontology emerges as a fractal 
figure of a common world drawn from lots of singular ontographies accidentally encountered 
with each other.  
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Whereas the fractal for Bogost is descriptive of an emergent state of objects ―held 
together tenuously by accidents‖ (p.25), we can take this instead as a metaphor for the maximum 
interoperability of smart objects in an ubicomp system. The looseness of a huge ontology could 
then be understood not simply as the consequence of pure random encounters between tiny 
ontologies in ―modern environments,‖ but a design decision to maximize their functional 
interconnections. For a greater number of local agents to communicate about common 
environments, supposedly embedded with the problems they need to handle collectively, the 
protocols to translate one‘s output into another‘s input should require only the minimum degree 
of mutual understanding for interoperation. The primary concern of the IoT system is therefore 
not to know about each singular worldview of smart objects but to discover a larger number of 
hidden problems, which may not be perceivable by any singular agents, but accessible through 
certain combinations of their loose interoperations.  
Regarding this ontological commitment of objects to a system‘s modeling of a common 
reality, we may need to examine how the AI research in the turn of the century redefined 
knowledge systems in computer science, once designed as ―isolated monoliths‖ with each 
―idiosyncratic [way] of modeling the world,‖ as those interoperable through ―external coupling 
interfaces‖ (Gruber, 1991, p.601). In ―The Role of Common Ontology in Achieving Sharable, 
Reusable Knowledge Bases,‖ Thomas Gruber suggests ontology as the name for the 
―knowledge-level protocols‖ for the exchanges of knowledge bases (KB) between different 
intelligent systems with their own peculiar ―symbolic-level‖ at the core. For him, ontology is not 
to accumulate the knowledge about the most fundamental features of the world observable from 
every singular inner representation of local agents. Instead, its function for him should be to 
provide the algorithmic agents with formal languages to translate their secret understanding of 
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the world from each peculiar data structure into a formal response to the queries from any other, 
no matter how incompatible their symbolic insides are with one another. Ontology in this way 
extracts the ―libraries of shared, reusable knowledge‖ from every edge in a network of intelligent 
agents externally coupled and interoperable (Gruber, 1991, p.602). The goal of this huge system-
level Ontology is however not to maximize the detailed knowledge on a single world, but to 
maximize the possible external couplings between these otherwise incommensurable inner 
realities of smart objects through their formal symmetry of query-answer, rather than to enroll 
them in the production of a unitary reality. Therefore, what this huge Ontology could tell us 
about the common world is just the most tenuous facts, such as the most common classes of 
objects and their possible interactions in the world. This ―weakest theory‖ nevertheless 
guarantees ―the most models‖ about the same world to coexist without being subject to a single 
coherent meta-model (Gruber, 1993, p.909). Furthermore, in order to mobilize more ―ontological 
commitment‖ from smart objects with their own singular worldviews, the weakest theory should 
make ―as few claims as possible about the world being modeled‖ to guarantee their maximum 
freedom ―to specialize and instantiate the ontology as needed‖ for their own goals (p.910). 
Ontology as a knowledge-level protocol for smart objects in this sense prevents a system from 
stipulating any detailed knowledge about its world as a given matter of fact that could restrict the 
contents of messages its agents communicate. Conversely, maximizing the wireless 
interoperability between agents, the system transforms its environments into a continuum 
embedded with lots of mutually incommensurable hidden realities.  
The current IoT ontology, in the same way, intensifies its physical domain with these 
sorts of hidden realities to commodify them into the future service domains of the IoT. As the 
smart objects constantly fold and refold a smart space into certain sensor-actuator arcs their 
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intensive interoperations draw, these problematic realities of a continuum would gradually be 
unfolded as each singular domain for the advanced smart application. For instance, under the 
governance of smart objects, a nervous system could be remapped as a neuronal continuum 
embedded with multiple levels of cognitive functions; a body becomes a physiological 
continuum with multiple levels of needs and desires; and a smart home or city becomes a 
domestic or urban continuum with hidden efficiency and security problems. Given that all these 
continua separable under each different IoT system can also be converged upon a bigger 
Ontology operating in a same physical domain such as a smart city, we can think of two different 
ways for the IoT to expand its frontiers. First, the development of new sensors, processors, 
actuators capable of responding to finer-grained fluctuations of a continuum would expand its 
syntactic ―technological frontiers in sensing.‖ At the same time, the improvement of the system‘s 
―ability to extrapolate information from the data provided by the existing technology and 
dedicated sensors‖ would expand its analytic ―frontiers in inferential sensing‖ (Andrejevic & 
Brudon, 2014, p.25). The ongoing experiments to embed more ―smart dusts‖ in biological, social, 
and ecological networks would expand the synthetic frontiers of ubiquitous computing by 
transforming a greater number of context-specific interactions of these networks into each 
separable data continuum under ―small, focused ontologies customized to the available sensors 
and sensor data‖ in each domain. On the other hand, in their convergence upon a single dataset, 
or Big Data, ―the combination and integration of a larger number of such ontologies‖ would 
discover more correlations between different domains (Underwood et al., 2015). In this sense, a 
larger scale Ontology could be assembled from a multitude of small and focused ontologies. For 
instance, a smart electrocardiography (ECG) registered in the ontology for wireless bioinformatic 
devices may also belong to the ontologies for the sensor networks in smart home and smart city. 
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The smart home, what the next chapter will discuss, is one of these local IoT domains, 
and its own focused ontology is for the smart appliances to communicate about their common 
world, a domestic space. Still serving human needs even though they no longer straightly ask 
humans what they need, the world these smart objects are most and only concerned about is that 
of our unknown needs and desires, or more generally, things to be resolved about us. In short, the 
universe for these objects, with which we share our daily routine, is a continuum of unknown 
problems. For each smart appliance or a group of appliances tied in an application, this 
continuum would appear to be each focused problem space. The next chapter develops a 
topological framework to describe this feature of the new domestic space, namely its being 















CHAPTER 2: TOPOLOGY AS NEW GOVERNMENTALITY OF  
EVERYDAY LIFE IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET OF THINGS 
 
Re-intensifying a (non-)smart home 
Let me begin this chapter with a thought experiment on a non-smart home, filled with lots 
of electronic devices, not yet digitally interconnected, but physically interoperable. Say they can 
be redeployed anywhere insofar as their physical boundaries do not overlap one another. A 
domain that each device‘s operation reaches could then be stretched and bent flexibly since they 
are rearrangeable in many improvised ways. Following the definition of topology as a study on 
the properties of a space that ―remain invariant under bending, stretching, or deforming 
transformations‖ (DeLanda, 2002, pp.25-6), this domestic space can be now considered a 
topological object characterized not so much as a container for separable devices but as a 
continuum with flexible and complicated inner boundaries, whose topological invariants, namely 
the infinitely elastic and unbreakable boundaries of devices, describe all the potential 
interoperations of the devices (Figure 2.1). Each device in this conceptual space is symmetrical
8
 
to any transformations the house undergoes in that it could operate invariantly in any positions.  
However, as a tenant moves in, most of their symmetries begin to break. Her daily 
routine—waking up, sitting at a table, having breakfast, reading something—is embedded and 
redeploys the devices to the new niches. Their previous invariance in operating anywhere, in 
other words, their symmetry to any spatial rearrangements, is broken because they are functional 
now only by being consistently engaged with a trajectory the tenant draws to refresh her energy 
                                                 
8
 Symmetry in mathematics is when an object or its property is invariant under a specific transformation the object 
undergoes. In this sense, symmetry is always symmetry to a certain manipulation performed over the object. 
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to begin and continue a day. They no longer remain the same under all possible stretching and 
bending of the continuum but symmetrical only to a linear transformation along the tenant‘s 
daily routine. As DeLanda says, ―an undifferentiated intensive space (that is, a space defined 
continuous intensive properties) progressively differentiates, eventually giving rise to extensive 
structure‖ (2002, p.27). Her singularity embeds a line of force or attractor within the continuum 
and makes ―a large number of different trajectories, starting their evolution at very different 
places in the manifold, … end up‖ being aligned ―within the ‗sphere of influence‘ of the 
attractor‖ (p.15, 32). Despite the extensive structure the space‘s intensive transformation 
eventually culminates in, this topological description conceptually preserves the undifferentiated 
continuum beneath the space and, with the introduction of other attractors than the tenant‘s daily 
routine, it could unfold lots of hidden functional states of the space. Topology repurposed as a 
means to describe the place-binding of a domestic space in this sense rediscovers its intensive 
proto-territory where manifold functional relations among the entities, often contradictory to one 
another in realization but virtually co-embedded, are still open to all possible re-deployments 
prior to any extensive structures. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Three topological isomorphs of a domestic space with flexible inner boundaries of devices 
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This chapter examines the smart electronic devices and their network called the Internet 
of Things as the technological attractor that re-intensifies this topological potential of our 
domestic space renamed smart home. Embedded with the multitude of sensors and actuators, or 
―smart dusts‖ (Kahn et al., 1999), a domestic interior in its most advanced form is redefined as a 
topological continuum. As software applications constantly redeploy these smart objects and 
their intensive interoperations, the continuum folded along their sensor-actuator arcs gradually 
unfolds its hidden functional spaces. This chapter‘s topological approach analyzes how a smart 
home re-excavates this continuum once buried under our daily routine, and re-differentiates it 
into as many new service domains of the IoT as the number of smart home applications. For 
doing so, it borrows the mathematical concept of manifold from Bernhard Riemann‘s differential 
geometry, whose phenomenological meaning will be further examined through Henri Poincaré‘s 
group theory. 
 
Topology in Culture 
In the introduction to Theory, Culture & Society‘s special issue on ―Topologies of 
Culture,‖ Lury, Parisi, and Terranova illustrate the recent ―topological culture‖ as emergent from 
―a proliferation of surfaces that behave topologically‖; the origin of which they trace back to the 
―20th-century developments in the gridding of time and space, the proliferation of registers, 
filing and listing systems, the making and remaking of categories, the identification of 
populations, and the invention of logistics‖ (2012, p.8). Digital interfaces currently embedded in 
our everyday life can also be considered as these flexible surfaces that encompass all these early 
computational modelings of workplace, domestic space, and social geography. For the past 
decades, these interfaces have registered a variety of objects—from home/office appliances to 
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consumer goods—to their heterogeneous networks. At the same time, the functional values of 
these objects have been re-categorized along with online activities of their users, whose 
quantified-selves have also been registered to the same interfaces as the collections of 
computable variables: from their demographic characters to the patterns of web-surfing. By 
topology, these authors thus mean the changed ―‗lower level‘ principles of invariance or 
consistency‖ for the social life of humans and objects in these networked social platforms. 
Departing from the Euclidean axioms, which have defined objects as something invariant under 
geometric transformations such as ―rotation, symmetry, scale and translation‖ and in turn defined 
their movement as the ―transmission of fixed forms in space and time,‖ movement becoming 
topological is expressed instead in the form of ―the ordering of continuity,‖ or the bending and 
stretching of a continuum to make something invariant or orderly-variant emerge from its folded 
surfaces (pp.6-7, 13). Suppose that you are walking around a city with a GPS tracking 
augmented-realty app. Before everything else, your physical displacement would be expressed as 
a linear transformation of a geo-data continuum along the trajectory of a data point representing 
your location. The graphical boundaries of urban objects would, on the other hand, appear in the 
app‘s user interface as nearby Points of Interests (POI) only as the result of the software‘s 
constant ordering and folding of the continuum into the changed data point. In the same way, 
your social profile would be constantly updated from and improvised through the algorithmic 
comparison of your pathway across the POIs to what others draw (Lury & Day, 2019). The 
movement topologically re-conceptualized does not mean dis-placement as the operation of a 
power ingrained in ―pre-given territorial containers‖ (Allan, 2011, p.286), but expresses the 
power that makes a place itself emerge from the continuum in which objects should be 
constantly re-included as those orderly-variant under given deformations.  
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―Becoming topological‖ of something in this sense means the liquidation of ―the rigidity 
of the distinction between inclusion and exclusion,‖ once determining the legitimate place of an 
object ―based on essential properties, such as archetypes, values or norms, or regional location‖ 
(Lury et al., 2012, p.5). Its boundary now needs to be constantly re-created through ―different 
kinds of folding and filtering‖ of the continuum (Mezzadra & Neilson, 2012, p.60). At the same 
time, the geography reconfigured as a continuum of multilevel relational data also becomes 
topological as it is assumed to hide lots of embedded boundaries of objects as its ―excess‖ in the 
background (Lury, 2009, p.80), or ―implicate orders‖ (Bohm, 1980), which could be 
foregrounded through the software‘s alternative ways of folding/filtering in the future. Topology 
in the recent discourses of cultural geography has described these innovated lower-level 
principles for the movement of humans and nonhumans ―in culture as a field of connectedness,‖ 
and their ―inclusion and exclusion‖ along deformable boundaries (Lury et al., 2012, p.5).  
By the term topological power, I refer to a new form of power that capitalizes this 
transformability of human geography converted into a digital continuum. For its further (market) 
penetration into our everyday life, this power constantly re-differentiates the continuum into a 
multitude of problem-spaces, which can be managed optimally by its environmental sensors and 
actuators. There can be various conductors of topological power, such as an active user of self-
tracking devices exemplified by the early proponents of quantified-self, a smart watch to which 
its casual user delegates the job to quantify herself instead of being a data analyst herself, and the 
governmental and corporate agencies who transform the social dynamics of a city into Big Data. 
No matter what object these conductors take as their domain, from a body to city, topology 
expresses their common logic for territorial expansion, never imaginable with the territoriality 
understood as geometric extension, but with the intensification of existing territories. A space 
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under topological power is transformed into a relational database with lots of hidden correlations 
supposed to be discovered sooner or later by embedded sensors and actuators. The objects under 
its governance are no longer contained in a pre-given space but need to be constantly re-defined 
as orderly-variant under a certain folding/filtering of the continuum (like hidden health problems 
or terrorists, distinguishable only by the pattern recognition algorithms of a smart watch or smart 
city). Topology in this chapter thus describes the intensive infiltration of power into a space 
beyond its extensive object boundaries, and the tendency to redefine objects as relational 
problems constantly re-unfolded from the space‘s intensive transformations. As the following 
sections will demonstrate, the technological embodiment of topological power, such as the 
Internet of Things, is therefore superior to other territorial actors based in a single extensive level 
of space since the number of objects that a topological actor put under its governance is 
potentially unlimited as it could unfold hidden levels of the space ad infinitum. The more 
problems are hidden, the more topological their solutions should be. 
The expansion of topological power along the digital networks for the past decades has 
been exemplified by the proliferation of software interfaces attached not only to the surfaces of a 
city but also human skins under smart wearable devices. Lots of hidden correlations otherwise 
undetectable have been foregrounded by the wireless interoperations of these objects. On the 
other hand, the thought experiment on the transformability of a non-smart home in the 
Introduction of the chapter suggests another direction that topological power recently takes to 
excavate the underlying continuum of our everyday life. A space‘s becoming topological in this 
domestic scenario is no longer due to the connection to the outside networks. It is instead 
intensified through the manifold regional interconnections of the devices in the same sense that 
the term manifold means in Riemannian differential geometry a set of ―multiply extended 
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magnitudes … susceptible of various metric relations,‖ in which ―a [Euclidean] space constitutes 
only a special case of a triply extended magnitude‖ (Riemann, 2007, p.23). Our not-yet-smart 
home is likewise topological as it is charged with lots of potential interoperations among the 
devices that would be susceptible to various functional relations if once again rewired properly to 
each other. As the technological solution to this quest for becoming topological of everyday life, 
the Internet of Things embeds miniaturized ―RFID and sensor technology‖ in the objects 
occupying a space and lets them ―observe, identify and understand the world‖ from their own 
data points and, in turn, transforms a space into a relational database (Ashton, 2009). We can 
take this as the new technological attractor representing topological power‘s recent shift from 
global networking to regional intensification.  
According to the International Telecommunication Union‘s paper for standardization, 
the things in the Internet of Things are enrolled to a new dimension called ―Any THING 
communication,‖ distinguishable from other two dimensions of the ICTs in the past namely 
―Any TIME communication‖ and ―Any PLACE communication‖ (2012, p.2). The new 
dimension for machine-to-machine communication provides the smart objects with an 
ontological platform for their reciprocal presences without being necessarily used in human 
TIME and PLACE. To realize its ideal for the ―full use of things to offer services to all kinds of 
applications‖ (p.3), the IoT-based smart home thus needs to liberate its objects from their 
previous obligation to follow the instructions directly given from humans. Precipitated from this 
liberation, the intensive machine-to-machine communications would then gradually unfold a 
space‘s hidden relational problems—such as its states not being optimal for a predictable tenant 
behavior, for instance, going to bed—in the form of parameters manageable by a set of smart 
80 
 
objects deployed for the relevant IoT applications—such as a sleep app to manage the 
interoperation of a smart thermometer, lighting, phone and watch.  
A smart home topology in this scenario is analyzable into three different conductors of 
topological power in negotiation. First, there is the tenant, so conscious of possible inefficiencies 
hidden in her daily routine, and thus persuaded to think of her home and own body as an 
intensive continuum embedded with lots of non-localizable problems. The smart home 
applications she purchased would then function as technical conductors of topological power to 
unfold these invisible levels of her daily routine. Lastly, there is a service provider, who owns 
the Big Data gathered from its smart home subscribers, and constantly re-folds this continuum to 
data-mine more problems for the companies‘ further market penetration into the intensive 
domain of a smart home. The most optimized domestic space today first needs to be intensified 
with people‘s concerns about something hidden and embedded in their daily routine in order to 
justify its local governance through smart objects, as much as its enrollment to the global 
infrastructures outside is believed to contribute to the frictionless digital convergence for the 
utopian ―Internet of Everything‖ (Evans, 2012) or ―everyware‖ (Greenfield, 2006).  
 
Manifolds in the Internet of Things 
Kirstein (2016) suggests an architectural abstraction for expanding ―the edge of the 
networks that make up the Internet‖ even to the not ―IP-enabled‖ objects, such as the devices in 
our non-smart home scenario. According to him, a typical IoT system consists of two layers. 
DeploymentNet, or the physical lower layer, is for the actual enrollment of smart objects to a 
physical domain. ServiceNet, or the upper software layer, is on the other hand where the virtual 
objects as the algorithmic counterparts of the physical objects are abstractly defined for their 
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deployment for the IoT applications. For the regional IoT infrastructure (such as a smart home 
with several smart devices) to be automatically operational for the applications in the software 
layer, the semantic technology called ontology needs to intervene in the middle for ―the 
alignment and matchmaking tasks … to identify which smart entities that ‗live‘ in [the tenant‘s] 
house are appropriate for the applications/services to function‖ (Kotis & Katasonov, 2012).
9
 
Replacing the tenant‘s habitual deployment of objects for her daily routine, this ontological 
protocol for machine-to-machine communication enables the smart home to optimize itself for 
her life. This technological optimization of the space, which the tenant may believe she delegated 
to the IoT to save the time she used to spend for walking around and manually turning on and off 
the devices, is however not only serving for her daily needs but following the corporate 
conductor‘s commercial interests, namely to renew the space constantly.  
For the tenant in the not-yet-smart setting, to live her daily routine is to transform her 
surroundings gradually into the symmetrical figure to her everyday practices. Along the multiple 
sensorimotor pathways from what physiologists call reflex arc to what phenomenologists call 
intention arc (Merleau-Ponty, 2005), any move she takes at home is followed by her somatic 
expectation on the transformation that this move would bring in the space. The actual perception 
succeeding her move would in turn confirm or update this expectation for her future moves. In 
this sense, the tenant‘s living in her not-yet-smart home is topologically isomorphic to the 
process whereby a spatial continuum is folded along a set of biological sensors and motors 
                                                 
9
 This stratified structure is also typical in other IoT-based system such as IBM‘s blueprint for a smart city 
which consists of the bottom layer of instrumentation ―made up of sensors, actuators, programmable logic 
controllers and distributed intelligent sensors‖ and the top layer of intelligence for ―urban software 




interconnected along certain physiological pathways. As Ingold says, ―places are formed through 
movement, when a movement along turns into a movement around‖ (2008, p.1808). Like the 
typical residents of modern buildings Pink et al. call ―directors of flows,‖ our tenant improvises 
―the material configuration and atmosphere of [her] bedtime home as [she] move[s] through‖ the 
space for ―switching the lights on and off, closing curtains, plugging in things to charge and 
setting up technologies to ‗work‘ while [she is] asleep‖; in other words, she makes the home ―felt 
right‖ to her ―bedtime routine‖ (2016, p.86, 88).  
On the other hand, the IoT‘s optimization of a smart home is not for stabilizing it into a 
single ―right‖ level for living. Its stability is bad news for the service provider because that 
means no more problems embedded for the company‘s further penetration. Stability in a smart 
home should thus be only a transitory equilibrium about to be broken by the new problems the 
updated application soon excavates. As Kitchin and Dodge illustrate with the term ―code/space,‖ 
in a smart home, ―space is constantly bought into being as an incomplete solution to an ongoing 
relational problem‖ namely the maximum optimization (2011, p.71). For this bringing forth of a 
more optimal space to be repeated over and over again, the physical continuum of a smart home 
should be full of small problems relational to a variety of predictable tenant behaviors, such as 
its being not-yet-optimal-enough for having a sleep, doing exercise, or watching TV, which can 
be optimized further by each different application. Unlike the spatial continuum of a not-yet-
smart home, that was folded along the physiologically hardwired sensorimotor pathways, the 
continuum of a smart home, under multiple sensor-actuator arcs, is not detained within a single 
level of optimality. Instead, its IoT system needs to keep the continuum intensive enough to be 
de/re-territorialized by different sets of sensors and actuators for different applications. For doing 
so, it needs to redefine a tenant not as a director of flows, but a source of flows constantly 
83 
 
disturbing the space. In this sense, we can interpret the two-layered structure of the IoT as a 
strategic design decision that guarantees the corporate power‘s intensive market penetration. 
While its lower layer for the maximum interoperability of smart objects intensifies the space with 
lots of relational problems, the upper software layer gradually identifies and commodifies them 
into its serviceable domains. For instance, Lanzeni observed in a citizen-sensing environment 
project that the problem of knowing the real cause of air pollution is always engaged with some 
―other environmental elements‖ that the current deployment of environmental sensors cannot 
detect. These others withdrawing from the grip of current software solutions are nevertheless 
hidden in certain implicate orders that would ―become tangible‖ and ―bring [the participants] 
closer to understanding what was causing the pollution‖ as they redeploy the sensors by 
―improving firmware or to move to a different technology‖ (2016, pp.55-6, 60).
 
In other words, 
smart futures are already embedded in the intensified materiality but able to be brought in reality 
only through the ubiquitous computing of smart devices because the symptoms of these futures 
are too widely distributed over the environments to be predicted by the linearity of human reason.  
As Dourish and Bell say, ―the proximate future vision‖ of ubiquitous computing has 
financially justified the ―dramatic transformations of technological infrastructure‖ for the last 
three decades from Mark Weiser‘s early research at Xerox PARC in the 1990s to the recent IoT 
(2011, pp.24-5). In the topological framework roughly sketched above, this future vision is now 
interpreted as more than just the rhetoric of Silicon Valley on its ―future infinitely postponed‖ 
(Ibid.). In-between the intensive lower layer and abstract upper layer of a smart home, the most 
optimal future for our living is inevitably postponed infinitely because it would stay lurking in 
the underlying continuum until the software applications unfold all of its problematic levels and, 
more importantly, because this intensive continuum is always abundant with hidden problems. 
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Lauren Martin and Anna Secor say about the current use of the term topology in human 
geography:  
 
In this formulation, topology becomes very much like the ‗base‘ to the topographical 
‗superstructure‘ – except, to be fair, topological space is not defined by a set of given 
relationships (such as a capitalist mode of production) but rather by the multiplicity of 
potential relationships that comprise that space‖ (2013, p.432). 
 
Likewise, the topological continuum of the IoT is the base to the superstructure of each 
IoT service domain, which is no other than the commodification of one embedded level of this 
―multiplicity of potential relationships that comprise the space.‖ While Martin and Secor 
examine topology in line with the ―periodic passions for the appropriation of scientific authority 
in the social sciences and humanities,‖ they also raise a question whether its scientific authority 
has brought ―a host of decidedly positivist and even Cartesian assumptions,‖ which they call 
―topological desire‖ (p.433), back to the poststructuralist spatial theory. In the place where these 
scholars feel something Cartesian again, what I term topological power, on the other hand, 
rediscovers the measurability of space in a more general sense than that once inferred from 
Euclidean axioms, the desire to measure all embedded levels of space exhaustively. 
 
Riemannian and Poincaréan theories of symmetrical space 
The promise for the IoT‘s never-ending market penetration, even after everything is 
already replaced by smart objects in our smart home, is thus based on people‘s renewed concerns 
about the multiplicity embedded in their material reality. Topological power is descriptive of 
how the recent software industry exploits this multiplicity by drawing multiple sensor-actuator 
arcs over a spatial continuum to unfold its hidden marketable levels. For the conceptual tool to 
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analyze the way this power creates certain ―cuts‖ within a continuum to unravel its embedded 
spaces and geometries (Poincaré, 1913, p.54), we can refer to Bernhard Riemann‘s mathematical 
concept of manifold and Henry Poincaré‘s group theory.  
In the essay on a manifold ―at the foundation of geometry,‖ Riemann devised a 
mathematical apparatus to demonstrate how this conceptual space of multiply extended 
magnitudes unfolds a surface with a constant curvature. He assumes that for measurement in the 
most basic sense to be possible, a length of the line should be independent of its position no 
matter where it is superposed to be compared with other lengths. He then contrives heuristically 
an anonymous ―one,‖ who (or which) passes from one magnitude to another to transport ―the line 
element ds‖ as an infinitesimal yardstick to define ―metric relations of which a manifold … is 
susceptible.‖ This mathematical cursor running across a manifold gradually localizes the nearby 
magnitudes it passes through into the points fixed by the homogeneous Pythagorean distance 
function, and consequently, it concretizes one embedded level of the manifold, on which any 
configurations ―distinguished by a mark or a boundary‖ that the cursor draws appear 
symmetrical to the group of geometric transformations, such as displacements and rotations 
(Riemann, 2007, p.24, 26).  
Riemann‘s differential geometry in this heuristic explanation suggests a mathematical 
conductor of topological power, which functions to fold the entities infinitely close to its 
trajectory into the geometric theorem at the expense of breaking all other relations possible in a 
manifold. In this sense, it provides one possible way to explain how the intensive space of the 
nineteenth century‘s microphysics was re-wired along the Cartesian coordinate by a sort of 
topological power that aimed to unfold a level of measurability. As the substitute for this purely 
mathematic conductor in Riemann, Poincaré on the other hand suggested a simple biological 
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being that senses and moves in its multiply extended intensive environments. In his physiological 
and phenomenological explanation on the emergence of geometry, what appears to be invariant 
enough to replace Riemann‘s hypothetical line element (ds) is an elementary correlation between 
two types of state change that this biological cursor undergoes as it moves around the continuum 
of intensities: namely the changes aroused from its sensors ―independent of will‖ and those 
―voluntary and accompanied by muscular sensations‖ (Poincaré,
 
2007, p.121). An eye, for 
instance, can be thought of as an intersection for these two types of changes to be intermingled. 
As a cursor, it may move to the right and left as the manifestation of a motor volition that 
activates specific muscles; the metric relation between the external sensations which have passed 
through the retina during the motor activity could then be measured by the amount of the 
coincident muscular sensations. If there is no other motor apparatus activated in this micro 
phenomenological experience, these voluntary muscular sensations would be enough to unfold 
certain spatial relations within the continuum as invariant under the muscles‘ repeated activations, 
whereas the other portion of the continuum would withdraw to the intensive background (p.135). 
For the physiological system that is multiply extended to its surroundings through its sensors and 
motors multiply interconnected inside, these elementary sensations can be the alternative to the 
Riemannian line element, not hypothetically given any longer, but experientially emergent. 
Along the trajectory this body draws, the surrounding manifold would eventually bifurcate into a 
phenomenological space symmetrical to a group of transformations that this biological cursor 
performs through its elementary muscular operations and ―all the combinations which can be 
made of them‖ (p.125).  
For Poincaré, the conductor of power that unfolds a geometric structure embedded in the 
intensive background is one‘s voluntary action accompanying certain muscular sensations, or 
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what current neuroscience calls proprioception, which enables ―the sensory cortices to predict 
specifically how the actions to be taken will change the relations of the eyes, nose, ears, and 
fingers to the world‖ (Freeman, 2000, p.33). He also knew that a ―sensible space‖ this biological 
being inhabits is not three dimensional a priori but possible to be folded into ―as many [degrees] 
as there are nerve-fibers‖ (Poincaré,
 
2007, p.132). From this feature of a manifold, which can be 
bound by many local sensorimotor pathways but inexhaustible by any of them, the continuum 
underling the extensive reality is inferred to embed lots of hidden levels within its intensities, 
each of which can be unfolded separately by different attractors, but never unfolded all together. 
Geometry for Poincaré was therefore just one embedded order out of manifold others in the 
world. Geometry is just unraveled as a single stable level on which an anthropomorphic 
sensorimotor pathway ―achieve[s] maximum grip‖ (Freeman, 2000, pp.120-1).
10
  
In Poincaréan group theory, symmetry hitherto indicating an object‘s invariance under a 
subject‘s observation and manipulation attains a new ontological meaning as it refers to the 
emergence of the subject-object boundary itself from a continuum under transformation. 
Symmetry is an event whereby a group of sensors and motors is interconnected along an arc 
through which the folded inside of the continuum achieves a stable grip on a certain level of the 
outside. In this respect, symmetry is akin to what Karen Bard describes by the term agential cut: 
―topological dynamics of enfolding whereby the spacetimematter manifold is enfolded into 
itself‖ whereby ―the marking of the ‗measuring agencies‘ by the ‗measured object‘‖ emerges 
(2007, p.140, 177). This cut is where a continuum is folded in two and differentiated into the 
symmetrical inside and outside. The cut is, therefore, prior to any boundaries of the 
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 For how Poincaré thought of geometry in relation to an organism‘s pursuit to ―achieve maximum grip,‖ 
see Poincaré, 2007, p.274. 
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observer/observed, toucher/touched drawn on the continuum.
11
 As the cause which makes this 
cut, power does not belong to either of two poles of the symmetry, namely subject and object. 
The power topologically thought is describable better as a continuum‘s fluctuation to make a fold 
on its own surface, from which something invariant comes to the fore, or bifurcates as an object. 
This movement is both material and discursive in that the unfolded space not only displays the 
objects‘ invariant boundaries but expresses the group of transformations to which their 
objectness is defined as symmetrical. Territorialization is the expression of this power. 
Riemann‘s infinitesimal yardstick is one instance, which folds a mathematical manifold into a 
measurable space under the maximum grip of the Pythagorean Theorem. Poincaré‘s group of 
transformations is another as it folds an intensive continuum to filter out a livable space on 
which a living being achieves the maximum grip along its sensorimotor pathway. There is also 
my own example of the Internet of Things, whose wireless sensor and actuator network 
constantly refolds the underlying continuum of a smart home to cultivate lots of serviceable and 
marketable spaces for its perpetual market penetration. 
 
Two types of power in manifolds 
Symmetry as a mode of relational thinking has been common in social theories since the 
actor-network theory manifested the principle of symmetry as its democratic agenda. In ANT, 
symmetry means the equal right assigned bilaterally to both human and nonhuman and ―the 
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 The force which makes a cut in a manifold involves the operation of apparatuses such as the sensors 
and motors which constitute a cursor; however, before folded into the cut as a local sensorimotor pathway, 
these apparatuses are no other than just entities or magnitudes affective to their multiply extended 
surroundings. As Barad emphasizes, these measuring devices should be understood as ―boundary-making 




same type of explanation‖ given to ―all the elements that go to make up a heterogeneous network, 
whether these elements are devices, natural forces, or social groups‖ (Law, 2012, p.124). For this 
same cause for the formation of the social, ―the choice of network‖ has been discussed as the 
activity that any entities not identified yet need to do for making themselves present in ―a 
noticeable and individual way‖ to others (pp.125-6). According to this principle, the evolution of 
a technical system with many autonomous parts, such as the Internet of Things, has often been 
interpreted as an actor-network‘s gradual individuation or sudden bifurcation into a systemic 
whole at the expense of breaking all other relations among the actors, once preserved in their 
earlier contradictory coexistence. However, as Couldry points out, repurposed as the theory of 
spatialization, this way of explaining the social as emergent merely from the autonomous 
fluctuations of distributed actors has provided only a limited account neglecting ―the long-term 
consequences of networks for the distribution of social power‖ (2008, p.101). ANT‘s emphasis 
on the bilateral symmetry between actors is ―strangely silent when it comes to assessing whether, 
and why‖ asymmetry still rules the network in the long run (p.102), unless it simply points out 
some stronger actors at the center of the network as the culprits.  
On the other hand, the symmetry re-conceptualized in the last section suggests another 
way to think of the world-making processes in ANT without assuming any actors in distance. 
Understood as the expression of topological power that stirs the continuous deformations of a 
manifold, symmetry now illustrates what Barad calls intra-actions: not the interactions between 
two existing relata, but the movements to fold an arbitrary boundary between subject and object 
(2007, p.139). Symmetry does not mean the relation between two actors with equal rights but an 
ontological event whereby a continuum is folded along an arc and something invariant appears 
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under its transformations. Put differently, symmetry describes a fold as an expression of the 
power that reveals a livable, perceivable, or measurable world from a continuum‘s folded inside.  
We can distinguish two types of power that governs the emergence of inter-objective 
spaces from a manifold according to whether this fold tends to be hardwired to maintain its 
current grip on a single level of environments out of many, or tends to constantly re-wire to 
update its current grip to a different level every moment. First, like the eye swaying from side to 
side, a fold may move along the continuum and then move around in order to enroll what it 
keeps passing through as the objects re-traceable by its registered or remembered motor 
operations. On the other hand, there could be another fold, which moves around to the initial 
point only to initiate each new move-along to the undiscovered territories of the space. The 
feature of a manifold the first sort of power seeks out is its single symmetrical level bound by the 
routinized sensorimotor pathways. The second sort, however, does not much concern what is the 
most stable level but constantly redeploys its wireless sensors and motors to examine all the 
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 These two tendencies of power can be explained through two modes of technological attractors that 
science and technology studies call, respectively, ―immutable mobile‖ and ―boundary object.‖ They are 
not distinguishable as opposite one another. They rather have a common function as technological 
protocols to organize a network for scientific research. Immutable mobile describes the protocol‘s 
circulation to redeploy its sensors and actuators, not only experimental equipment in a local lab but 
discursive apparatuses such as the questionnaire, and it functions to stimulate hidden matters of fact (or 
concern) of space and reproduce their invariant responses (Latour, 1990). On the other hand, the boundary 
object is characterized by its inherent ambiguity, whose circulation along different labs, insititutes, and 
disciplines constantly reorganizes local sensors and actuators to draw different levels of measurability and 
discursivity hidden in its ambiguity (Star & Griesemer, 1989). 
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If Riemann and Poincaré provide the theoretical abstractions of the first type of power 
that governs the bifurcation of a mathematical or phenomenological space, we can find its 
application to a social continuum from Brian Massumi‘s topological interpretation of 
Foucauldean governmentality. As a neo-liberal form of power ―structuring and shaping the field 
of possible action of subjects‖ (Lemke, 2002, p.52), governmentality for Massumi is analyzed 
into the combination of ―disciplinary power‖ and ―regulatory biopower‖ alternating within ―the 
continuum ‗that lies between the organic and the biological, between body and population‘‖ 
(Massumi, 2015, p.24). This continuum unfolds ―the spatial distribution of individual bodies‖ as 
―the first effect of power … [that] passes through‖ the continuum to enable ―bodies, gestures, 
discourses, and desires to be identified and constituted as something individual‖ (Foucault, 2003, 
p.242, 29-30). The symmetry of this level of ―man-as-body,‖ on which the disciplinary 
apparatuses achieve their maximum grip, is however broken as biopower re-bifurcates the 
continuum into ―man-as-species‖ (p.243). In this ―second adjustment‖ of the power, what 
appears symmetrical is instead population: the ―phenomena that are aleatory and unpredictable 
when taken in themselves or individually,‖ thus no longer symmetrical to atomistic disciplinary 
processes, but ―at the collective level, display constants‖ to the networked apparatuses for 
regulation (p.246, 250). Alternating these different techniques to fold the same social continuum, 
Foucauldian governmentality devises ―a correctional reuptake mechanism for emergent 
normative variation‖ to update the norms for the disciplinary power‘s further deployment of 
man-as-body (Massumi, 2015, p.25). Governmentality can be in this sense abstracted as a 
technique to fold and refold a social continuum to detain its transformation under the power‘s 
maximum grip on its two embedded levels, namely individuals and population, by re-distributing 
individuals in a way to make their collective figure symmetrical to a population kept under 
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certain statistical constants and vice versa. In its tendency to detain the social dynamics under the 
manageable alternation between many and one, this power is topologically isomorphic to how 
the tenant in the introduction governs her space. Her moving in the continuum of a not-yet-smart 
home also gradually redeployed the individual devices to the new niches whose collective 
interoperations would correspond to the constants in her daily routines such as her regular needs 
and desires to fulfill with these devices.  
On the other hand, the second type of power is distinguishable by its tendency to unfold 
more symmetries hidden in the continuum no matter how symmetry-breaking an attempt to find 
a new symmetry is to the others already discovered. It does not seek out a limited set of constants 
to detain the continuum‘s dynamics in a single or two-coupled level, such as geometry or 
individual-population. Instead, the power now draws a whole state space for the continuum to 
pass through in its recurrent differentiations from one state to another, constantly updating its 
optimal grip from one level to another. We can think of this type of power also as what appears 
in the middle of the two layers of a smart home and governs its space-binding. It is revealed 
through the software layer‘s constant redeployment of sensors and actuators. Whenever a new 
smart home application is downloaded and executed in the high, the smart objects in the low are 
redeployed to assemble a new sensor-actuator arc to unfold a hidden marketable level of the 
space. For instance, in an existing smart solution to ―the wellness of an elderly living alone,‖ a 
set of smart objects including a room heater, toaster, microwave, TV, bed, and chair is deployed 
by an algorithm that calculates the ―wellness parameters,‖ the measure for the space‘s 
engagement with a person‘s health-related routine (Suryadevara et al.,
 
2013). On the other hand, 
the same set of objects can be re-deployed in other applications to calculate other parameters, 
such measures as of the space‘s engagement with energy-consuming routine (Moreno et al., 
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2014), calorie-burning routine (Helal et al., 2009), and so forth. As a semantic protocol to define 
the types of sensors and actuators in the low and their possible interoperations for the 
applications in the high, the IoT ontology executes a different kind of governmentality, whose 
spatial redistribution of individual devices is not to stabilize them as a systemic whole regulated 
by a finite set of constants. Instead, the ontology as a protocol for machine-to-machine 
communication is for maximizing the different ways of their distributions for each different level 
of the manifold, in which a problem otherwise unidentifiable eventually appears to be 
symmetrical. Re-stirring the continuum once detained by an average routine of the tenant, and 
exploring all the problematic levels its resumed differentiation could pass through, this new 
technique for space-binding in turn transforms a smart home into a continuum, or a nested set of 
problems related to each other by symmetry-breaking bifurcations.
13
 
A smart home understood as a manifold in this sense redefines the meaning of a 
domestic space. It is no longer something lived by and organized through one‘s habitual 
sensorimotor activities. A domestic space now is constantly re-differentiated into a specific 
―problem space.‖ Under a particular ―set of operators‖ temporarily redeployed to form a measure 
for a unique lurking problem, this conceptual space progresses from ―a set of initial states‖ to ―a 
set of goal [or solved] states‖ according to the execution of an application (Newell, 1980, p.5). A 
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 Donna Hoffman and Thomas Novak‘s assemblage theory approach to consumer experience of the IoT 
describes this transformation. They categorize the possible interactions that could occur in a smart home 
as follows: 1) Consumer-centric part-part interaction (such as a consumer experience of a smart object), 
2) Consumer-centric part-whole interaction (a consumer experience of a smart home), 3) Nonconsumer-
centric part-part interaction (an object experience of another object), 4) Nonconsumer-centric part-whole 
interaction (an object experience of a smart home). As ―a set of nested and overlapping assemblages with 
different spatio-temporal scales‖ within a smart home assemblage, these multiplied interactions, each of 
which can be analyzed into an object-object or human-object assemblage, or a sensor-actuator arc in my 
term, serve the abundance of computational problems for IoT applications (2018, p.1179, 1183). 
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human tenant cannot govern these problems optimally not because there are too many of them, 
but rather because she cannot live all different levels simultaneously. The smart objects thus do 
not need to be symmetrical to the context of the tenant‘s direct uses of them, or human-centered 
―correlationism‖ (Meillassoux, 2010). For the larger number of smart objects to be interoperable 
enough to foreground all the hidden parameters of the space, they should be symmetrical more to 
the microscopic perturbations of the continuum each other‘s operation arouses. 
 
 
Figure 2.2: An intensive space and a problem space 
 
To put this IoT architecture simply, the wireless sensors and actuators in the low 
intensify the intra-active potential of the space; the ontology in the middle translates this 
potential into the modular machine-to-machine communications and enables their autonomous 
redeployment for software applications; the upper software layer, on the other hand, draws a 
state space, which describes all possible problematic states of a smart home detectable and 






To define a physical domain of the IoT as a multiply extended manifold is not only an 
engineering solution to the ubiquitous problems in our everyday life but also a marketing 
necessity for its state space to expand ever to the new marketable states of the intensive space. 
As early as the 1950s, the American architect Charles Eames anticipated that the future 
architectures would approach their new state of the art ―based on handling and relating of an 
impossible number of factors.‖ His early vision for cybernetic architecture required the architects 
to control ―the effect of and affect on many simultaneous factors‖ insofar as they are responsible 
―to use such a tool‖ that ―could make possible the inclusion of more factors—and could make 
calculable the possible results of relationships between combinations of factors‖ (Halpern, 2014, 
p.134). About a half-century later, Mark Weiser in the 1990s suggested ubiquitous computing as 
this kind of tool to integrate lots of human and machine-generated databases in one‘s home and 
office. However, emphasizing its withdrawal to the peripheries of human attention, what the 
ubicomp‘s slogan of ―calm technology‖ promised was not to enable humans to process more 
computational elements, but to liberate users from their responsibility for multitasking in the PC 
era, namely to symmetrify lots of technical objects to their conscious goals (Weiser & Brown, 
1997). Finally, ―in [our still] coming age of calm technology,‖ we witness that the withdrawals 
of the smart devices into our intensified ―periphery‖ are mobilized by the corporate conductors 
of topological power, enabling every human problem environmentally dispersed to be potentially 
symmetrical to and thus orderly manageable by their smart applications. The state space the IoT 
lays over our intensified smart home redefines these problems as what we cannot access since 




The market potential of a smart home is, therefore, proportional to the number of 
problems assumed to be hiding in its intensive space. To justify the IoT‘s interventions, these 
problems should remain undistinguishable until their urgency is measured by each different 
software application. Under this commercial necessity, a smart home is defined as what Massumi 
calls a ―crisis-incubating environment,‖ where the crises are concealed in the forms 
asymmetrical to a Poincaréan observer, or our human tenant, who recognize the problems too 
late after the crises already disturb the symmetries of her daily routine. In this environment, 
―[t]he crises are tailored to justify solutions‖ (Sadowski & Bendor, 2019, p.553). What the recent 
smart home applications and other regional smart environments incubate foremost as this sort of 
crisis is the inefficiency in the tenants‘ energy uses (Moreno et al., 2014). No longer merely 
being a problem of our bad habit, the inefficiency is now embedded in the imperceptible 
fluctuations of a space that our non-conscious behaviors precipitate. ―The preemptive power‖ of 
the software layer thus needs to be always ready to ―counter the event-driving force of accident if 
it catch it in the before of incipience,‖ in other words, before you commit the bad habit once 
again (Massumi, 2015, p.40). As Massumi says, the power in this sort is environmental as it 
―alters the life environment‘s conditions of emergence,‖ but different from how biopower detains 
a continuum within ―a territory, grasped from the angle of its actually providing livable 
conditions for an existing biological being‖ (p.40). Instead, the preemptive power of the IoT 
resides in ―a prototerritory tensed with a compelling excess of potential which renders it strictly 
unlivable‖ (p.40): such as a world of smart objects an ideal IoT ontology defines, in which every 
object perceives any tiny fluctuations everything else arouses in a continuum. Tensed with these 
fundamental symmetries among the objects and their unlimited interoperability, the IoT‘s crisis-
incubating materiality also cultivates its smart futures, which could be brought in reality as 
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proper sets of smart objects eventually discovers hidden parameters for each unknown problem. 
Following Massumi, we can call this topological power ontopower. As he exemplifies with the 
battlefields of modern warfare embedded with ―the proteiform ‗terrorism‘‖ (p.11) and as Howe 
(2019) exemplifies with Iceland‘s glaciers with the intensified ―environmental precarities,‖ the 
―continuum in space/time/matter‖ this power operationalizes is characterized by its excessive 
implicate orders, asymmetrical to the ―human-centered‖ sensing practices, but symmetrical to 
the sensing practices of ―other-than-human entities‖ (Gabry, 2016). As the domestic counterpart 
to these post-9/11 battlefields and Anthropocenic environments, a smart home also incubates its 
own problems asymmetrical to our everyday sensorimotor activities and re-symmetrifies them 
into serviceable problems through its IoT-driven ontopower.  
Ulrich Beck said in the 1980s that ―the ‗logic‘ of risk production‖ would replace the 
―logic of wealth production‖ in late capitalism where the risk distribution, not the wealth, 
becomes the most urgent problem for the still on-going project of modernization (1992, p.12). 
Under the ―conditions of ‗scarcity society,‘‖ the function of techno-science as the engine of 
modernization was, he says, for ―opening the gates to hidden sources of social wealth.‖ On the 
other hand, under the condition of a risk society where ―for many people problems of 
‗overweight‘ take the place of hunger,‖ the hidden source for this techno-scientific monetization 
is no longer ―obvious scarcity,‖ but invisible side effects of modernization, such as harmful 
chemicals and pollutants, which ―escape perception and are localized in the sphere of physical 
and chemical formulas‖ (pp.20-21). These threats, detached from ―any possibility of perception,‖ 
are ―not only transmitted by science, but in the strict sense are scientifically constituted‖ (p.162). 
In this respect, modernization‘s self-referential turn to its own side effects, or modernization 
risks, has formed a vicious cycle of self-intensification, which has constantly generated new side 
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effects no matter how many solutions have been accumulated to the known problems so far. As 
he said, ―the insatiable demands long sought by economists‖ have been discovered from our 
inexhaustible concerns over the life-threatening side effects in the techno-scientific second 
nature while the material demands from the first nature, such as hunger and basic needs, seem to 
be sated and satisfied in the welfare-states of the West (p.23).  
As the local demonstration of this risk-cultivating second nature, a smart home however 
shows that some of the most urgent problems hidden in our not-enough modernized ways of life 
are still rooted in the first nature of our biological self. In this new domestic space reflexive of its 
own resource consumption, our biological needs as much as the sociocultural are revealed to 
have never been satisfied optimally by the consumerism of the past century insofar as our self-
recognition of problems entails inevitable delays and inefficiencies. Unlike Beck‘s expectation, 
the fields of science from which the most number of invisible problems have been commodified 
for the new economy in the last decades would be in this sense neither chemistry nor 
environmental science but the studies on the too-human-inefficiencies in our biological first 
nature, such as behavioral economics and ergonomics (Nadler & McGuigan, 2018). Beck says 
that the excessive specialization of measuring method and devices in each discipline of techno-
science has embedded the ―shunting yards of problems‖ in the intensified material reality of the 
modernity (p.179). Algorithmatizing this web of procedures to measure a variety of hidden 
problems, the Internet of Things has expanded its service domains in our everyday life.  
 
Self-knowledge and self-symmetrification 
In the topological framework I developed in this chapter, what Dourish and Bell call 
―the proximate future vision‖ of ubiquitous computing or its ―future infinitely postponed‖ is 
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reinterpretable (2011, pp.24-5). The infinite postponement between the diagnosis of our current 
state as full of hidden problems and the future of their complete resolution no longer debunks the 
promise of ubiquitous computing. This gap is, instead, what attracts the constant re-bifurcation of 
a more optimal future from the intensive continuum of the IoT.  
If this ceaseless bringing-forth of better futures is the ultimate goal of a smart home, the 
human‘s intentional and reflexive temporality would be the problem that needs to be 
symmetrified first to the IoT‘s algorithmic temporality. It is because the most optimal future 
would mean the future ready to accommodate anything we intend to do. We can think of our 
quantified-self as a topological solution to this problem. As the digital shadow of one‘s everyday 
practice, the quantified-self implies how the presence of human ―bodies, minds, and daily lives‖ 
is now translated into the imperceptible perturbations of space detected by ―various self-tracking 
tools and applications, including emotion trackers, food trackers, and pedometers‖ (Ruckenstein, 
2017, p.402). Like other embedded problems, these human-caused perturbations display certain 
constants at the collective level that signifies her ―wants, needs, and goals … individual diversity 
in areas such as sleeping, eating, drinking, or exercising‖ (p.411). However, occurring as 
nonconscious processes in the first place, these problems would remain no other than just 
fluctuations of a physiological continuum (namely one‘s body or brain) until they appear, at best 
several milliseconds of missing time later, as something intentional or (un)conscious to one‘s 
self-understanding.
14
 If it is true that intention is not the cause of our agency, but the 
consequence of lots of distributed actors in the smart home, these too-human milliseconds of 
delays in self-understanding would be already long enough to make an intensive continuum of 
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our body—yet to be bound by our mind—felt as a crisis needed to be preempted by ontopower. 
Given the inefficiency embedded in this delay of human conscious, your home should be under 
the control of the IoT applications to make it always and already optimal to your imminent 
intentions and desires. For instance, even before you find you want to go to bed, the environment 
should be symmetrified to the actions to come by dimming the light and warming the room. In 
short, the tenant needs to have a sort of open-mindedness as a new technique of self-management, 
which I term self-symmetrification: to render one‘s nonconscious more connectable to various 
smart devices, which outrun humans in managing the most optimal state of their physiology. 
This does not require a tenant to re-engineer her whole body and behaviors but live her life in 
accord with the daily protocols the IoT suggests. Sometimes, these protocols ask her to act as 
naturally as possible as if nothing unnatural or machinic operates in the background. Don‘t talk 
―to Alexa in a stiff, awkward manner‖ but ―relax when … [talk] with Alexa‖ so that it could 
learn more about your particular self. Don‘t use ―Alexa in a restricted and stunted way,‖ 
otherwise you would feel ―reduced as a person, even robotic, when [you talk] to Alexa.‖ Don‘t 
let yourself locked-in an assemblage ―repeating the same interactions because of the limitations 
of‖ user data, which ―constrains what the consumer, as part of the assemblage, is capable of 
doing and experiencing‖ (Hoffman & Novak, 2018, p.1179, 1187). 
As Foucault already pointed out in 1979, the concept of homo œconomicus, or the 
economic human, since B. F. Skinner‘s behavioralism, has been redefined and, under the recent 
behavioral economics, our smart home tenant is this economic human not because she is a 
rational decision-maker but because of her ―systemic responses to the variables of the 
environment‖ (Millner, 2019; Foucault, 2008, p.270). For the behavioral economists, human 
rationality is something enhanceable by modifying these variables in the environment, as 
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exemplified by its ―nudge‖ policies, which redesign the environment as a ―choice architecture‖ 
by redistributing conscious and nonconscious cues secretly intervening in people‘s decision-
making. Their ―libertarian paternalism,‖ which Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein declare in 
Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness, suggests the new symmetry 
between humans and environments. In ―the libertarian aspect‖ of their mission, humans still feel 
their ―freedom of choice‖ guaranteed or even increased in the new choice architecture (Thaler & 
Sunstein, 2008, p.5); but, at nonconscious level, they are in fact guided by this architecture and 
―choice engines‖ (Thaler & Tucker, 2013).  
Let us consider the smart home this chapter described as one of the most advanced 
examples of these nudge architectures. The tenant now rediscovers herself not symmetrical to her 
own self-understanding, but as a host of manifold vital signals traceable by smart devices‘ 
―power of countless observations of small incidents of change—incidents that used to vanish 
without a trace.‖ However, contrary to how the tech-savvy gurus in Wired Magazine once 
willfully ―delegated‖ the practice of ―data-gathering‖ and ―record-keeping‖ ―to a host of simple 
Web apps,‖ the tenant‘s movements in a smart home are more silently tracked by the ubiquitous 
sensors, which quantify ―every facet of life, from sleep to mood to pain, 24/7/365‖ (Wolf, 2009, 
June). She is no longer a director of flows, but a source of flows. If the smart home‘s promise for 
the ―commitment to continual lifestyle improvement‖ is proportional to the number of 
connections that the tenant has with the devices, the only rational decision left for her is no 
longer to symmetrify the devices to her everyday uses, but symmetrify herself more to the new 
devices. It is always true in the IoT: ―more (convenience, comfort, entertainment, security) is 




INTERMISSION 2: ON HUMAN RESPONSE-ABILITY 
 
In the new smart environments, we are free from the previous responsibility of PC users, 
namely to rearrange all algorithmic objects in the forms symmetrical to our conscious goals. We 
are required instead to symmetrify our conscious or nonconscious activities to the ubiquitous 
computing in the background through the everyday protocols camouflaged in very mundane 
practices such as wearing smart clothes, watches, glasses, using smart appliances, or using smart 
plugs even for non-smart appliances everywhere. What I term self-symmetrification is in this 
sense a practice to transform one‘s own body into a multi-nodal figure within a network, or to 
black-box its physiology and neurology as the indeterminate middle within multiple sensor-
actuator arcs each smart application organizes in a smart home. Its effectiveness in optimizing 
our surroundings to our psychosomatic state and vice versa is however not relevant at all to the 
behavioralist reductionism, which defines a neurophysiological continuum of a body as a simple 
sensory-motor mechanism similar to a Skinner box. Its promise for the ever-optimizable near 
future is rather based on a topological feature of the continuum that bifurcates as many different 
sensor-actuator responses as the number of smart applications. 
In the previous chapter, a smart home was discussed as the new domestic space that 
encloses a human tenant within its black-box. The wireless interoperability of smart objects and 
their constant re-assemblages were considered what enable a smart home to bifurcate each 
different problem space every moment to stabilize the most urgent perturbations that happen in 
the building‘s hidden physiology and neurology. As Deleuze says about the logic of the 
―societies of control,‖ a smart home functions ―like a self-deforming cast that will continuously 
change from one moment to the other.‖ The tenant, or an undifferentiated inner circuit of this 
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black-box, is also redefined topologically as her conscious and nonconscious responses to the 
ubiquitous smart objects are not fixed along a single sensorimotor arc, but under constant 
transformations ―like a sieve whose mesh will transmute from point to point‖ (Deleuze, 1992, 
p.4).  
The discourses on human responsiveness to a technical system in media studies have 
traditionally found its prototype in the operator of Whirlwind radar, a Cold War-era digital 
computer developed for the U.S. Navy. In this real-time early warning system of the 1950s, the 
job of a human operator in front of a CRT monitor was to make the ―man-machine interaction‖ 
continue through the repeated ―input-output relationship‖ between the operator and computers. 
For instance, it was a typical role of a human operator shooting ―a light gun‖ at a small flashing 
dot on the monitor to identify potential enemies or ―taking various push button actions‖ to the 
data that the computers put ―in varying display format‖ (Rowell & Streich, 1964, p.539). For this 
military system to detect the ongoing enemy attacks in real-time for their permanent deterrence, 
the operator should be trained to perform each specialized task to close a gap between a monitor 
and switch panel through his semi-mechanized behavioral responses (p.539). In short, the 
operator should be a Skinner box.  
In the age of the Internet of Things, this model of human-machine interaction is updated 
to a non-Skinnerian version as the system‘s sustainable operation in current smart environments 
is no longer achievable simply through the deterrence of known problems, but through the 
preemption of the unknowns. The responsibility of a human operator is not to put their 
neuroplasticity in the cast of automatized input-output relations, but let it transform, like a 
―sieve,‖ into lots of different potential networks. The problematic future that we need to prevent 
is not a nuclear holocaust or defeat in market competition. The futures to be preempted are 
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involved with different kinds of problems such as ubiquitous dangers of terrorism or 
unsustainability of market system itself. As the proactive means to prepare for these unknown 
enemy networks, or to re-network the markets around unknown needs, smart objects require their 
human users always to preserve some extra response-ability for the new sensor-actuator arcs that 
they would pave for the breakthroughs of the current impasses. Until these innovative pathways 
emerge, our black-boxed neuronal connectivity should remain plastic. 
As Catherine Malabou distinguishes, the neuronal ―flexibility‖ as a brain‘s ability ―to 
receive a form or impression, to be able to fold oneself‖ was enough to train the human operator 
of Whirlwind through its software manuals or protocols for input-output interconnections. But 
our new responsibility to reassemble ubiquitous intervals between smart objects is no longer 
trained in a disciplinary process but performed in our living through everyday protocols, which 
renew our ―neuroplasticity‖ as ―the resource of giving form, the power to create, to invent or 
even to erase an impression, the power to style‖ (2008, p.12).  
In his genealogy of human responsibility from the Whirlwind operators in the 1950s to 
the early videogamers in the 1970s, Claus Pias (2011) summarizes how the users before the PC 
era were integrated into the machinic rhythm of algorithms by responding to the ―ping‖ 
computers sent with the ―pong‖ as human answer. Ping is a symbolic term he derives from the 
same name of a software utility for network administration, which functions to send a small data 
packet to a particular address in the network to see if it is ready to answer, like a sonar 
technology to detect responsible objects in the dark of oceans. Pong, another term derived from 
the name of an early videogame, on the other hand, describes the condition of a gamer, 
responsible for exchanging a virtual tennis ball with a computer across a net and thus need to be 
in the right place at the right time to continue a rally. The pair of ping and pong for Pias thus 
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represents the necessity to close the loop between humans and computers to ―prolong the 
playing‖ itself. If this reflects the meaning of sustainability in the early cybernetics whose radar 
network was responsible for constantly delaying the threat of total devastation translated into 
―symbolic death of the player and an end to all communication‖ after ―Game Over‖ (p.73, 76), 
we can extend this genealogy further to the two other periods of algorithmic culture. First, during 
the PC era, the sustainability of networks for software industries meant the stable functional 
loops between a user‘s multitasking and several software applications on a ―desktop.‖ The stage-
based videogame design in this period redefined the gamer responsibility as to develop each 
different strategy to the different goals from stage to stage: to continue the rally of ping and pong 
for each separable goal of the stages. Second, in the UC era, the sustainability now means the 
system‘s capability to preserve enough sensor-actuator correlations within its network, which can 
be mobilized for their timely repurposing into the solutions to the ubiquitous problems not yet 
specified.  
The following chapter examines the recent videogame design called ―open-world‖ as an 
illustration of the changed gamer responsibility corresponding to the UC era. Enmeshed by a 
network of algorithmic objects in a virtual reality, the neuroplasticity of the open-world gamers 
are responsible for drawing multiple lines of correlations among the objects to individuate lots of 








CHAPTER 3: TARGETING AS TRIGGEER FOR  
THE ACTOR-NETWORK IN THE OPEN-WORLD VIDEOGAMES 
 
Targeting and Videogame Objects 
To aim a crosshair at an object, or to target it, is the most rudimentary skill you have to 
master in many videogames. From a first-person shooter gamer (FPS) caught in a killer instinct 
for shooting every enemy to a third-person role-playing gamer (RPG) obsessive about searching 
hidden clues to continue a quest, targeting is the first step to map a gamer‘s chance encounters 
with objects. There are lots of targetable objects such as non-playable characters (NPC), humans, 
animals, plants, and items. Each of them has a different degree of concreteness according to its 
way of becoming in a virtual reality—whether assigned to certain locations when a map is 
generated, like the bosses and treasure chests in The Elder Scrolls V: Skyrim (Bethesda, 2011), or 
randomly generated in certain areas as a player character steps in, like the citizen NPCs in Grand 
Theft Auto V (Rockstar North, 2013), or produced by a player such as healing potions made of 
other ingredients. Even for an object existing from the very beginning with concrete properties 
defining its existence (such as the coordinate of a position and predefined behavior patterns to 
environments), it is only through targeting that this object is dragged out from its initial isolation 
and begins to interact with others and eventually reoccurs as an event a gamer experiences as a 
part of a story or play. In other words, targeting realizes an object‘s operational values by 
drawing its interactions with others, whose collective interoperations would progressively unfold 
certain stories, challenges, and quests hidden in a videogame‘s virtual reality. In a recent 
philosophy of videogame design called open-world, the number of targetable objects and their 
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different responses to a gamer‘s targeting are determinant for the number of possible events that 
the gamer‘s interactions could unfold from a videogame. 
Targeting is in this sense a supplementary action to fill the gaps between the pure 
signifiers called objects. Under the conditioning of a game engine‘s object-oriented programing, 
these objects are generated in an open-world as individual paradigmatic elements belonging to 
each different class of objects with different properties and responses to the environments. On 
the other hand, as the only un-programmed source of uncertainty in this open-world, a gamer‘s 
targeting functions to create actual syntactic interconnections between objects and converts them 
into the events happening. However, neither being a parolē to anchor a signifying chain at an 
instance of storytelling, nor an intentional noetic activity, targeting in videogames often happens 
during a gamer‘s meaningless wandering over objects as well. For these algorithmic beings, a 
gamer‘s ludic wandering—that Aarseth calls a gamer‘s ―extranoematic responsibilities‖ 
comparable to a reader‘s ―eye movement and the periodic or arbitrary turning of pages‖ (1997, 
pp.1-2)—is indistinguishable from his/her noetic-narrative acts, the targeting intentionally 
performed to make a story unfold. No matter what a gamer intends, his/her behaviors are, beyond 
a user-friendly videogame interface, fed-back as undifferentiated motor inputs for the objects to 
initiate their interoperations. These motor inputs are classifiable as either noetic narrative action 
or ludic wandering only secondarily as the responses of objects are either serialized as an 
algorithmic simulation of a story-arc or intermittent as mere chance encounters. In this sense, the 
recent design decision for the more playable values or replayability in videogames—by making a 
story unfold in many different paths to multiple endings, hiding more sub-plots, or making even 
simple encounters enjoyable—can be re-analyzed at the algorithmic level. Designing an open-
world in a videogame involves an engineering question on how to make algorithmic objects 
108 
 
more communicable so that their interoperations could evolve into creative assemblages for 
multiple story arcs or more playable values even from a gamer‘s ―emergent strategies‖ that are 
―neither anticipated by the game designer, nor … easily derivable from the rules of a game‖ 
(Juul, 2002). 
This figure-ground switch in videogame design foregrounds a symmetric engagement 
between gamers and objects, which the ludologist/narratologist debates of the early videogame 
studies have concealed in their obsession at the authentic cultural value of gaming blind to the 
algorithmic values generated on the flip side of the interface.
15
 As much as targeting is a gamer 
action with a strategic value over objects, the machine also induces and mobilizes this gamer 
action for drawing motor inputs to instantiate its technical agents, objects, into specific 
operational units. For instance, the audio-visual cues objects radiate and the auto-targeting that 
makes the crosshair automatically attracted to objects are not only to help gamers reassemble 
objects into certain discursive or playable orders, but for these objects to target back to the 
gamers‘ attentions to extract the resources for their individuation. As another example of this 
figure-ground switch, we can examine the recent studies on gamer behaviors in massive 
multiplayer online role-playing games (MMORPG) (Kafai, 2010; Lee et al., 2011; Chan et al., 
2009). On the other side of these studies‘ attempts to analyze log-files as algorithmic inscriptions 
of so-called ludic or narrative gamer behaviors, we can rediscover lots of cryptic network figures 
assembled from the interactions of objects, which are generated from, used for, killed by, thrown 
towards, transacted with, transformed into, and operated upon others, all triggered by a gamer 
action, targeting. Contrary to Aarseth‘s definition of narratives‘ ―hypertext epiphany‖ from a 
videogame space, which he supposes to be all rooted in ―a planned construct rather than an 
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 For this debate and its focus on theorizing the purity of videogames as cultural forms, see Keogh, 2014. 
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unplanned contingency‖ (1997, p.91), these objects in the open-world are planned to be flexible 
enough to create certain functional networks even from the unplanned contingency of gamer 
actions. For all those objects to be relocated in a world played, gamers‘ prolonged hours of 
aporia are necessary as their ―disoriented movements … looking for fresh links in a hypertext 
labyrinth‖ (pp.78-9).  
As a recent trend in nonlinear game design, an open-world that MMORPG exemplifies 
best is characterized by its lack of invisible walls, which used to restrict the number of objects 
interactive with a player for each stage in the game‘s overall story-arc. Commonly used in a 
linear level design, these walls were given to objects (including the gamer‘s avatar) as redundant 
rules from above to prevent certain interactions from happening, especially those which would 
be controvertible to the story, such as an avatar‘s leaving for a quest even before a princess is 
kidnapped. On the other hand, designing an open-world without this sort of transcendent rules 
means that the ―task of defining and ordering the [collectives] should be left to the actors 
themselves‖ (Latour, 2005, p.23). In other words, an ideal open-world is potentially open to any 
controversial interoperations of objects insofar as a space their networking unfolds is still 
playable, no matter how short-lived its story-arc is or how distracted with too many interruptible 
events to close an arc.  
In this sense, the recent narrative games simulate an actor-network through their open-
world design in more than a metaphorical sense. Not just as a method in science and technology 
studies, but as an ontological concern for the ―world-making activities‖ of objects under research, 
actor-network theory and its nonhuman turn ask researchers ―to define the social not as a special 
domain, a specific realm, or a particular sort of thing‖ such as ―invisible and unaccountable 
social forces.‖ The social in ANT is instead defined from ―a very peculiar movement of re-
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association and reassembling‖ traceable only through ―following the work done to stabilize the 
controversies‖ by objects themselves (Latour, 2005, p.57, 7, 53). In the open-world design in 
videogames and its emphasis on objects‘ autonomy, the ―notion of social force‖ is also dissolved 
and replaced ―either by short-lived interactions [as mere chance encounters] or by new 
associations [extended as multiple story-arcs]‖ (p.66). The social appears twofold in this 
videogame genre. First, the rules for interactions, once given as redundant ―invisible walls,‖ are 
now emerging from the interoperations of objects whose uneven distribution on a game-board is 
enough to influences on the probabilities for their encounters to happen in certain orders. Second, 
gamers‘ ludic or narrative interest in objects, which the log-file analysts assume as a sort of 
invisible force outside to put objects in certain network figures, now turns out conversely to be 
retraceable along ―the summing up of interactions‖ between objects (Latour, 1999, pp.17-8), 
whereas a gamer‘s avatar is no more than just another object whose irregularity in targeting 
initiates the others‘ interoperations. From the actor-network perspective, the macro state of 
object networks is thus neither narrative nor ludic a priori, nor algorithmic translation of cultural 
prototypes outside, but ceaselessly engineered as the summing-up of many micro encounters. As 
McKenzie Wark says in Gamer Theory, ―The moral code of the storyline‖ is in this sense ―just 
an alibi for the computer code of the game,‖ not vice versa (2007, par.148). At the same time, 
gamers‘ ludic or narrative interest, supposed to over-code the progress of an object network into 
either a story-arc or game-board, becomes an alibi hiding the objects‘ interest in the resources for 
their own becoming from the motor inputs that a gamer‘s avatar exerts within the network. 
The actor-network analysis of videogames, one possible model of which this chapter 
suggests, thus re-operationalizes narrative and play: two human forces in the social, once 
discussed as if their representational structures or rules of game have already been transplanted 
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in a videogame space, either to assign certain roles to objects, or to define their possible moves 
on a game-board. These two cultural forms are however now re-emerging only as the summing-
up of what objects have done to stabilize the uncertainties an avatar arouses in an open-world. If 
Wark is correct in saying that ―The gamer is the new model of the self‖ that becomes ―a function 
of an algorithm‖ (2007, par.148), the actor-network analysis could show how this functional self 
is also summed-up from what one‘s avatar does: targeting, an operational form of voluntary or 
involuntary attention to the objects in the open-world. 
For modeling an actor-network as an alternative framework for videogame studies, this 
chapter examines first how the algorithmic paradigm called object-oriented programming (OOP) 
simulate various cultural goals and interests from its end-users through the networks of its 
algorithmic objects. It then investigates actual gaming objects in the videogame genres that I call 
object-oriented puzzles and recent open-world videogames, and traces how the objects in these 
games reassemble gaming subjects and their cultural experiences of gaming.  
 
OOP: Object-Oriented Programming/Puzzle 
In 1970s, Alan Kay, the creator of an early OOP language Smalltalk, anticipated the 
nonhuman turn that his ―object-oriented design‖ of programing would bring about, as he ―had a 
very McLuhanish feeling about media and environments: that once we‘ve shaped tools … they 
turn around and ‗reshape us‘‖ (Kay, 1993, p.30). Since their appearance in the mid-20
th
 century, 
high-level computer languages have functioned to install a user-friendly linguistic layer upon 
―the computational real,‖ bits or mere differences of voltage fluctuating on system boards, and 
translate these ephemeral signals in circuit boards into human-understandable data-structures and 
their functional relations (Joque, 2016, pp.351-2; Yoran, 2018). Before OOP, the high-level 
112 
 
language was ―constructed as a sequential set of commands that followed one after the other‖ 
(Joque, 2016, p.341) and consequentially abstracted the artificial intelligence(s) of the time into a 
sort of mathematical mind ruling over the machine codes at lower levels, reminiscent of 
professional programmers with exclusive accesses to the mainframes in big institutes at the time. 
On the other hand, developed not only for experts but various end-users of the PC era including 
even children, Smalltalk for Kay was to map the same computational real on motherboards of 
personal computers with collectives of autonomous agents called objects ―all hooked together by 
a very fast network‖ communicating small talks to each other (Kay, 1993, p.3).  
In Kay‘s personal historiography, the emerging object-oriented philosophy was foretold 
by the shift in his academic interests, which he describes as the shift from his undergraduate 
math major ―centered on abstract algebras with their few operations generally applying to many 
structures‖ to biology minor ―with its notions of … one kind of building block able to 
differentiate into all needed building blocks‖ (pp.5-6). This analogy between OOP‘s appearance 
in the 1970s and that of cell-biology suggests the changed approach of the algorithmic culture to 
re-territorialize the digital signals about to infiltrate into every cultural sector of the Western 
world. During this incipient stage of the PC era, the domestication of binary signals in offices 
and houses was not achieved at once by marketing computers as desktop technologies, but 
requires a transitional period of negotiation for the unspecified end-user purposes in the 
grassroots to come to the fore as the problems to be remapped upon its new linguistic layer. 
Meanwhile, the algorithmic solution of OOP to translate cultural practices on human sides into a 
plane of binary matrix on machinic sides was modeled after ―the notions of 20
th
 century physics 
and biology,‖ which re-territorialized the natural with ―the recursive composition of a single kind 
of behavioral building block‖ (p.3). The ―algebraic patterns‖ functioning to over-code bits into 
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mathematical variables in a linear programing were replaced by multitude algorithmic agents, 
which transmit these binary signals into each different object with its own data structure and 
functional operations, not necessarily over-coded by a supplementary dimension over and above. 
The networks of objects loosely-assembled along these bits-messages on a system-board began 
to be considered as a solution for any general tasks through their multiple and ―inexhaustible‖ 
ways of re-assemblage (Yoran, 2018, pp.130-132). 
The benefit of this paradigm shift for Kay was not only its efficient compiling but its 
intuitive way to map the real-world problems with monad-like objects that hide ―[their] 
combination of state and process inside and can be dealt with only through the exchange of 
messages‖ (p.3). As much as these black-boxed objects were what programmers needed to adapt 
in the changed condition of the algorithmic culture, a variety of end-users and their peculiar 
purposes also appeared to be the complex real-world problems that OOP needed to remap within 
its object networks. As observed from children‘s playful use of Smalltalk to model ―amusement 
parks, like Disneyland, their schools, the stores they and their parents shopped in‖ (p.23), 
something ludic and narrative was what this educational computer language redisposed first upon 
its network topology in order to enroll these future programmers to its object-oriented 
philosophy. Many purposeless coding exercises such as the famous ―Hello world!‖ example in 
programming textbooks still show that what a novice programmer has to learn first even today is 
to assemble these algorithmic objects into a hypertext architecture for a sort of interactive 
storytelling. The McLuhanish feeling which Kay once had about his own creature becomes more 
ordinary in the ―human-computer symbiosis‖ (p.7) of the PC era and it reflects the necessity of 
translating cultural experiences of programming, its playful small talks, into something able to be 
mapped upon a network of objects. To rephrase in actor-network terms, the objects in OOP 
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exemplify what ANT calls immutable mobiles: the protocols to relocate the peculiarity of a 
matter under research into a common abstract space. As immutable data structures, which can be 
incarnated into many different instances, the objects are capable of transposing peculiar end-user 
purposes on one side to a network topology being drawn by their interoperations on another 
side.
16
 It is however not so much when these objects are defined as stable building blocks but 
when they are assembled into as many different figures as an indefinite number of user purposes 
that they eventually begin to translate local interests of their allies, users, into the problems only 
resolvable through the networks that OOP affords against the obsolete procedural programing 
(Callon, 1986).  
In Kay‘s retrospection, the early ―interactive computer graphic‖ applications such as 
Ivan Sutherland‘s Sketchpad (1963) were the first to concretize this object-oriented philosophy 
as the graphic designer‘s means to instantiate different geometric figures from the same 
topological object abstractly defined. (Kay, 1993, p.7). As another instance of graphical objects 
responsible to capture the generality of end-user purposes, we can examine videogames and their 
role in popularizing OOP as an ontological and aesthetic style of problem-solving in algorithmic 
cultures, which has integrated more and more cultural activities and their singularities into the 
networks of general-purpose objects. For the previous two decades, the digital‘s remediation of 
culture has provided an alibi for the digital‘s penetration into private spheres along the domestic 
assemblages of circuit boards embedded in ubiquitous computing devices. On the other hand, the 
user-friendliness of videogame interfaces for the same time has provided the end-users, gamers, 
with an effective but nonprofessional means to domesticate these ephemeral and intangible 
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 For Immutable Mobile, see Bruno Latour, 1990, pp.44-5; for a topological space of actor networks, see 
John Law, 2002. 
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materialities in digital infrastructures into the agents objectified or personified (Johnson, 1997, 
Ch.6). These objects have not only served for fulfilling gamers‘ cultural interests but mobilizing 
their actions oscillating between ludic aporia and narrative epiphany. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: The Incredible Machine 
 
The Incredible Machine 
Kevin Ryan‘s creative puzzle game The Incredible Machine (1993) shows how a simple 
object-oriented game design realizes the general purposeness of personal computers. The goal of 
this puzzle is to make a literal machinic assemblage
17
 performing a simple task (such as ―pop all 
the balloons,‖ ―drop the cage onto Mort the Mouse‖) using everyday objects available in each 
stage. For this goal, a gamer needs to drag and drop each object in the inventory on the right to a 
                                                 
17
 DeLanda defines machinic assemblages by their components aggregated through ―relations of 
exteriority,‖ which can be flexibly ―detached from it and plugged into a different assemblage.‖ The 
Incredible Machine literalizes this theoretical entity with the autonomous objects coupled to each other 
for a common goal (2006, p.10). 
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niche position within a main frame, in which simple operations of the redisposed objects would 
miraculously fill the missing links of the incredible machine (Figure 3.1).  
Each stage begins with a number of objects distributed on the frame and most of them 
have specific interactions with or reactions to others. For instance, a bulb lighting on a lens burns 
the fuse of a dynamite; a ball hitting one end of a seesaw triggers a gun roped to another end; a 
motor connected to a conveyor belt catapults a baseball on it. Simple rules govern the machine‘s 
operation: when a gamer clicks ―START MACHINE‖ on right-top, the objects responsive to 
environmental parameters (gravity and air pressure) such as balls and balloons move first. If they 
collide with others, their direction and speed change according to the game‘s physics engine and 
the collided object also implements its operation if the condition is met (for instance, when a ball 
falls on a switch, the flashlight is on). When there is no more extendable operation, the machine 
stops. To make the machine keep operating until the assigned task is done, a gamer therefore has 
to redeploy each object in a way in which it would, after the machine‘s execution, gradually 
evolve into a niche in a machinic assemblage that successfully fulfills a given task. The role of 
the gamer as an engineer of this incredible machine is thus to re-adjust the initial state of objects‘ 
reciprocal orientations to the condition that Simondon calls metastability, ―the initial absence of 
interactive communication between them, [but] followed by a subsequent communication 
between orders of magnitude and stabilization‖ (1992, p.304). For Simondon, ―individuation‖ of 
technical objects from their abstract to concrete states involves not so much some invisible forces 
outside, but a sort of selective pressure that works across their uneven distribution in each 
solipsistic state. Metastable objects ―have no effect on the other elements‖ at first, but gradually 
interoperate one another in ―a multitude of reciprocal causalities‖ (1980, pp.13-4; Yoran, 2018). 
This ostensible stability of an assemblage, or its metastability, which hides its potentials to 
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progress into another level of stability through its further individuations, also expresses the state 
of what Latour calls plasma, entities ―not yet socialized, not yet engaged in metrological chains,‖ 
but charged with potentials for an indefinite number of actor-networks to come as novel 
connections are made among them (Latour, 2005, p.244). The Incredible character of the 
Machine in this puzzle game is this metastability that keeps its loosely-assembled components, 
objects, always potent to evolve further into different networks with functional stability.  
In popular OOP languages such as C++ and JAVA, the autonomy of objects is 
symbolized by their boundaries ―{}‖ defined separately from those in the ―main{}‖ function in a 
source code. Whereas the ―main{}‖ provides a platform for ―objects{}‖ to be assigned as 
operational units for the goals defined at a system level, each object{}‘s peculiar operation and 
its recursive combination with other objects during compiling replace the cumbersome sequential 
commands in procedural programing. Enfolding the definitions of its own constituents and their 
data structures as well as its possible operations upon other entities, an object envelopes its own 
―tiny ontology‖ stating its selective exposures and preferred responses to environments (Bogost, 
2012, p.21). In The Incredible Machine, the main frame for the machine to be assembled 
provides a user-friendly interface substituting for the ―main{}‖ function in OOP as it serves the 
platform for the objects to be assigned and instantiated from the inventory on the right, in which 
objects available for each stage are defined in a decontextualized state just as abstract classes of 
objects in OOP has to be first defined outside of main{}function. For the object-oriented 
programmers and puzzle gamers, to design an algorithmic system or a machinic assemblage is 
therefore to allocate these objects into certain metastable states, from which they would be, in 
every single execution or ―START MACHINE,‖ instantiated into niche parts of a logical or 
mechanical circuit operating in changeable environments. The variability of the environments, 
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which are databases or human inputs, could condition one or some objects into different initial 




Figure 3.2: The basketball in a metastable state (modified by author) 
 
In this puzzle, the metastability in which objects are trapped is expressed in an 
unexpected aesthetic form when the machine malfunctions. It becomes visible, for instance, 
when an object is stuck between two others as shown in the case of a basketball in Figure 3.2, 
unable to be bound out from one end of a seesaw because of being blocked by a pipe. If the 
physics engine imitate the physical laws exactly, the ball fallen in between should be gradually 
relocated in a stable state after several oscillations. However, in the game, even if the momentum 
of the ball is the minimum detectable by the engine, it still maintains that minimum even after 
collisions and thus keeps oscillating between the obstacles until the game stops the machine 
forcibly. The physics engine is, to put it differently, biased towards keeping objects metastable 
and always containing at least the minimum potential for further interactions rather than 
stabilizing them into non-operational stasis. As the expression of an object‘s resistance to the 
exhaustion of its operational values, this tiny agitation is fed-back to the gamer as a signal 
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referring to the necessity of the ball‘s relocation into another niche in a next trial for its further 
individuations. 
Alongside a campaign mode in which a gamer plays each stage with each pre-defined 
goal and set of available objects, The Incredible Machine also provides an extra stage called the 
―FREEFORM MODE‖ where a gamer can use and manipulate all objects and environmental 
parameters without having any specified goal. In this mode, the metastable vibrations of objects 
exemplified by the basketball are potentially mobilizable for the machine‘s individuation into an 
indefinite number of playful tasks and purposeless performances. Whether the machine is 
working for an arbitrary goal set by a gamer or just for experimenting unexplored momenta 
hidden in everyday objects the game simulates, the experimental function of this mode considers 
the assemblage in the making as a general translation machine able to capture any particular 
goal-oriented gamer intentions and even purposelessness into its object-oriented network. The 
general-purposeness of the network is preserved as the game‘s physics engine preserves the 
minimum momenta in objects for a variety of their possible interoperations even in the objects 
currently employed for a specific mechanical task. On the other side of this claimed flexibility of 
the incredible machine, the gamer may have ―a very McLuhanish feeling‖ as a her freedom in 
playing with a machine is reshaped as a number of networking strategies she could take in 
targeting the machine‘s components.  
Before ―START MACHINE,‖ the assemblage in the game exists as mere ―summing up of 
interactions‖ of the objects distributed over the space with each environment-sensitive 
momentum. (Latour, 1999, pp.17-8). After ―START MACHINE,‖ however, these objects begin 
to couple with each other according to their autonomous responses to given environmental 
parameters and their assemblage re-appears as a network for a specific goal. As Bogost says 
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about the paradigm shift in the algorithmic cultures to OOP, The Incredible Machine in this 
sense simulates ―a new kind of system: the spontaneous and complex result of multitudes rather 
than singular and absolute holisms‖ (2006, p.4). The longevity and sustainability of this system 
depend on whether the programmed metastability would remain intact even in the changeable 
environments. Insofar as the changeable in the game‘s environments refers only to human inputs 
and uncertainties caused by gamer activities, the miracle of machinic assemblages this game 
symbolizes is about the incredible transformability of an object network, sustainable even in 
unpredictable environments of the human-caused.  
 
The Perpetual Motion Machines in Portal 
In The Incredible Machine, the gamer‘s targeting intervenes only in the initial states of 
objects before the physics engine implements their attractive and repulsive forces. On the other 
hand, today‘s 3D puzzle-platform games such as Portal series put a gamer‘s avatar on the same 
platforms in which other game objects are distributed in metastable states. On these immanent 
game-boards with no transcendent intelligence designing a puzzle playing from above, a gamer‘s 
targeting and consequent interoperations of metastable objects are triggered by another object 
relatively unstable, namely an avatar. Being the only object capable of generating truly random 
behaviors, an avatar introduces an unplanned contingency to the object-oriented labyrinthine of 
the game in which a path to the exit is individuated only as certain interoperations between 
objects are triggered by this contingency. For instance, an exit in Portal (Valve Corporation, 
2007) will appear when a cube is transported to a distanced platform and placed upon a button on 
it. But, for the cube and button to be interoperable, the avatar should fire the portal gun to create 
two portals to transport the cube from here to there. In a typical single-player campaign where 
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most tiles on the walls and floors are connectable through the portals, the avatar has to shoot the 
tiles to unfold a path to the exit out of the surfaces of distributed objects in order to escape from 
this laboratory-labyrinth created by a mad scientist in the game‘s story.  
 
 
Figure 3.3: A perpetual motion machine in Portal II (DoctorMelon, 2011, June 26) 
 
Despite their being narrative-based, shooting in the Portal series is often performed 
regardless of the goal and story of each stage. As many user-performed Portal experiments on 
YouTube show, for the gamers whose primary concern is to create their own labyrinths using the 
―Puzzle Creator‖ mode, a FREEFORM MODE in Portal II (Valve Corporation, 2011), rather 
than to solve puzzles, the avatar‘s playful wandering in labyrinths is not a painful experience of 
deferred ―desire for [narrative] closure,‖ which Aaserth means by the term aporia (1997, p.92). 
Shooting the tiles in these experiments is conversely a desired purposelessness to examine more 
ways of tunneling between objects and twisting their spatial relations to unfold a greater number 
of transformable labyrinths hidden in the assemblages. In Portal, one interesting experiment in 
this purposeless tunneling happens when an object falls into a portal on a floor that is tunneled to 
another portal on the ceiling directly above. Since the physics engine conserves the momentum 
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of an object when it passes through portals, this object perpetually falling between portals is 
gradually accelerated by gravitational force until it reaches the maximum velocity available and 
eventually meta-stabilized into a sort of perpetual motion machine (Figure 3.3). Contrary to the 
tiny vibration of the basketball in The Incredible Machine, this freefalling entrapped between 
portals shows another instance of an object‘s metastable fluctuation that gradually accumulates 
its momentum to the maximum in this case.  
Even though this sort of perpetual machines is often exhibited on YouTube as purely 
experimental as it violates physical laws (DoctorMelon, 2012, June 26) or purely aesthetic as 
visualizes an unimaginable dimension (Arctic Avenger, 2011, April 27), building up an object‘s 
momentum within this loop also has a significant strategic value in the game‘s campaign mode 
as it allows a gamer to reorient this object, a cube or avatar itself, to a farther platform not 
reachable in an ordinary way (Valve Corporation, 2007, in-game developer commentary, #12, 
48). For instance, while a cube in Figure 9 falls between two portals on the floor and ceiling, the 
avatar could fire the portal gun and make a new portal on a distanced wall; then the cube fallen 
into the portal on the floor would come out from the new one with the maximum momentum 
conserved through the portals. In this way, a metastable object in perpetual motion within a 
closed-circuit necessitates the gamer‘s intervention, targeting, as the trigger for its reorientation 
from the abstract freefalling to the actions for the gamer‘s goal, escaping the labyrinth. While the 
gamer plans this escape scenario, a network topology being drawn by objects under 
interoperations eventually appears as a diagram for an emerging artificial intelligence. This 
abstract diagram decomposes ―problems in terms of autonomous agents that can engage in 
flexible, high-level interactions‖ (Jennings, 2000, p.283); flexible enough to map not only the 
gamer‘s creative goal-oriented behaviors but their purposeless creativities as it can be 
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transformed into an indefinite number of labyrinth structures responding to both planned and 
unplanned contingencies from a human gamer. 
 
Programming the Open-Worlds Metastable 
In the previous section on the puzzle gaming, targeting was discussed as a human-caused 
trigger for a network solution of objects to a given task of each stage. On the other hand, the 
open-world setting in today‘s narrative games usually contain these object-oriented puzzles as 
the parts of storytelling. From the first Legend of Zelda to the most recent Legend of Zelda: 
Breath of the Wild, puzzles in this RPG franchise have functioned to embed certain temporal 
orders in a game space‘s becoming a world explored by the player character, Link. In the first 
Zelda (Nintendo, 1986) where Link has to explore the eight dungeons in the world for searching 
the eight pieces of an ancient relic called Triforce of Wisdom supposedly to lead him to Death 
Mountain where Princess Zelda is kidnapped, the number of ways for this simple rescue 
narrative to unfold through his dungeon networking is restricted by the existence of specific 
objects, whose operations can be triggered only after Link follows certain orders, such as the 
gate of the seventh dungeon appearing only in response to the melody of Recorder acquirable in 
the fifth dungeon. In this early open-world RPG game, the linearity of the story oriented to a 
fixed ending, the rescue, can be stretched and bent in an indefinite number of ways according not 
only to the paths that Link draws among eight dungeons, from the most straight to the most 
convoluted, but also to his unexpected encounters with monsters which interrupt his labor for 
networking. At the same time, on this immanent game-board with no outside rule except 
interoperations between objects, these object-oriented puzzles—given to gamers as an explicit or 
implicit instruction saying ―operate an object upon another to make an event happen‖—function 
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to impose certain invariant structures on the narrative-arcs unfolded from the assemblages of 
objects. Some significant inflection points of the arcs, such as ―the sixth dungeon ought to be 
opened after the fifth dungeon,‖ should be kept intact by these puzzle elements for the integrity 
of the story despite its flexibility to bend and stretch freely. The classes of interoperable objects 
defined by the game engine and their uneven distribution on the world map are thus determinant 
of the types and probabilities of the events capable of being triggered by the gamer‘s goal 
oriented or purposeless motor inputs during the gaming.  
The spaces in these games are, as Galloway says, individuated both by the machinic 
agents and the contingency of human operators, which ―work together in a cybernetic 
relationship to effect the various actions of the videogame in its entirety.‖ He classifies ―gamic 
actions‖ thus along the axis of machine agent—human operator, which is intersected by another 
axis of diegetic action—nondiegetic actions as Figure 3.4 describes (2006, p.5). 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Galloway‘s classification of gamic actions (2006, p.37) 
 
It is notable that, even if a player character‘s encounters with objects in an open-world 
are the things to be logged as parts of a story, their probabilities and consequences are often 
conditioned by certain actions performed outside the story, such as turning on auto-targeting, 
changing difficulty in the setup, and calibrating certain environmental parameters in physics 
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engines. These actions, defined as nondiegetic-operator actions in Galloway‘s diagram, intervene 
in the cybernetic unfolding of a story by conditioning the probable transformations of object 
networks by changing not just the number of interoperable objects such as enemies, but the 
patterns of their behaviors to environments. For instance, if you select ―difficult‖ in the setup, an 
enemy‘s momentum preserved in its metastable patrolling would be re-oriented to the search for 
the player character when it discovers certain environmental objects, shrubs, wavering by 
something behind. But if you select ―easy,‖ it would not respond to any environmental signals 
and kept in passivity. In this sense, the shape of a narrative arc unfolded from the ubiquitous 
objects in an open-world is restricted by the asymmetries implicit in the two axes of Galloway‘s 
classification. First, the initial metastability of objects in machine actions requires the instability 
from the actions of a human operator to release their accumulated momenta for unfolding certain 
events. Second, as the local occurrences of chance encounters, these diegetic events between a 
player character and objects are under the probabilistic control of non-diegetic actions from the 
game engine that governs all the chances of possible events on a game-board. 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Gamic actions in open-worlds 
 
In open-world games, targeting as an operator action over machinic objects can be thus 
re-diagramed as the gamer behavior conditioned by a game-board as a network of algorithmic 
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objects. The object called avatar is in a state of permanent oscillation between goal-oriented and 
purposeless actions as it is conditioned doubly by nearby objects and the game engine. On one 
hand, in-game nearby objects mobilize the gamer‘s targeting, which would trigger their 
individuations into epiphanic local events. On the other, the game engine keeps an open-world in 
more aporias, open to lots of unexpected chance encounters with random objects that would 
delay the revelations of the solutions to local puzzles and quests. In this new diagram (Figure 
3.5), the diegetic end of the vertical axis shows how the gamer‘s targeting tends to relocate 
objects to each niche position that would make their network a spatial revelation of a narrative 
arc. For instance, in the typical treasure hunting quest in The Elder Scrolls V, the item acquired 
from a boss battle always accompanies a new marker on the map for the location of another 
object, a NPC or depository, to which the item originally belongs according to the story of the 
quest. The topology of markers on the map thus translates the trajectories the player character 
has to follow to complete the story of the current quest. On the other hand, the nondiegetic 
direction of the same axis alludes that the gamer‘s narrative-oriented actions can be delayed by 
purposeless but still playful chance encounters with other objects under the probabilistic control 
of a global agent, game engine. The player character‘s way to the depository can be, in this case, 
deferred by unexpected encounters with enemies and other quests. According to this diagram for 
the open-world gaming, the narrative and ludic characters of a game space are corresponding to 
the local and global features of a same network. An object at each node of the network is, being 
touched by an avatar, instantiated into something happened in a quest told by the gamer‘s 
diegetic-operator actions (just as the momentum maximized by the perpetual motion in Portal 
should be reoriented through the avatar‘s shooting). At the level of a whole network, the game 
engine conversely keeps the inexhaustible minimum of momenta between its nodes (that the tiny 
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vibrations of an object within The Incredible Machine symbolize) for their further individuation 
into different quests, not only for the more degree of freedom to the gamer but more ways of the 
networks‘ topological transformations. On this axis, an object‘s metastability, or its hesitance 
between becoming an actor for a specific task and remaining undefined to be multipurpose, is 
expressed by its oscillation between the local affordance for epiphany and global conditioning of 
aporia.  
In recent open-world games, this metastability within the diegetic-nondigetic axis of the 
network is noticeable in forms of colorful auras surrounding objects, visible through the special 
skill an avatar activates. In Witcher 3: Wild Hunt (CD Projekt RED, 2015), Geralt, the player 
character, uses his ―Witcher Sense‖ to switch from a stable geometric field of view (FOV) in his 
normal state to a distorted superhuman perspective detecting the momenta hidden in 
environments through the auras effused out of objects. In Batman: Arkham Knight (Rocksteady, 
2015), Batman wears an in-game HUD device, ―Detective Vision,‖ to make the movements of 
networkable objects stand out through the technologically augmented auras (Figure 12). As the 
actions in the middle of the diegetic and nondiegetic, or the nondiegetic disguising as diegetic 
(Jørgensen, 2012), using these skills or gadgets is what the games‘ tutorial instructs first to the 
gamers as a way to access an abstract space of metastable objects; which adumbrate the nodes of 
a network that the avatar needs to mobilize as a solution for the given object-oriented puzzle or 
quest. Driving out all the less interactive objects to the peripheries of attention, this space 
extracts small ties from objects visualizing the momenta for their further interactions, which 
anticipate the narrative arcs or object-oriented puzzles capable of being unfolded from a space. 
Even though some objects could move by themselves like enemies patrolling designated areas in 
Batman: Arkham Knight, these metastable objects rarely communicate each other but walk 
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around in each closed circuit unless they step out to track the actions taken by their arch enemy, 
Batman. Put differently, without the player character‘s intervention, their routine movements are 
left in a mere aesthetic metastability which Galloway calls ―ambience act.‖ Even if these ―Things 
continue to change‖ in their metastable routines, ―nothing changes that is of any importance‖ 
(2006, p.10). These games‘ aestheticization of ambient movements of isolated objects, however, 
implies something much more than just a pacific look of their seeming stasis as it also brings 
about a thrilling feeling for the emerging actor-networks. Magnified under the higher resolution 
of Detective Vision, objects appear to be full of ―charged expectation‖ (p.11) about its possible 
future interoperations, which could cause catastrophic chain-reactions among the objects across 
an open-world as the avatar‘s targeting transmits uncertainties. In this sense, Galloway‘s 
statement about the ambience act as that in which ―No significant stimulus from the game 
environment will disturb the player character‖ (p.10) could be rephrased. The lack of significant 
stimulus from the game environment will really disturb the player as long as this anxious 
metastability of an open-world makes it intolerable for him/her not to hit or shoot the objects. 
 
  
Figure 3.6: Witcher Sense (CD Projekt RED, 2015) and Detective Vision (Rocksteady, 2015) 
 
Encountering these abstract spaces, the player-character no longer occupies a center of 
perspective as a simulated Cartesian subject. Like Detective Vision activated at the edge of the 
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screen, or Witcher Sense causing distortions in a geometric space (Figure 3.6), the avatar‘s 
transcendental position in the normal field of view is retreating to the oblique glance from 
peripheries as an animistic world of metastable objects emerges. In this moment of a perspectival 
withdrawal that suspends a geometric grid‘s overcoding of objects, the gaps between objects‘ 
tenuous membranes are filled again with their minute ambience acts, which preserve 
inexhaustible potentials for each thing‘s own object-orientation for heterogeneous network 
making. Insofar as some of their networks are supposed to reveal certain narrative arcs for quests, 
solutions for object-oriented puzzles, or hidden trophies and achievements, the gamer is 
responsible to target an object as soon as possible to break the ambience with the epiphanies of 
those individuations. At the same time, the gamer should also be careful not to shoot every target 
too quickly lest the network becomes too stabilized to the extent of having no more metastable 
objects for the further transformations to reveal other quests, puzzles, trophies and achievements.  
These conflicting responsibilities that a gamer feels encountering the ambience of an 
open-world can be expressed most clearly in two extreme strategies of gamer action, namely 
Speedrun and Seeker Achievement. As a way to traverse a space along the simplest labyrinth 
structure with one shortest path from an entrance to an exit, Speedrun lets no single moment of 
ambience act happen. For instance, you may attempt to draw the fastest and most straight route 
to rescue Princess Zelda in The Legend of Zelda: Breath of the Wild (Nintendo EPD, 2017). On 
the other hand, individuating the same space into a labyrinth with lots of secret caves to the 
extent that all possible links and operations between objects are experimented, Seeker 
Achievement does not let any single object remain isolated in its initial metastability. You may in 
this case discover every area on the world map, explore every dungeon, open every chest, cook 
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every recipe, tame every wild horse, take pictures of every creature, and do every possible thing 
in the game before rescue Princess Zelda.  
Given the extreme difficulty in achieving a new world record in Speedrun and extremely 
long play hours required for Seeker Achievement, these two gamer strategies seem located in the 
two extreme ends in our diagram as the two least probable worlds the linkages of distributed 
objects can unfold. At one pole, the most concise diegetic world is unfolded while, at another, 
the same network is ceaselessly complicated until all interoperable objects are convoluted with 
the gamer‘s itinerary.  Given the extremely low probabilities for a gamer‘s chance encounters to 
occur in specific orders for these boundary cases, most diegetic-operator actions in videogames 
might be expected to happen along the path in the middle of these two. However, many posts in 
the online gaming forums about gamers‘ challenges for these almost impossible goals show the 
opposite (Speedrun.com). As the two poles defining the limits of a network‘s topological 
transformations, Speedrun and Seeker Achievement attract the gamer action, targeting, towards 
two extreme subjectivities imaginable within the networked societies of algorithmic objects. 
Going back to the studies on gamer behaviors mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, what 
we now rediscover in the flipside of the cryptic networks of objects in the log-files is these 
afterimage of gaming subjects, stretched between the most linear story teller drawing the shortest 
escape plan on the one hand, and the nonlinear and ludic dungeon dweller complicating the 
networks over and over again on the other. Their ludic and narrative interests do not exist outside 
as invisible social forces to bind the objects into these network figures. Instead, their 





Targeting in Object-(Re-)Oriented Realities 
By giving their own object-orientations to the algorithmic objects, the open-world 
videogames transform their game-boards into a sort of animistic planes for these nonhuman 
actors to stretch out their metastable ties for communications. As shown when it happens through 
the Witcher Sense and Detective Vision, targeting is a gamer‘s means to connect to the 
solipsistic autonomy of these reanimated objects by tuning the avatar‘s magically or 
technologically augmented sense to the tiny agitations of the objects. In a sense that it also 
extracts an object ―from the spatiotemporal coordinates‖ of the normal field of view and 
exaggerates as ―an autonomous entity‖ larger than before (Doane, 2003, p.90), we can compare 
targeting with another technological perception well-studied in the past decades of media studies, 
the close-up.  
As a moment in which an object‘s ―perfect, seamless face, the unwavering stare‖ is 
revealed to audiences, the close-up has been discussed in the framework of narrative cinema as 
what exemplifies the metastability of a thing temporarily isolated from a diegetic network. Its 
solipsistic autonomy has been thought of as what makes audiences ―impossible not to project 
thought, emotion‖ by connecting it to an imaginary signifying chain over other filmic objects 
―although the face itself gives no indication of either‖ (pp.104-5). For cultural critics with their 
exclusive autonomy from the objects under perception and research, a close-up‘s oscillation 
between isolation from and subjection to the chain of signification has been somewhat non 
understandable without simply stipulating it as the fetishistic character of a media object. From 
the self-claimed human autonomy in cultural production, which also makes the log-file analysts 
presume human gamers as isolable narrative and ludic agents outside, the metastability of a 
closed-up object has been interpreted as either a misrecognized human product or an abject other 
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arousing castrating hallucinations to a subject; either human-produced or human-lost; just as ―the 
Modern repertoire keeps anything from happening in the middle‖ even though the close-up in 
practice, as much as targeting in videogames, always ―happens in the middle‖ (Latour, 2010, 
p.19). 
On the other hand, the objects magnified by Witcher Sense or Detective Vision enforce 
the gamer‘s avatar to withdraw from its normal geometric view once built upon the Modern 
―ideal of detachment from every [metastable object] that brought it into action‖ (p.65). A gamer 
is now relocated to the non-Modern middle in which the objects‘ autonomy regains its meaning 
as ―the right not to be deprived of ties that render existence possible, ties emptied of all ideals of 
determination, of a false theology of creation ex nihilo‖ (p.59). Removing the lines of 
perspective projection, these ties of the emerging actor-networks allow the gamer‘s shooting to 
unfold stories, quests, quizzes, and meaningless events from the interoperations of the objects her 
shooting initiates. The fetish-like character of objects reappears in the forms of tiny agitations 
but it is neither reaffirmation of what human lost nor human projection at distance. Rather, for 
these object to persist as the actors in the network, their momenta should be constantly reoriented 
towards others by the avatar‘s interventions as much as the gamer‘s individuation into a narrator 
or dungeon dweller is also the network effect of the avatar‘s constant targeting.  
As Andrejevic says about ―various ‗smart‘ objects that will come to populate their 
lives,‖ the ―fetishes of yesteryear‖ once debunked by the criticism in the last century have 
recently found the ―technologies for their silicon reincarnation‖ not only in the open-worlds 
simulated by videogames but in the real-worlds augmented by small wireless sensors and RFID 
tags (2005, pp.116-8). Attached to any kinds of cultural and technical objects, these smart dusts 
extract the unexamined momenta of the things to make them interoperable with others 
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intensively once again. For instance, a light bulb is now connectable to any electronic devices in 
a smart-home as experimented in The Incredible Machine. The commercial buildings and 
services geo-tagged as operational points-of-interest (POI) in a smart city and other smart 
infrastructures reveal their hidden interoperability to urban dwellers through the augmented-
reality (AR) apps reminiscent of Batman‘s Detective Vision or location-based apps similar to the 
world maps in open-world videogames (Figure 3.7).  
 
 
Figure 3.7: Nokia‘s City Lens (Ponder, 2012, May) 
 
In these AR interfaces, the real-world objects begin to exhibit their metastable agitations 
or communicability, ready to be dragged by a person‘s fingertip to a network in the making as 
the solution for the peculiar interest of the end-user. People‘s ―operations of citizenship‖ in this 
real-world is redefined as the technique to connect these reanimated objects in ―sustainable and 
efficient‖ ways for a general-purpose of a city and home (Gabrys, 2016a, p.203, 185). Given the 
emphases put on the efficiency and sustainability of these object-(re-)oriented domestic and 
urban spaces, citizens‘ being smart also involves two networking strategies that this chapter 
examined in the context of videogames. Either to draw the shortest and least energy-consuming 
route to a goal, or to explore all possible operations of each object in a network to individuate 
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more alternative ways for the goals. If becoming a smart citizen, or smart network-builder is the 
alibi for a human‘s participation in these gamified environments, what the alibi conceals behind 
would be the following fact: for its sustainability and replayability, a network needs to cultivate 
more marketable and playable relations among its nodes, while a gamer‘s ceaseless paying-
attention, which targeting operationalizes, is serving as the trigger for those perpetual re-




















INTERMISSION 3: ON INTERFACE 
 
The algorithmic objects, overwhelming the physical domains of the recent urban 
landscapes, operationalize topology as a new form of governmentality. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
topology is a mode of power optimal to manage the relations supposedly hidden everywhere but 
undetectable until foregrounded as the parameters orderly variant under certain transformations a 
space undergoes. Enmeshed by these hidden relations, our life would be, as the IoT warns, 
subject to the constant threats of unsustainability unless we surround our life with the manifold 
sensors and actuators in the background, in other words, unless we symmetrify ourselves.  
In Massumi‘s interpretation, Foucaultian governmentality is ―a correctional reuptake 
mechanism,‖ which constantly folds and refolds a social continuum into man-as-body and man-
as-specie. For Foucault, the sustainability of this continuum is achieved by detaining its 
differentiation within the two-coupled level of individual-population. His governmentality thus 
needs to interface two technologies operating in different geopolitical scales, namely 
―disciplinary apparatus‖ and regulatory ―state apparatus,‖ which bifurcate the continuum 
respectively into the series of ―body-organism-discipline-institutions‖ and that of ―population-
biological processes-regulatory mechanisms-State‖ (2003, p.250).  
On the other hand, revisiting ―the new techniques of environmental technology or 
environmental psychology‖ that Foucault mentioned briefly in the 1979‘s lecture (2008, p.259), 
Jenifer Gabrys examines ubiquitous computing as what embodies Foucault‘s ―environmentality‖ 
in the recent urban transformations. She gives a hint as to how this new form of governmentality 
re-interfaces individual and population by reprogramming our environments through the 
networks of algorithmic objects ―above and beyond direct attempts to influence or govern 
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individual behavior or the norms of populations‖ (Gabrys, 2014). These objects are now 
embedded in our domestic and urban landscapes and reveal their hidden agency through various 
augmented reality apps for houses, schools, offices, and the city, where they redesign ―the rules 
of the game‖ for our smart participation (Foucault, 2008, p.260). In the ideal ―open-world‖ 
characterized by the lack of ―invisible walls‖ restricting players‘ moves from above, these rules 
are emergent from the uneven and strategic distribution of interactive objects, which can be re-
networked with the neighbored objects for a variety of gamer goals. For ontology as the semantic 
protocol to maximize the interoperations of smart objects in the open-world, a social continuum 
remapped by the environmental sensors is thus not simply to be stabilized in a sustainable 
alternation between identifiable individuals and manageable population. Under the governance 
of ubiquitous computing, the sustainability of the continuum rather means its plasticity capable 
of continuously unfolding numberless hidden levels for registering them as each new problem-
space of an IoT application. In other words, between the most individualistic level of man-as-
body and the most collectivist man-as-species, a multitude of hidden levels should be re-
bifurcated and re-commodified.  
A framed set of algorithmic objects such as that in a smartphone screen may be the most 
simplistic example of the machine for this environmentality. These graphical objects are 
functioning to govern the social continuum of users (individuals-population), and interface it 
with another continuum of digital signals. Their operations are however neither for simply 
training individuals how to use each object for each different task nor for updating the normative 
variation of users as a whole from each reported irregular user behavior. The recent interface 
design, on the other hand, as often happens in open-world gaming, allows users to customize 
certain subsets of objects frequently used for their self-defined goals. As ―an environmental type 
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of intervention instead of the internal subjugation of individuals‖ (Foucault, 2008, p.260), this 
customizability provides the users with the means to represent their urgent needs as something 
resolvable through the networks of objects they draw with their fingertip or mouse point. For 
doing so, the screen re-embeds the algorithmic objects it encloses, such as smartphone icons, in a 
user‘s field of perception as the things close enough to touch, click, and target, just as it happens 
when we scan a smart city with augmented-reality apps in our smartphone. Through this user-
friendly interface, the user is black-boxed in the middle between what s/he perceives on a screen 
and how s/he responds through input devices, and a neurophysiological continuum of her/his 
body unfolds the inexhaustible sensor-actuator interconnections. In a smart space where this 
rectangular frame of icons is expanded into its blueprint embedded with smart objects, the PC 
and smartphone users‘ conscious trajectories of the mouse point and fingertip are replaced by 
their nonconscious daily routines. Through our living according to the everyday protocol of the 
IoT, the human neurophysiology is black-boxed in-between what our skin feels and how our 
body walks through, and it is readily interfaced with the underlying digital continuum as one of 
the other input-output circuits that construct an IoT ecosystem altogether. However, contrary to 
the other smart objects with each limited perceptibility and actionability, the human circuit could 
bifurcate as many sensorimotor responses as needed for these nonhuman others to relay further 
for many different IoT applications.  
Warren Neidich (2003) describes our ―visual landscape‖ as ―a network or field‖ of 
―phatic signifiers,‖ the objects that have survived throughout their evolutionary histories as the 
result of humans and other organisms‘ ―neural selection‖ of them as the stimuli or environmental 
cues relevant to the imminent cultural and physiological needs. According to him, ―the invention 
of smaller and smaller microprocessors to run smaller and smaller computing devices‖ in our 
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smart environments changes the way in which our field of perception is constructed by these 
phatic signifiers. In a current software interface, artificial stimuli ―engineered to have superior 
attention grabbing capabilities beyond their naturally created counterpart‖ are not naturally 
selected through our habitual perception of geometric objects in a field of perception. They are 
rather registered as important objects on both sides of the interface for different reasons; first, 
users select them as representing their personal goals that they intend to do with these objects, 
while software reproduces them as the means to translate a variety of user interests into the 
networkable variables. In this way, the networks of algorithmic objects, Neidich (2003) says, 
―become the stencils upon which the networks of the brain are modeled.‖ As another metaphor 
for the Internet of Things that encloses the human mind in-between its technological inputs and 
outputs, stencil describes how the plasticity of the neuronal continuum of a brain is mobilized for 
the formation of certain sensor-actuator arcs with the environmentally distributed algorithmic 
objects.  
Ubiquitous computing reactivates the neuroplasticity of our brain and exploits this 
plastic continuum for expanding its governance further to our hidden neuronal realities. An 
experimental example of the Internet of Things the next chapter analyzes, Brain-Machine 
Interface (BMI), is, roughly speaking, a device to stretch this plastic brain out of a skull and 
biological body to the smart objects, such as microsensors, computer algorithms, and robot arms, 
which construct a machininc assemblage for the futuristic neuroprosthetics. The chapter 
examines how the interfacing of BMI differentiates hidden neurophysiology of human or animal 
mind into multiple levels of motor intentions, and examines how the device exploits these 
intentions, cultivated in a lab in the first place, as the resources to develop a greater number of 
brain-powered sensors-actuators for the future industrial uses.    
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CHAPTER 4: BRAIN-MACHINE INTERFACE AS  
THE ACTOR-NETWORK AFTER THE INTERNET OF THINGS 
 
The version of new materialism that I developed in this dissertation is a little tricky in 
that its new materiality seems not only to be reasoned from the concept of topological continuum 
but also assumed as a sort of sufficient reason. The renewed understanding of materiality is an 
urgent need for the current capitalism and its venture capital to ground their speculation about 
the abundance of correlations, data-minable, and thus commodifiable. The groundlessness that 
the humanities in the past century had discovered from its critique of Enlightenment and its 
culmination in the rupture of the subjective enclosure of the modern world might also have 
necessitated another sort of sufficient reason: the nonhuman ontology, what the humanities in the 
impasse cannot help but jump into.  
For this dissertation, this new materiality, infinitely communicable by nonhumans but 
never exhaustible by any of their communications—the materiality properly termed only as 
intensities—was, in this sense, something that should be self-sufficient as the common solution 
for both worlds of capitalism and Enlightenment. As a conceptual assemblage of recent 
materialist thinking, the topological continuum (of these intensities) thus shares many properties, 
which other new materialists have speculated as what should be embedded in our hidden realities 
as the sufficient reason to compensate our failure to enlighten them exhaustively. For instance, 
this continuum is akin to what Karen Barad‘s agential realism calls ―spacetimematter manifold‖ 
upon which an ―agential cut‖ is made by the intra-action, not the interaction between two entities 
but the transformation of the manifold to draw an arbitrary boundary of observing and observed 
upon its surface (2007).  
140 
 
The sensor-actuator arcs that the interoperations of smart objects drew in Chapter 2 were 
to unfold multiple domains of measurability from this manifold underlying a new domestic space. 
According to Manuel DeLanda, the manifold is embedded with singularities, something virtual, 
whose influences are nevertheless real as the attractors to hold the transformation of the 
continuum within their ―sphere of influence‖ (2002). The problems, which the ubiquitous 
computing re-problematizes as things supposedly embedded everywhere but never fully 
resolvable, are the practical redefinition of these singularities this dissertation suggests. The 
ubiquity of embedded problems, paired with the expandability of software applications in the 
cloud, was to re-differentiate a smart home into each singular problem space. The continuum 
also describes what Jane Bennett calls ―a vital materiality‖ or ―the swarm of activity subsisting 
below and within formed bodies and recalcitrant things‖ (2009, p.50); or what Bruno Latour calls 
plasma, gaseous and highly conductive entities not yet congealed into actors nor networks 
(2005); or the mysterious entities constantly withdrawing from any correlationist understanding 
of human subjects and even from any pan-correlationist network-making of nonhumans (Harman, 
2005). This tricky materiality is, for the recent humanities discourses, what should remain after 
and thrive within the ruptures of our subjective realities so that the universe with numberless 
intervals is still convertible into a plenum for creative evolution. In this dissertation, this 
materiality is, on the other hand, also the condition for the software industries to discover a 
plenum of data for its further commodification. 
 In an article on the public opinion and activist response to the Snowden leaks in June 
2013, Lina Dencik and Jonathan Cable (2017) report how ―feelings of widespread resignation‖ 
that people have towards the governmental and corporate practices of surveillance have had them 
accept ―a system of ubiquitous data collection‖ as an unavoidable reality their ―surveillance 
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realism‖ describes. This recent version of ―capitalist realism‖ (Fisher, 2009), or realism in 
general, is, for Dencik and Cable, no longer the question of people‘s viewpoint as the means to 
correlate themselves with the world. The reality of ubiquitous surveillance is rather what people 
cannot help but accept facing the asymmetry through which they are engaged with the invisible 
material practices underway in their surroundings. Data collection is secretly done all over our 
daily activities, and we can feel it only obliquely. However, the maximum expression of our 
discontent at this hidden reality would still be resignation as long as we are not accessible to the 
language of ―national security‖ and analytic tools for the hidden danger of ―terrorism and crime‖ 
(Dencik & Cable, 2017). Peter Benson and Stuart Kirsch (2010) studied how tobacco and mining 
industries have, for perpetuating their harmful pursuit of profits, mobilized resignation from 
people by preempting possible criticisms to their practices and proactively manage their 
relationship to the critics. Resignation is the affective response to the impossibility of an 
alternative future to the status quo of capitalism.  
Recently, the ―corporate cultivation of digital resignation‖ has also perpetuated the 
exploitive mode of corporate data-mining (Draper & Turow, 2019). If digital resignation is an 
expression of reactive privacy concern against the untrackable hidden realities of one‘s 
behavioral data (the most active form of which is the practice of obfuscation, to make them 
further untrackable even by surveillance networks (Brunton & Nissenbaum, 2015)), the affective 
response that the capitalist realism in this dissertation cultivates from the people stuck in-
between the ubiquitous sensors and actuators is somewhat proactive rather than reactive.  
The new materiality, which people may feel anywhere massive data collection occurs, 
such as their own bodies, homes, and cities, also suggests a hidden reality of inexhaustible 
correlations. People‘s speculation about its promise is however not because there is no 
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alternative but because it is the only alternative to break through the status quo of capitalism, 
humanities, and their self-optimization. Industrial capitalism might at some point fill the world 
with people‘s resignation about its exploitive mode despite the bad feeling about its 
unsustainability. It is now filled instead with people‘s speculation about the hidden resource, the 
ubiquity of data, ever re-minable, and thus sustainable. The intervals between sensors and 
actuators of the IoT are where our hope for the smart sustainable future is cultivated.  
In this respect, the realism now is neither what we naively believe nor a subjective 
construction. It is what we need to wager on for the continuous exploitation of the world. The 
realism of brain, or neuro-realism (Gruber, 2017), is one example of this recent realist thinking 
that has been aroused by the brainwaves becoming streamed as real-time digital signals through 
the advanced sensor technologies such as fMRI, EEG, and the Brain-Machine Interface that this 
chapter analyzes. A brain may be the smallest physical domain of the IoT as it is scanned by 
hundreds of small sensors and easily stimulated by a variety of actuators embedded in one‘s 
daily routine. Relocated within this interval the IoT inscribes, a brain cultivates potentially 
inexhaustible correlations between sensors and actuators, which redefine the exploitability of our 
brainpower in the smart future. In this chapter, actor-network theory is used as a tool to describe 
this cultivation of resources within the ubiquitous intervals of a network.  
 
ANT, IoT, and Brain-Machine Interface (BMI) 
The word network has been popular in social theories since the emergence of the World 
Wide Web as a communication infrastructure in the 1990s. For the actor-network theorists who 
once advertised their network concept as descriptive of a ―series of transformations—translations, 
transductions—which could not be captured by any of the traditional terms of social theory,‖ the 
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Internet‘s apparent ―access to every piece of information‖ without deformation seemed to make 
their once revolutionary concept as mundane as a readymade term (Latour, 1999, p.15). In ―On 
Recalling ANT,‖ Bruno Latour imputes the criticisms that have been raised against the 
―managerial, engineering, Machiavellian, demiurgic character of ANT‖ to a misguided 
understanding of ―actor‖ and ―network‖ as separable terms. According to him, ―actor‖ 
misunderstood as a stand-alone term has made ANT‘s actual application focus exclusively on 
how strong ―male-like‖ actors mobilize their wider accessibility to networks to fulfill their own 
interests. On the other hand, conceiving of ―network‖ as something social above all actors below 
leads to a critique of ANT for ―its apparent dissolution of independent actors with morality and 
intentions in a ‗play of forces‘ in which no change through human intervention seems possible‖  
(Gad, 2010, p.61). Lost in these misunderstandings is the ―freshness‖ of the network concept, 
which hinges on the hyphen in ―actor-network,‖ not simply signifying the epistemological limit 
of a subject in a node of networks, but as an ontological entity in itself, which the actor-network 
theorists called ―translation.‖ Translation for them is not a byproduct of an actor‘s interaction 
with another actor or their interoperation for creating a network, but something akin to what 
Karen Bard calls ―intra-action,‖ from which both networks and actors are generated (Barad, 
2003).    
In 1999, the same year Latour recalled this early freshness of ANT, ―the Internet of 
Things‖ (IoT) was suggested to name the new technological infrastructure, which would catalyze 
more intra-actions within the traditional Internet, refreshing it (Ashton, 2009, June). Throughout 
its development, the ubiquitous computing of the IoT has integrated a variety of smart objects 
embedded with small digital sensors and actuators. But the process of their becoming actors with 
noticeable influences in the new Internet has not been simply through their registration as ready 
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to function. It has rather been through these smart machines‘ adaptive learning, or human users‘ 
new adaptability to smart infrastructures through their augmented sensor-actuator responses. 
―Thingification,‖ a process that has taken place in our urban environments, has been, contrary to 
what Barad originally meant by this term, not simply meaning the ―turning of relations into‖ the 
interactions between ―‗things,‘ ‗entities,‘ ‗relata,‘‖ things already fully individuated as 
autonomous actors before the interactions (Barad, 2003, p.812). Conversely, thingification the 
IoT re-initiates is to refresh the relation-making processes, or intra-actions, whereby machines, 
humans, animals, and objects in both real and virtual worlds are constantly re-drawing their new 
sensor-actuator relations to one another (Gabrys, 2016b).  
The goal of this chapter is to renew the actor-network theory as the practical tool to 
analyze an experimental example of the Internet of Things. Brain-Machine Interface (BMI) is an 
idea for the futuristic neuroprosthetic devices that Miguel Nicolelis and his neuroengineering lab 
at the Duke University have developed since 2000 and one version of it was publically 
demonstrated at the opening ceremony of the 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil. Compared to 
other cloud computing-based IoT applications, the entities that Nicolelis Lab has mobilized for 
constructing BMIs, such as human/animal neurons, biological/robotic limbs, and computers, 
have been small in number and usually put together in a small laboratory setting, rather than 
being distributed as widely as the sensors in a smart city. Nevertheless, cloud is still a working 
metaphor because what Nicolelis Lab has experimented is not so much the seamless and well-
defined interoperation of these biological, mechanical, and algorithmic objects, but their 
unexamined networkability, the nebula of relations aroused from their experimental 
juxtapositions. Freed from hardwired or habitual contexts of neuronal interactions, and not yet 
stabilized into a simple sensorimotor interaction, these objects have been cultivated as the things 
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ready to be mobilized for a variety of sensor-actuator relations that the lab has advertised as the 
evidence for the various future uses of BMI.  
 
The Missing Times 
On June 12, 2014, Juliano Pinto, a 29-year-old former athlete who lost the use of his legs 
after a car accident in 2006, entered the Corinthian Arena in São Paulo, Brazil, as part of the 
opening ceremony of the 2014 FIFA World Cup. Pinto was wearing an exoskeleton which 
looked ―as if came from the ‗Iron Man‘ movies‖ and was accompanied Nicolelis‘s staff who had 
supervised the development of the exoskeleton over two years, relying on about fourteen million 
dollars of funding from the Brazilian government. After Pinto‘s name was announced, the 
exoskeleton took its historic first step as its electroencephalogram (EEG) cap scanned the action 
potentials from his motor neurons and transmitted them to its robot legs. As the foot of the 
exoskeleton touched the grass, tactile stimuli sensed by the artificial skin of the soles were fed 
back to his arm skin instead of his paralyzed feet. Based on tactile perception transmitted through 
a millisecond-long interoperation between neurons, robots, and the grass, Pinto (or his motor 
cortex) could design his/its next move. After a couple of steps, he finally kicked the official ball. 
An event completed and broadcasted for only a few seconds at the beginning of the ceremony, 
soon buried by the spectacle of other events.  
For the last few months prior, Pinto, along with seven other patients in the Nicolelis Lab, 
trained to adjust his motor cortex to the way a machine interacts with its surroundings. In these 
training sessions, hundreds of his motor neurons were scanned by an EEG cap, which registered, 
or re-thingified, these neurons as laboratory objects transmitting their ambiguous action 
potentials to operate other lab devices. To find niches for his neurons to settle in to form a 
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working sensor-actuator loop with his robot legs, the control system of the exoskeleton also 
needed this time to learn human kinetics. These intervals of time—required for both the patient 
and machine intelligence, and their mutual adaptation to form casual relations—were however 
easily black-boxed in short sentences within the ―method‖ sections of papers according to the 
conventions of scientific publications and public demonstration. Information about the lab‘s 
practices was updated every day on social media starting sixty-nine days before D-Day, and 
partial close-ups of a working exoskeleton were released to arouse curiosity, but most other parts 
of the lab were still black-boxed.
18
 
Before the actual training began, the exoskeleton, initially developed in France, was 
transported to the Nicolelis Lab in São Paulo, where it was re-coordinated by an engineering 
professor from Munich so that it would be ready to respond to the neurons in the lab de-
contextualized from Pinto‘s conscious motor intentions (Sample, 2014, April). Leading up to this, 
more than one hundred scientists from different countries had already organized a consortium 
named the Walk-Again Project, designing a lab setup in which neurons and robot limbs could 
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 Since sixty nine days before the World Cup opening, images of a mysterious rectangular banner, 
literally a black-box, were posted to Nicolelis‘s Facebook page. While the information about the 
participants and their training were kept secret on his page, a short clip showing only the lower part of an 
anonymous body walking in the exoskeleton was the only one shown online to stimulate more curiosities 
from the followers about the scene behind the screen. It was, on the other hand, just after Pinto‘s kick-off 
was aired worldwide and Nicolelis tweeted ―We did it!!!!‖ that several videos of volunteers, highlighting 
their struggling but hopeful faces, were posted all at once. See the post on 22 May 2014, ―Historic 







achieve stable connections. The idea of Brain-Machine Interface had in this sense been 
concretized through the years-long negotiations of manifold interests from scientists, patients, 
and governmental officials. These parties believed that BMI would provide a means to 
demonstrate the validity of their scientific hypotheses, showcase the recent achievement of their 
‗national science,‘ fulfill their desires to walk again, or to draw public attention, justifying the 
government investment in their projects.  
Compared to this long duration for the formation of an intra-lab network and inter-lab 
cooperation of complicated interests, ―Pinto‘s few seconds of fame‖ did not seem worth all of 
those costs. It was only during the short seconds of the very beginning of the opening ceremony 
that neatly coordinated neurons and robot limbs were temporarily aligned with Pinto‘s conscious 
motor intentions, while at the same time aligned with the angles of the broadcasting camera, as 
well as with the lab‘s and government‘s interests in drawing public attention to this media event. 
Nevertheless, this short exposure was sufficient for Nicolelis Lab to mobilize as its allies some 
news outlets who were willing to argue, in favor of Nicolelis, that ―the historic event‖ signifying 
―the beginning of a future in which people with paralysis will be able to leave the wheelchair and 
literally walk again‖ was not given the attention ―it deserved during the opening ceremony‖ 
(Boyle, 2014, June; Martins & Rincon, 2014, June).  
From this specific example of a flickering constellation of things and their interests, we 
can identify three time intervals, or missing times, which were endured by both human and 
nonhuman participants in the Walk-Again Project—such as neurons, robots and algorithms, 
individual scientists, patients, labs, and a government—until their dissimilar interests were all 
aligned along a common technological invention. First, to form the working sensor-actuator loop 
between neurons and robots, the BMI needs to manage an imperceptible delay in its algorithmic 
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prediction of a person‘s motor intention. There has usually been a several-milliseconds of 
interval between this intention created in the form of neuronal firing and its manifestation 
through actual body movement or the person‘s conscious recognition of it, (Hansen, 2015a), and 
the machine‘s scanning the relevant signals and preemption of a motor intention should thus be 
done within this interval so that the wearer would not feel a significant delay. Besides the 
milliseconds spent to renew the sensor-actuator loop for each new motor intention scanned from 
a brain, two other longer-term intervals have also been necessary in order to make this loop 
represent the intentions of individual and institutional actors both inside and outside the lab. The 
second missing time omitted in the BMI‘s public presentation involves translating the 
heterogeneous interests of scientists, government officials, and individual patients into a specific 
disposition or diagram of things inside a lab. The third, happening behind closed doors in the lab, 
involves the hours of training of animals and human subjects, to make them not only capable of 
living with the BMI but believe in the hope it promises, namely ―walking again.‖ This chapter 
explores these three missing time intervals, which the lab has simply obscured behind its 
narrative of natural adaptations of subjects to smart infrastructures, and suggests how these 
intervals become prevalent in the twenty-first-century media‘s re-thingification of human brains. 
As Steven Brown and Rose Capdevila write, re-situated within these missing times of ―electronic 
networks,‖ actor-network theory functions as a tool to investigate ―the space for subjectivity and 
what is left of ‗the human‘‖ (Brown & Capdevila, 1999, p.45, 47), in other words, what is left of 
human intention, occurring first as neuronal firing and digital transmission.  
This chapter examines news articles and the Nicolelis Lab‘s scholarly publications about 
the BMI since the prototype of this robotic prosthetics was first developed in 2000 with primate 
brains connected to robot limbs, mediated by computer algorithms. I will also examine how the 
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scientists mobilized the mutual adaptability of these organic and technological entities to create a 
closed-loop of artificial sensor-actuator responses, which have not only demonstrated the validity 
of the lab‘s scientific principles, but also promised that the heterogeneous interests of actors 
around ―Walking Again‖ could be manifest by this invention. 
 
Some ontological implications of actor-network 
Before its actual application to describing a science lab, the relationship between two 
seemingly incompatible variables hyphened in the concept of the actor-network should be 
clarified. First, there are actors whose presences are noticeable only through their behaviors or 
consistent responses to the lab‘s attempt to communicate with them via either discursive or 
technological means. On the other hand, a network is something global not representable as a 
mere sum of these clearly-defined local actors. In order to resolve this contradictory paring-up, 
we usually rely on the so-called relational definition that the hyphen in actor-network may 
signify: an actor can be defined only by how it makes relations with others, whereas a network 
describes not so much the connections between independent actors but those relations in the 
making. Each actor‘s autonomy thus turns out to be something misunderstood, but the effect of 
relations in constant making and remaking, or intra-actions, prior to their being black-boxed, or 
congealed into two separable actors. However, this convenient definition also has a problem as it 
tends to dissipate the analytical usefulness of the term ―actor‖ in an abstract network potentially 
applicable to any haphazard relations, even to those that look too unstable to be localized as 
relations between noticeable actors. To overcome this, we might try to restrict our use of the term 
actor-network only to certain detectable and patternizable relations. But, in this case, we would 
make another mistake and reduce any haphazard relations simply to the background of a system 
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being studied. This problem of defining the actor-network suggests some ontological 
implications.  
First, actors are not independent entities that a theory presupposes as building blocks for 
its theoretical system to explain given problems. Rather, actors are ―those entities that exert 
detectable influence on others‖ (Law, 2012, p.126). Their presence is empirically inferred from 
recurrent influences but only in the presence of observers, both humans and nonhumans, ―able to 
propose their own theories of action to explain‖ the causes and effects by imputing the 
immediate influences they feel to certain actors in distance (Latour, 2005, p.57). An actor-
network is therefore when certain entities—not yet actors—are juxtaposed and begin to influence 
one another in a long-term sustainable way, so that they serve as ―heterogeneous but mutually 
sustaining elements‖ of a system (Law, 2012, p.115). In other words, an actor-network (and its 
actors and network) appears only in hindsight to an observer after an amount of (missing) time 
spent by those entities to stabilize their interactions with others in sustainable ways. This does 
not necessarily mean that only those entities with detectable influence in the association of a 
given network could be called actors. We could suppose the existence of other entities that might 
dissociate from the network under observation because they prefer to associate with ―other actors 
in the environment in the course of the inevitable struggles.‖ As John Law writes, the features of 
these others, constantly creating invisible networks conflicting with the networks ―being built by 
people,‖ such as the laboratory, are often branded as the ―obduracy‖ of Nature (Law, 2012, 
p.124). Therefore, missing times are not simply spent for association and stabilization, but also 
spent for struggle and switching between networks, one under techno-scientific construction and 
many unfavorable others black-boxed as mere natural environments by this human project.  
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Via this explanation, we can assume that there were some neurons in Pinto‘s motor 
cortex not firing towards the exoskeleton during the demonstration because they were more 
strongly associated with other kinds of neuronal sub-networks relevant to behaviors other than 
kicking off and to the stimuli other than tactility. They might struggle against the EEG cap‘s re-
thingification, namely its operation to switch them from previous enrollments in habitual 
neuronal contexts to another in the making under its algorithmic system. Insofar as their denial to 
fire meant their obduracy in being associated with other sub-networks of Pinto‘s brain, the actor-
network in the World Cup demo did not operate simply in a natural environment. Rather, there 
might be many struggling networks, which denied sending detectable signals to the observers—
scientists, engineers, or audiences—who were also obdurate in their enrollment to this invention, 
or media event in broadcasting. In this sense, actor-network theory does not presuppose a rigid 
dichotomy between systems and their environments, as long as environments mean the 
heterogeneity of networks just black-boxed conveniently as the ―obduracy‖ of Nature.  
Second, the successful operation of a science laboratory as an actor-network thus 
depends not only upon the design decisions of scientists to distribute those entities, but also upon 
those entities‘ ability to fill the gaps within their disposition to form an actual network. In this 
sense, the role of scientists is better described as creating ―juxtapositions‖ rather than 
―associations.‖ According to Michel Callon, ―it is from these juxtapositions that the associations 
draw their coherence, consistency, and structure of relationships that exists between the 
components that comprise it‖ (Callon, 2012, p.89). In a laboratory setup, the coherence of these 
relationships the components sustain for a long enough term is evidence of the validity of the 
lab‘s hypotheses; however, more importantly, the juxtaposition of components should be first a 
proper spatial translation, or diagrammatization (Ahn, 2019), of the rules of statements which 
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define valid variables and restrict their possible interactions. Therefore, what is demonstrated 
through an experiment or training session is most of all the validity of the theoretical variables 
and experimental parameters, as well as their communicational protocols, exemplified by the 
Nicolelis Lab‘s ―principles of neural ensemble physiology‖ (Lebedev & Nicolelis, 2009); or the 
validity of the hopes, which various stakeholders of the research have anchored on BMI. The 
good managerial skill of scientists thus requires them to be capable not only of maintaining these 
hopes until the gaps in an abstract diagram are fleshed out with actual connections between small 
lab objects, but also constantly re-distributing these gaps to draw more hopes around their 
diagram.  
Though it was just a few seconds of the opening ceremony, the 2014 World Cup 
demonstration allowed the Nicolelis Lab to show off that ensembles of neurons and robots—
whose plasticity to form lots of different sensor-actuator loops for different motor tasks the lab 
had experimented for a decade—could also create a closed-loop with an exoskeleton walking 
outside. In the demo, a local network of these organic and machinic things did not just validate 
the lab‘s scientific hypotheses, but that their design can serve to mobilize more hopes for the 
BMI‘s medical, academic, industrial, and commercial uses beyond the physical boundary of 
human bodies.   
 
A Description of BMI 
Since Nicolelis designed his first BMI involving a rat in 1993, his lab‘s BMIs have 
evolved through several different forms, varying according to the species of the animal subjects, 
numbers of registered neurons, methods of scanning action potentials, types of motor functions 
simulated by the machines, and the pattern-recognition algorithms used to predict a subject‘s 
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motor intention. It was in 2000, after an experiment with an owl monkey named Belle, that the 
lab began to refer to BMI as the future of ―neuroprosthetic device[s]‖ which ―could be used to 




Figure 4.1: A prototypical description of a BMI (Nicolelis, 2003) 
  
As described by Nicolelis in his 2003 Nature article (Figure 4.1), this early version of 
BMI was comprised of three major actors. First, there was a monkey wearing a head-mounted 
device, consisting of a hundred ―Teflon-coated stainless-steel microwires‖ implanted in the 
neurons in several regions of the monkey‘s motor cortex. The monkey was located in front of a 
monitor to operate a fake joystick with her right hand to win a videogame and receive a sip of 
fruit juice as a reward. Second, placed alongside these interconnected neurons and microwires 
were a device for data acquisition from neuronal firing, called a Harvey Box, and computers for 
real-time pattern recognition algorithms (linear and artificial neural network (ANN) algorithms). 
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These computing devices were able to ―properly sample, filter and amplify neural signals from 
many electrodes‖ that had been evenly distributed within the subject‘s motor cortex, and 
integrate these parallel signals—scanned every 50 to 100 milliseconds from multiple neurons—
into a linearized input for machine learning. Further, there was a robot arm, operating a real 
joystick responding to instructions from the computer, which predicted the monkey‘s motor 
intentions in milliseconds. As the robot operated the real joystick in the same moves that the 
monkey did with the fake one, a cursor on the videogame monitor moved as though the monkey 
was controlling it. At the same time, information about the robot‘s grip force was fed back to the 
―small vibromechanical elements attached to the animal‘s arm‖ (Nicolelis, 2003, p.419). 
When the monkey moved her joystick, believing it to be the real one, the kinetic patterns 
of her arm movements were captured from ―infrared markers‖ attached to each joint and 
calculated into machine-readable ―motor parameters (such as arm position and velocity, or hand 
gripping force).‖ These parameters were then used in the pattern-recognition algorithm, which 
determined a set of coefficients for a proper linear sum of the multiple neural firings, matched to 
the linear change in the motor parameters observed some milliseconds after. These filtered brain 
waves were then properly linearized to reproduce the patterns of ―subject‘s voluntary motor 
intentions,‖ allowing the computer to operate the robot arm to play the game on behalf of the 
monkey, so that she could get a reward (Lebedev & Nicolelis, 2009, p.531). As information 
about the robot arm‘s performance was ―relayed back to the animal‖ in the form of visual and 
tactile feedback, ―a closed-loop control BMI‖ was formally completed (Nicolelis, 2003, p.419). 
However, for its actual operation to be seamless, some intervals within the loop should be 
stabilized. First, between the monkey‘s mind and brain, her goal-oriented intention to win the 
game must be successfully relayed into manifold paralleled neuronal firings. On the other hand, 
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between a brain and computing devices, these paralleled neuronal firings from the cortex must be 
linearized again to be paired with linear changes in the monkey‘s arm movements. At the same 
time, the linear movements of the robot arm must be translated into ―proprioceptive feedback‖ 
signals, which were re-distributed to the monkey‘s paralleled visual and tactile receptors. 
Between the abstract juxtaposition of these lab entities and their transformation into an 
association or working actor-network, the entities facing each other across these parallel-serial 
junctures were supposed to create actual connections for mutual adaptations.   
 
Defining Actors 
The monkey, computers, and the robot have been identified as the three major actors, but 
they did not exist as independent components prior to their association being networked. John 
Law defines an actor and its agency as ―an effect generated by a network of heterogeneous, 
interacting, materials‖ (Law, 1992, p.383). This relational definition requires us not to carelessly 
localize actors into a small number of influential things or nodes. However, to explain how these 
distributed influences keep circulating in and sustaining a current form of a network, it is still 
practically required to assume that certain actors have more agency than others in the network. In 
the above description of parallel-serial junctures, the three major actors are localizable as each of 
them is capable of mobilizing the many small entities in the parallel side of a juncture for its 
linear goal in the other side. In Latour‘s terminology, this function of junctures to integrate and 
transmit many is called translation, a process through which scientists or experimental 
instruments represent the heterogeneous responses from voiceless actors and mobilize them as 
the resources to fulfill their own interests (Latour, 1987). In other words, these major actors have 
more agency because they can represent voiceless others latent in the network.  
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Thus, we can define the monkey in question as one of the major actors, as she can 
translate the interests of manifold neurons into her interest in winning the game and translate 
their ―neuronal ‗vote‘‖ of action potentials into her highly trained skill to control a fake joystick 
(Nicolelis, 2001, p.404).
19
 The Harvey Box and computers comprise another major actor that 
translates the ―activation of large distributed populations of neurons‖ into their algorithms (p. 
404), ―inscribed with certain interests‖ of the researchers, namely to demonstrate the operability 
of their neurophysiological principles (Johnson et al., 2014, p.17). The robot arm becomes an 
actor as well, as its design represents the researchers‘ interest in restricting the monkey‘s arm 
movements to certain motor parameters, and as it translates the predicted motor intentions of the 
monkey into an actual operation of a joystick, making her more addicted to the game as she 
believes she really controls the cursor.  
However, even for the observers in the lab, these major actors were identifiable only in 
hindsight after ―a few nerve-racking, nail-biting, soul-searching moments‖ during which their 
dissimilar and conflicting interests were negotiated and properly re-aligned within the parallel-
serial junctures so that their mutual mobilizations became stably measurable (Nicolelis, 2011b, 
p.144). This missing time was however easily black-boxed by Nicolelis who simply writes that 
―nothing out of the ordinary happened‖ in these confusing moments.  
In this sense, the ―long-term training‖ required for both the monkey and computers to 
form a closed-loop through their mutual adaptation was also necessary for the actor-network to 
reach ―a favourable balance of power,‖ by which Michel Callon means a state in which all ―the 
concerned actors‖ eventually align their interests with the researchers‘ project (Callon, 1986, 
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 It is noteworthy, in his book Beyond Boundaires, how careful Nicolelis is not to describe one of his 
experimental monkeys (named Aurora) simply as a mere laboratory animal, but to introduce here as a 
sophisticated social being who was willing to cooperate with the project (Nicolelis, 2011b). 
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p.10). During the repeated trials for the monkey to learn how to mobilize her motor neurons for 
the motor parameters that the joysticks involve, some of the microwires became more strongly 
enrolled to the sorting algorithm of Harvey Box while other unfavorable ones were detached 
from the juncture and withdrawn to the background of the loop. From the 2001 prototype to the 
2014 human application, this favorable balance was promoted in news articles and the lab‘s 
publications as one of the most important achievements of their BMI, presented as though it had 
naturally been achieved by the ―monkey‘s thought,‖ ―only her brain activity‖ and the ―[m]ind-
controlled exoskeleton‖ (Blakeslee, 2008, January; Smith, 2014, June) or by ―physiological 
adaptations at the level of neural ensembles,‖ the ―ability of cortical ensembles to adapt to 
represent novel external actuators,‖ and ―adaptive algorithms that continuously update the model 
parameters while the subject trains‖ (Lebedev & Nicolelis, 2009, p.534; Lebedev & Nicolelis, 
2006, p.541; Lebedev et al., 2011, p.30), rather than being engineered within a disposition of 
artificially-juxtaposed things. The balance in this closed-loop was supposedly automatically and 
naturally maintained as ―[b]rain cells that ceased to influence the predictions significantly were 
dropped from the model, and those that became better predictors were added‖ as the result of 
their mutual adaptation (Nicolelis & Chapin, 2008). While the three nonhuman actors were 
foregrounded in the lab‘s public presentations, the managerial work of the scientists maintaining 
the loop was hidden in the background, alongside other neurons that disagreed with being 
enrolled any longer in the network. 
 
A Closed-Loop or Favorable Balance of Power 
The balance, naturally achieved ―between the brain and artificial devices,‖ was important 
in promoting BMI‘s future use in noninvasive neuro-prosthetics, with the promise that patients 
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could naturally adapt to the BMI without recurring interventions by engineers for brain-machine 
calibration (Nicolelis, 2001). With respect to the BMI‘s function in scientific experiments, the 
closed-loop was also taken as the evidence for the internal validity of the lab‘s scientific 
principles (Cicurel & Nicolelis, 2015, Ch1). Superficially, the algorithmic predictions of the 
monkey‘s behaviors from the randomly sampled neuronal firings show that the lab‘s principles 
of ―distributed coding,‖ ―neuronal mass effect,‖ and ―plasticity‖ are valid in the given cortical 
areas and motor parameters (See Table 4.1). Insofar as this closed-loop continues between a 
limited number of actors over a long period and the exchange of influences between actors could 
be black-boxed by considering it ―a unified whole‖ (Latour, 1987, p.131), the lab‘s principles 
would remain true, but only within the given cortical areas and motor functions.  
 
Table 4.1: Principles of neural ensemble physiology (Lebedev & Nicolelis, 2009) 
Principle Explanation 
Distributed coding The representation of any behavioral parameter is distributed 
across many brain areas 
Single-neuron insufficiency Single neurons are limited in encoding a given parameter 
Multitasking A single neuron is informative of several behavioral parameters 
Mass effect principle A certain number of neurons in a population is needed for their 
information capacity to stabilize at a sufficiently high value 
Degeneracy principle The same behavior can be produced by different neuronal 
assemblies 
Plasticity Neural ensemble function is crucially dependent on the capacity 
to plastically adapt to new behavioral tasks 
Conservation of firing The overall firing rates of an ensemble stay constant during the 
learning of a task 
Context principle The sensor responses of neural ensembles change according to the 
context of the stimulus 
 
In the actual development of the BMI, this prototypical closed-loop has however been 
significant for another reason because it could be occasionally re-opened to accommodate other 
as yet untested experimental objects, such as different neurons, algorithms, and robot designs. 
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The plasticity of the loop has promised that the validity of the lab‘s hypotheses could expand to 
other unexamined brain areas and motor behaviors. Once the initial network reached a state of 
autonomy, scientists could change ―the feedback information that the animal receives‖ and ―the 
kinematic properties of the motor actuator (robot arm),‖ as long as these newly introduced 
parameters were still adaptable by existing actors (Nicolelis, 2003, p.419). They observed 
whether the actors would keep enrolled to their project after they changed the location and size 
of the cortical areas used to sample neurons (for instance from the primary motor cortex to the 
posterior parietal cortex, in order to demonstrate the ―neural degeneracy principle‖) or added 
some new motor parameters such as three-dimensional arm movements (to demonstrate the 
―neuronal multitasking principle‖). In other words, after the loop was achieved, the lab design 
obtained strategic advantages in negotiating with the outside actors interested in the BMI‘s more 
general application to various fields, even though every new negotiation required a few hours or 
days of training. 
As long as new elements were contiguous to those already included and this contiguity 
was enough for existing actors to adapt to, the lab‘s scientific principles could be vindicated 
farther to the various cortical areas relevant to the more variety of motor functions integrated into 
the research. Exploiting these actors‘ adaptability and plasticity, the closed-loop has integrated 
many endurable changes in subsequent experiments. Consequently, the inner network of 
Nicolelis Lab has been intensified in terms of the number of voiceless actors, re-thingified by 
―Teflon-coated microwires,‖ ―wireless electrodes,‖ and ―EEG devices,‖ which made their action 
potentials farther beyond a monkey‘s cortical areas in order to generalize the lab‘s principles 
towards more unrestricted uses.   
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Though many individual neurons once enrolled in the loop were dropped from the 
junctures as the BMI evolved into many different forms to integrate various experimental 
parameters, they were never simply withdrawn to anonymous and unfavorable backgrounds. 
These neurons remained associated with other latent sub-networks of the brain, often mutually 
incommensurable with one another, and thus not detectable in a network in the making, but 
already catalogued in computer data and publications. These neurons have been preserved as a 
sort of reserve army of networks, ready to be re-mobilized anytime soon. Throughout the loop‘s 
expansion, a brain‘s ―complexity,‖ meaning lots of paralleled sub-networks embedded in its 
topological continuum, has been re-inscribed in the form of what Shirley Strum and Bruno 
Latour call ―complications,‖ which means the sum of linear translations of paralleled 
complexities. Each sub-network once integrated to the BMI has been archived as ―a succession 
of [machine-readable] simple operations‖ as a part of these complications. Responding to the 
unfavorable environments of the multitude struggling networks within a brain, the ―greater 
stability‖ of BMI and its applications to a variety of kinetic functions could be acquired ―only 
with additional resources; something besides what is encoded‖ in a current loop, namely the 
neurons kept in a database as the reserve army for the BMI‘s future applications (Strum & Latour, 
1999, pp.119-120). 
 
Closing the loop to become beyond boundaries 
Just after the first BMI with a primate brain succeeded in 2000 in predicting and imitating 
how Belle, an owl monkey, ―intended to move [her] natural arms,‖ Nicolelis Lab set to work on 
a new BMI to replicate their previous success with three macaque monkeys whose ―brains 
contain[ed] deep furrows and convolutions that resemble those of the human brain‖ (Nicolelis & 
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Chapin, 2008). Once a favorable balance of influences between a monkey and a robot arm was 
formed again, Nicolelis changed the BMI design by removing the fake joystick from the right 
hand of Aurora, ―an elegant female‖ macaque monkey. This symbolic action disabled Aurora‘s 
bodily extension and Nicolelis expected that she would adapt to her new physical condition with 
a new strategy allowing her neurons to operate the robot arm, this time without moving her 
hands. 
 
After being puzzled, Aurora gradually altered her strategy. Although she continued to make 
hand movements, after a few days she learned she could control the cursor 100 percent of 
the time with her brain alone. In a few trials each day during the ensuing weeks Aurora did 
not even bother to move her hand; she moved the cursor by just thinking about the trajectory 
it should take (Nicolelis & Chapin, 2008).  
 
This success with a disabled monkey was quite consequential, offering much more than 
what it seemed to simply offer to her, namely her ―out-of-body experiences‖ in the lab. 
Promoting the similarity of monkeys and their human relatives and Aurora‘s physical condition 
similar to a human patient, the actor-network inside the lab claimed to represent the interests of 
humans outside the lab, not only those aiming to renew ―hope of restoring mobility to people 
who are paralysed,‖ but also those trying to develop ―the conduit through which our brains 
control all our tools, to extend our reach, presence and communication with the universe‖  
(Nicolelis, 2011a). As Nicolelis said in the interview with the Washington Post, in order to 
mobilize ―enough political will and investment‖ for his project, the lab had ―to galvanize 




In closing this loop between a brain and a virtual body using BMI technology, we now know 
the primate brain can operate beyond the boundaries and physical constraints of its body and 
interact with any world presented to it (Nicolelis, 2011a). 
Here the target happens to be a robot. It could be a crane. Or any tool of any size or 
magnitude. The body does not have a monopoly for enacting the desires of the brain 
(Blakeslee, 2008, January). 
 
The plasticity of the BMI allowing it to close a loop with various motor apparatuses 
including even readymade technologies, such as a crane, was suggested as what would enable 
this network to be free from any physical constraints of the lab and bodily boundaries of 
experimental animals. This also means that, for the loop to extend beyond those boundaries, it 
should be continually re-opened to accommodate new experimental parameters, translating the 
public interests in the BMI‘s social applications. A favorable balance of influences needs to be 
renegotiated in every new training session so that the actors can re-adapt. Throughout the lab‘s 
publications, the BMI‘s performance has been measured in terms of how seamlessly its diagram 
could enclose more complex motor parameters and different types of robots into its loop. In 
Nicolelis‘ book, The Relativistic Brain, this capability of enclosing a variety of motor functions 
is discussed as the BMI‘s possibility as ―a biologically-inspired hypercomputer,‖ functioning like 
a biological version of a universal Turing machine, potentially capable of controlling every 
―artificial, real or virtual actuator‖  (Cicurel & Nicolelis, 2015, Ch7).  
While the capability of BMIs to wield their action potentials beyond typical physical and 
biological boundaries has been explained as ―what a naturally evolved brain can produce‖ with 
its ―self-adaptable (i.e. plastic) elements,‖ a number of questions remain unanswered, or even 
unasked. What happened to Aurora and other unnamed macaque monkeys during the ―few 
nerve-racking, nail-biting, soul-searching moments‖ of missing time in which they might feel not 
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only just ―being puzzled,‖ but disabled? What was the ―special care‖ that the scientists 
mentioned they needed to do ―to keep experimental conditions controlled and restricted to 
specific task requirements‖ (Kim et al., 2006, p.159)? As long as these interventions from human 
observers in training sessions are omitted from their publications, the closed-loop becomes more 
black-boxed as the product of the natural progress of a system. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Janus‘ dicta in Science in Action (Latour, 1987) 
 
However, when we shift our focus to the inside of these ―nerve-racking‖ hours, in which 
the intervals within the loop should be filled by the physiological and algorithmic adaptations of 
things, what previously appeared natural reappears to be problematic. As Latour, in Science in 
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Action, writes in the voices of his Janus, whose faces represent two different perspectives on 
science (one from the outside seeing science as a readymade product, the other from the inside 
where it is in the making) (Figure 4.2), the so-called natural progress of neural ensembles—
which the lab promoted as ―the cause that allowed controversies to be settled‖—appeared, in the 
moment of network making, to be ―the consequence of the settlement‖ between conflicting 
neurons in a certain design engineered as a spatial abstraction of the lab‘s principles. Whereas 
the BMI as readymade science expanded its influences upon the public by convincing people 
outside of the future that this naturally-inspired hypercomputer promised, the BMI in the making 
could begin to work only ―when all the relevant‖ actors—neurons, computers, and robot limbs—
were convinced by this design‘s re-distribution of their biologically or algorithmically 
programmed interests within the loop. From this perspective of the network in the making, the 
lab‘s principles of neural ensemble physiology—which are supposed to mirror the natural 
phenomena that the BMI imitates—are no longer ―the [natural] cause that allows projects to be 
carried out,‖ but what need to be naturalized by the network‘s inner densification (in terms of the 
number of relevant actors enrolled to a closed-loop) and outer expansion (in terms of a variety of 
social and individual interests in the ―Walk-Again‖ that the BMI promises). In other words, these 
scientific principles have functioned as an abstract diagram that has realigned the heterogeneous 
interests of outside actors with a local loop of small entities in the lab. They are not the natural 
causes science discovered, but the protocols or manuals to re-distribute a variety of actors both in 
the lab‘s physical and social environments according to the ontology it draws (Latour, 1987, p.10, 
99, 175).  
In the interval between the two faces of Janus, which also represents the missing time 
between the nonconscious mutual adaptations of small things in milliseconds and the awareness 
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of humans and animals of their agencies beyond boundaries, the experimental subject as a 
conscious being also reappears as an ambivalent figure. In the World Cup demonstration, Pinto 
was introduced as a readymade subject, already trained to know how to control and exploit a 
network of these small things for his interest in overcoming the boundaries of his handicapped 
body. The monkey‘s perceptual consciousness and motor intentions were, on the other hand, 
significantly restricted in the lab by a specific juxtaposition of things. The artificial sensor-
actuator circuits emergent from this juxtaposition determined the ranges of possible perceptual 
stimuli and cortical responses the monkey could engage with. 
For the lab‘s sustainable expansion, BMI needed to gradually re-cultivate a subject‘s 
heterogeneous motor intentions and desires for rewards into machine-readable and predictable 
forms. What Donald MacKenzie once wrote regarding the role of scientists as system builders is 
also true for the sustainability of Nicolelis Lab and its scientific principles: 
 
No laboratory development is ultimately self-sufficient. If the environment is not right or is 
not made right by the system builders, any line of laboratory development will lack external 
influence and may indeed cease altogether. (MacKenzie, 2012, p.208)   
 
 
Expansion of a Network and Mobilization of Interests 
Since Nicolelis Lab‘s BMI reached its first closed-loop with Aurora in 2001, the loop has 
been continually reopened to experiment with the range of its plasticity and adaptability, 
accommodating more actors and experimental parameters. The number of neurons in the loop 
has increased from about 100 to 800. The simple task of controlling a joystick directed left or 
right has been replaced by three-dimensional reaching and grasping tasks (Carmena et al., 2003), 
walking on a treadmill (Fitzsimmons et al., 2009), and bimanual arm movements (Ifft et al., 
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2013). The motor parameters scanned from infrared markers on the bodies of animals have 
become more complicated from the triad of hand position, velocity, and gripping force with 
small degrees of freedom to the simultaneous muscle activities of biceps, triceps, deltoid, 
extensor digitorum, measured by the surface electromyographic (EMG) (Santucci et al., 2005), 
―Muscle Geometry‖ consisting of ―the insertion point, origin point, and line of action of each 
muscle group‖ adapted from the field of biomechanics (Kim et al., 2007), and ―walking 
parameters‖ such as step time, step length, foot location, and leg orientation (Fitzsimmons et al., 
2009). The robotic-prosthetics operated by brains have also been changed from a robot arm to 
the locomotion apparatuses of a humanoid robot (Nicolelis & Chapin, 2008), and to ―a realistic, 
virtual monkey avatar‖ (Ifft et al., 2013). The physical range of the closed-loop has extended 
from a single laboratory in North Carolina to a network of two laboratories: one located in Kyoto 
working on the humanoid robot part of the loop, another in North Carolina taking the brain part, 
transmitting its action potential to Japan through a high-speed internet link ―literally expanding 
that primate‘s brain reach to the other side of the earth‖ (Nicolelis & Chapin, 2008). The physical 
medium implanted in a brain has also been renovated not only to send signals wirelessly 
(Schwarz et al., 2014), but also to receive proprioceptive feedback from robotic prosthetics in the 
form of intracortical microstimulation (ICMS) without sense receptors attached to the skin‘s 
biological boundaries (Brain-Machine-Brain Interface, BMBI) (O‘Doherty et al., 2009). 
Throughout these experimentations on the BMI‘s adaptability to other readymade apparatuses, 
including a treadmill, humanoid robot, EMG, Muscle Geometry, and noninvasive EEG used in 
the World Cup Demo, computer algorithms have also been updated from using linear modeling, 
such as Wiener filter, LMS adaptive filters, gamma filter, and subspace Wiener filters, to 
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nonlinear models, such as time-delay neural networks, local linear switching models, and finally 
the Unscented Kalman Filter (Kim et al., 2006; Li et al., 2009).  
 
 
Figure 4.3: Brainet of three monkey brains (Ramakrishnan et al., 2015). 
 
In more recent research, Nicolelis Lab juxtaposed three monkey brains with a virtual 
monkey avatar instead of a physical robot, experimenting with the possibility of the Brain to 
Brain Interfaces (BtBIs). The lab reported that, after ―several weeks of training,‖ the three 
monkeys and one avatar eventually formed an organic computing device which they named 
Brainet, ―a self-adapting computation architecture capable of achieving a common behavioural 
goal,‖ such as a three-dimensional reaching and grasping task in virtual reality (Ramakrishnan et 
al., 2015, p.10; Pais-Vieira, 2015). In this new setup, each monkey was in a separate room 
watching a computer monitor displaying a two-dimensional projection of an avatar shown from 
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each side and trained to operate only one side of this three-dimensional avatar (Figure 4.3). As 
the collective firings of three separated brains eventually succeeded in operating the avatar in the 
space of higher dimension than the space each belonged to, the researchers declared: the ―shared 
BMI allowed multiple monkey brains to adapt in an unsupervised manner.‖ Black-boxed as a 
―self-adapting computation architecture‖ (Ramakrishnan et al., 2015, p.10), the BMI, redefined 
as an inter-brain network, is now capable of expanding its promise to the problems supposed to 
be higher-dimensional than the world in which its users live.  
Throughout the evolution of the BMI, scientists have selected experimental entities to 
include in the loop driven by their interests in expanding the loop to the bigger neuronal, 
geographical, interdisciplinary, and industrial networks. Whenever those entities were chosen as 
possible contributors to the lab‘s expansion, the publications described them as representing new 
hopes that people outside could anchor on the BMI. From rats (as an umbrella species for the 
whole upper vertebrates) to owl monkeys (New World) and macaque monkeys (Old World) and 
then to human patients, experimental subjects have been chosen by how similar the anatomical 
structure of their brains was to their human relatives (Nicolelis & Chapin, 2008). The motor 
parameters involving the behavior of monkeys—from simple arm movements and reaching-
grasping tasks, to bimanual and bipedal movements, to the control of a virtual avatar—have been 
chosen by how they ―could be used in human neuroprosthetic applications‖ and ―contribute to 
the development of future clinical neuroprosthetics systems‖ (Santucci et al., 2005: 1537; Ifft et 
al., 2013: 8; Li et al., 2009). The wireless electrodes implanted in brains instead of microwires 
used previously were expected to ―reduce the risks of infection introduced by the use of cables 
that connect brain implants to external hardware‖ when applied to human patients (Lebedev & 
Nicolelis, 2006, p.540). The three monkey brains connected through the BtBI were supposed to 
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provide other scientists with ―the core for a new type of computing device: an organic computer‖ 
(Pais-Vieira, 2015, p.1). As the geographical distance between the brains in the Nicolelis Lab 
and the robots in other places are extendable through the internet protocols such as TCP/IP 
(Wessberg et al., 2000, p.363), the BMI eventually becomes a machine for a long-standing desire 
of humans in general, namely their telepresence ―beyond boundaries‖ (Nicolelis & Chapin, 2008; 
Nicolelis, 2011a). 
 
The more variety of biological and technological actors the loop enclosed inside, the 
more interests Nicolelis Lab promised to the actors outside. The more this loop looked adaptive 
to the new experimental setups in ―an unsupervised manner,‖ the more credits Nicolelis Lab 
earned from academia, patients, government, industries, and the audience of the World Cup 
demonstration. These interests, raised by the lab‘s ―promising too much,‖  (Miller, 2014, May) 
required Nicolelis to be a skillful manager not only as an organizer of an international 
consortium, but also as a supervisor, determining how to exploit the adaptability of small things 
to a new laboratory design that embodied the various interests of big actors outside. Put another 
way, mediating between the interests of small things and those of big things, Nicolelis needed to 
manipulate the missing times successfully; by translating the confusing and ambiguous moments 
of intervals full of relations as yet un-stabilized into the delayed hopes and promises for the 
future, everything is possible.  
Designing the BMI has for Nicolelis been to draw a diagram capable of realigning along 
its closed-loop the heterogeneous interests of the relevant actors—such as the physical (neurons 
and muscles), technological (filtering algorithms, robots, and brain scan apparatuses), and the 
societal (patients, a scientific consortium, media, and the Brazilian government). Their interests 
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should be passed through the mediation of this diagram to be represented as what the future 
applications of BMI promise and, in this respect, the diagram, as a spatial abstraction of the 
scientific principles, has functioned as what Michel Callon calls ―obligatory passage point‖ 
(1986, p.7). As long as the diagram‘s flexible and constant re-distribution of small objects inside 
the lab could translate the heterogeneity of interests outside, the BMI could attract more interests 
from supporters and exploit them as the resources for the lab‘s expansion. Throughout the 
missing times between the diagram‘s re-distribution of objects and their becoming a working 
sensor-actuator loop, or an actor-network, the subjectivity of experimental animals and human 
patients has also been reprogrammed and re-enclosed into the loop. Necolelis Lab‘s promotion of 
future subject, supposedly capable of becoming beyond boundaries according to ―what a 
naturally evolved brain can produce‖ (Kim et al., 2006), has however concealed the real 
condition of experimental subjects in the lab. Their actual attempts to reach out beyond their 
biological boundaries have been continuously subject to the system‘s scanning and filtering to 
measure how compatible their hopeless motor intentions are with the outside actors‘ interests in 











CHAPTER 5: THE HORROR OF FOUND FOOTAGE  
AND THE SPECULATIVE ECONOMY OF ATTENTION 
 
The case of the BMI provides a novel way to analyze the recent networks of smart 
objects as the juxtapositions of intervals. As the operational elements of an actor-network, these 
intervals describe what happens in the junctures between many and one, actors and a network, or 
parts and a whole during the missing times of network-making. Within these intervals, some of 
small entities have eventually become actors by contributing to the formation of a temporal 
sensor-actuator loop seamlessly working for a given task whereas many others have withdrawn 
from the intervals to the background as the complexity or manifoldness of unknown networks 
mutually asymmetrical. Topological continuum was the concept this dissertation suggested for 
describing this background with manifold hidden networks. A human observer was said to be 
somewhat too obdurate to discover them in holding on a habitual network organized along 
his/her hard-wired sensor-actuator practices with everyday objects. On the other hand, fold or cut 
in Chapter 2 was the concept to foreground these intervals, hardly black-boxed as stable 
functional circuits any longer in the current smart spaces where the seamfulness between objects 
is not something to be sutured or concealed but to be preserved for culturing the networks‘ 
multifunctional transformability. The intervals within these networks are open to lots of different 
interoperations between smart objects insofar as Ontology as the machine-to-machine protocol 
guarantees their maximum interoperability no matter what their interoperations intend. This 
openness of networks also enables application developers to redesign the sensor-actuator 
interoperations of objects for the new IoT applications. Nicolelis could promise almost any 
imaginable future uses of the BMI by exploiting or exaggerating the plasticity of small things—
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biological neurons in one‘s brain and artificial neurons in machine learning algorithms—to form 
any sort of working sensor-actuator loops. Likewise, the developers of IoT applications are 
exploitive of the unexamined interoperability of smart objects, which withdraws from the current 
uses of sensors and actuators, but would be re-employable for a new way to enclose a space 
around its new parameters, in other word, to re-bifurcate it constantly into different problem 
spaces for ubiquitous computing. However, for this sort of speculative job—namely, the 
ceaseless mining of hidden parameters—to be acceptable as still endurable by the IoT 
subscribers despite the fact that they already paid enough for their new digital infrastructures, 
they should become convinced about the futures that the IoT promises. In other words, to justify 
the smart objects‘ infiltration of a greater variety of our everyday activities and to reassure us 
about our being stuck in their intervals, certain discursive formation needs to be paired with the 
expansion of smart networks. As exemplified by Nicolelis‘s discursive strategy to manage 
people‘s hopes and speculations in the ambiguous futures of BMI, this discursive formation has 
functioned to do more than simply defining what is inclusive in the current form of networks and 
thus what is perceivable to the current system and its observers. In short, the discourse is no 
longer an epistemological issue. Rather, the discourse about the hopes and futures has the form 
of speculation about the totality never graspable by a single network because its massiveness and 
heterogeneity mean the complexity of networks lurking in the background, most of which prefer 
to remain silent as anonymous actors to one another. Instead of reconfirming a subject‘s 
epistemological limit to access the whole, the totality for these ontological discourses justifies 
our speculation about the other worlds constructed by invisible nonhumans. This sort of 
speculation is justified as the nonhumans withdrawing from our phenomenological world are still 
believed to be exploitable for our human goals if we have a better means to negotiate with them. 
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In this respect, the recent speculative realism, which Chapter 1 discussed as something resonant 
to the recent object-oriented worldview of the IoT, is an example of this new discursive 
formation for the speculative economy, which ventures its capitals on the risky missions to data-
mine the hidden correlations among the complexity of ecological beings in the background.  
 According to the previous chapters, this speculative model of economy has discovered its 
niche market from the intervals between smart agents, both humans and nonhumans. These 
intervals, until reassembled into working sensor-actuator interoperations, are where we project 
our ontological concerns about the worlds beyond our accessibility. A smart vehicle is an 
example of this interval where a driver‘s concerns for his nonconscious desires are graphically 
re-individuated along a red route to a Point of Interest (POI) that AIDA suggests on a screen. A 
smart home is another interval where a tenant‘s concerns for invisible efficiency problems in her 
everyday routine are re-individuated into certain parameters of a domestic space that smart 
objects communicate. An open-world in a videogame is an interval that hides lots of stories, 
puzzles, and encounters among its virtual objects ready for a gamer‘s targeting. Nicolelis Lab is 
where the intervals between neurons and robots are constantly redistributed to cultivate more 
sensor-actuator connections between them for various future uses of BMI. Despite the confusing 
moments of the intervals, they were all discussed as the places worth staying, even at the risk of 
disabling oneself as the monkey did in Nicolelis Lab, or at the expense of enduring a long time 
of nothing happened just as many open-world videogamers usually do. Our endurance of these 
confusing intervals and disoriented staying are the new forms of labor that we perform according 
to our routinized everyday protocols and this affective labor generates the resources from which 
the ubiquitous computing excavates further hidden correlations. There is always a plentitude of 
others within the intervals and they are constantly withdrawing from a network that humans 
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construct. As a technique to trace their withdrawals, what actor-network theory urges us is an 
ontological turn in our understanding of these slippery others and their ungraspable totality. No 
longer signifying the impossibility of a seamless closure of a subjective reality, the totality is 
now reimagined as a fractal of networks, guaranteeing our unlimited speculations about inter-
objective realities drawn by these objects‘ constant withdrawals from us. The wireless sensor and 
actuator network (WSAN) of the IoT operationalizes this ontological turn and discovers the 
resources for its creative reality-making from the ubiquitous intervals between sensors and 
actuators. Within the intervals, some things persist in lurking and making their secret networks 
without yet being communicated by any registered sensor-actuator arcs. These things can be 
unknown correlations between environmental parameters, imperceptible environmental cues, 
various vital signals from organisms, neuronal firings, and people‘s conscious or nonconscious 
behaviors. For human users, these things are only felt affectively as they always fail to pay 
proper attention to these existences beyond human understandability. Their repeated frustration 
in paying attention is in turn followed by their speculation about the problematic realities secretly 
proliferating in their surroundings and own bodies.  
This concluding chapter of the dissertation discusses how the current media industry 
accumulates its speculative capital within these ubiquitous phenomena of intervals, in the forms 
of people‘s ontological concerns about something unperceivable but proliferating behind their 
perceptions. In doing so, it examines found footage, a recent film genre characterized by its use 
of fragments of video footage created by the recent trend of miniaturization of camera 
technologies represented by the current designs of camcorders, smartphones, and surveillance 
cameras. In line with the dissertation‘s focus on sensor and actuator networks, this new film 
genre is important as the example to show the breakdown of the institutional form of cinema, 
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camera obscura, or an architectural prototype of a single and universal viewpoint of the modern 
subject into the multitude of small cameras embedded in our everyday life. Each of these 
cameras is the simplest combination of a sensor and actuator. Often augmented with a motion-
sensitive motor operation, this camera provides another instance of interval that cultivates within 
itself something withdrawing, persistently felt, but never fully graspable by the motor‘s local 
follow-up. Found footage, in this respect, reflects the changed meaning of media technology 
from the machine to produce attention to the machine to culture some things escaping from 
attention. This concluding chapter takes these things, proliferating or cultured within the 
ubiquitous intervals of surveillance networks, as the source of the recent cultural paranoia about 
hidden networks. 
 
Horror of found footage 
Paranormal Activity (Peli, 2007) and The Blair Witch Project (Myrick & Sanchez, 1999) 
are often considered the two most essential contributions to found footage‘s establishment as a 
film genre in the early twenty-first century. Alongside their unexpected box office success, both 
films‘ employment of portable video technologies as a means of extracting something 
photogenic from every quarter of reality has been cited as foundational of the genre‘s cinematic 
form (Heller-Nicholas, 2014; Och, 2015; Sayad, 2016). Something that has not been discussed, 
however, is how their conversion of material realities, now embedded with numerous video 
cameras, into ever-expandable filmic spaces suggests a cognitive condition for the genre‘s 
typical supernatural contents to be witnessed everywhere: from a domestic setting in San Diego 
recorded by a immobile camcorder to a desolate forest near Burkittsville, Maryland recorded by 
student filmmakers on a shaky handheld camera. Paranormal Activity‘s iconic long take 
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surveillance footage is noteworthy for the way it locates audiences in front of a monitor, making 
them hypersensitive to any minute anomalies occurring at the edges of the frame without letting 
them take proper action—panning, zooming-in, or moving to a better angle—to further identify 
what they perceive (Figure 5.1). On the other hand, The Blair Witch Project‘s handheld 
movement results from the filmmakers‘ panicky motor reflexes to the things they see but which 
are obscured for the audience, leaving too many vectors to reconnect its abrupt cuts into the 
intended narrative for a documentary (Figure 5.2). As the two aesthetic signatures of camera 
operations available in found footage, these moments of demonic emergence expose the genre‘s 
self-reflexiveness. Contrary to other classical genres, found footage has established its generic 
dimension not by sharing a thematic prototype but by its conscious deployment of a camera‘s 
sensorimotor relations to a space according to its redefinition of reality-effect, no longer based 
on the seamless interconnection of the actions the camera(s) take(s) in different angles. It is the 
alternative rule for reality-effect; all cameras need to be set-up, operated, and moved by a person, 
not an author or invisible narrator, but standing on the same material footing with cameras and 
other objects, so that a shot can be closed only by the actions contained in itself such as a person 
pushing the record button or an assault on the camera by unknown entities. As the result of this 
rule‘s consistent application, a segment of footage displays a tension between the things 
gradually foregrounded as responding orderly to the actions taken by the cameraperson and the 
things remaining embedded without eliciting any distinguishable response.  
Even in a shot closed by a camera operator‘s intentional action, this tension persists as an 
ambiguous quality sensible but not identifiable; we can think of this unresolvable tension as now 
emerging everywhere in our life-world which the ubiquitous surveillance cameras reframe with 
each narrow focus. As the owner of their own points-of-view rather than constructed as a textual 
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subjects in the continuous editing, the characters in these films ironically discover the 
uncontrollable always embedded in the periphery of their POV. As a self-reference to the genre‘s 
lack of proper means to exorcise the peripheral, the haunting of the spaces conversely reminds us 
of other genres‘ institutional means to represent something paranormal through the choreography 
of multiple cameras and their seamless combination. To reframe what the endings of both films 
leave unsolved, their sequels, Paranormal Activity 4 (Joost & Schulman, 2012) and Book of 
Shadows: Blair Witch 2 (Berlinger, 2000), indeed re-employed this institutional technique; 
respectively through the seamless interoperations of various self-tracking technologies such as 
video cameras, MacBook webcams, iPhone cameras and Xbox Kinect, and by simply restoring 
the institutional solution of continuous editing. 
In short, these found footages extract new horror values from the peripheries of a camera 
operator‘s restricted attention, and their timely appearance in the early twenty-first century and 
coincidence with the wide distribution of portable camera technologies reflect the media 
system‘s recent interest in capitalizing upon something hidden in these peripheries. The demonic 
is supposedly lurking at each edge of ubiquitous sensors but fully identifiable only through the 
institutional control of the sensors‘ sophisticated interoperation. From found footage not only as 
a film genre but as the raw output of democratized sensor technologies, represented by lots of 
―smart‖ spaces today such as Smart Body, Home, Office, and City, this conclusive chapter infers 
a new mode of attention economy that I term speculative economy of attention, and argues how it 
transforms something paranormal, or elusive of our efforts to pay attention, into a novel form of 





Figure 5.1: An inactive shot in Paranormal Activity 
 
 
Figure 5.2: A disordered-reactive shot in The Blair Witch Project 
 
Post-cinematic affect in-between sensors and actuators 
In the frame of narrative cinema, or its Deleuzian definition as movement-image, we can 
describe the cinematic form through which the poltergeists possessing the spaces in both films 
reappear as such: something perceived at the edges of the sensor but never re-locatable to the 
center by a proper action, thus dischargeable only through the disordered motor responses. 
Deleuze categorizes cinematic images according to their states in circulation in a nervous system, 
or a machinic assemblage that consists of mechanical sensors, motors, and human brains. For 
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him, the classical narrative cinema is most of all a technological restoration of a brain‘s 
sensorimotor representation, in which something perceived gets involved with subjective 
meanings as it changes in response to the actions taken by an actor (a camera or character). On 
the other hand, what he terms affection-image is an intermediary form of delay between 
perception and action, or that which ―surges in the centre of indetermination, that is to say in the 
subject, between a perception which is troubling in certain respects and a hesitant action‖ (1986, 
p.65). As a quality remaining unresolved due to the absence of any following actions, the 
demonic in Paranormal Activity in this sense provides an example of affection-image recently 
emergent from between the machine‘s fatigueless perception and the human‘s delayed or 
―failed‖ actions to follow it (Hart, 2019, p.76). In Blair Witch, the demonic on the other hand 
appears to be more active in arousing numerous unorganized actions from the camera operator, 
and in this respect the affective is also agential in the Spinozian sense as the quality of a shot in a 
―critical point‖ at which it ―embodies multiple and normally mutually exclusive potentials, only 
one of which is ‗selected‘‖ by an abrupt cut (Massumi, 2002, pp.32-3). Brian Massumi 
characterizes ―our information-and image-based late capitalistic culture, in which so-called 
master narratives are perceived to have foundered‖ as the ―surfeit‖ of affect. According to him, 
affect is distinguished from emotion as ―a subjective content‖ since it is pre-individual and pre-
signification, emergent from the suspension of the sense-making of images at ―the semantic or 
semiotic level‖ defined ―linguistically, logically, narratologically, ideologically, or all of these in 
combination, as a Symbolic‖ (pp.26-7). The wane of ―symbolic efficiency‖ of the narrative 
structure in fictional and nonfictional forms of media has revealed the ―post-referentialitiy‖ of 
our material reality, which rarely turns clear responses back to the actions for its technical and 
discursive measurements (Andrejevic, 2013, p.85). As a result, affect has been generalized as our 
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common responsive state. The timeliness of found footage as a new film genre of the early 
twenty-first century can be in this sense examined from its redeployment of the geographical 
distribution of digital cameras as the means to display the affective through its cinematic re-
emergence between sensor and actuator. Found footage exploits affect as the new resource for 
filmmaking accidentally re-discovered from the failure in the seamless relay between multitude 
perceptions and actions of these ubiquitous sensors and actuators, and in this respect it also 
reflects the media industry‘s recent strategy to monetize even audiences‘ failure to pay attention.  
In the film theories of the second half of the last century, the cinematic meant the quality 
effected from the alignment or misalignment of the images montaged together along the 
concealed actions of machines, such as a shutter‘s flickering, the camera‘s movement within a 
single shot, or its geographical displacement between two shots. Jonathan Beller says that ―the 
cinematic mode of production,‖ which operationalized the attention economy of the last century, 
was based on the ―separation and expropriation of vision from the spectator‖ by substituting this 
machinic circulation of images for our voluntary motor responses to the field of perception (2006, 
p.8). For him, the cinematic means the neurophysiological extension of the logic of industrial 
capitalism. He says; ―Instead of striking a blow to sheet metal wrapped around a mold or 
tightening a bolt, we sutured one image to the next (and, like workers who disappeared in the 
commodities they produced, we sutured ourselves into the image)‖ (p.9). In other words, what 
the expropriation of the kinetic means of perception production in a theater leaves for the 
audiences to do is invest their ―freedom reflex‖ (or neural plasticity liberated from the physical 
and geographic constraints of human bodies) into the production of surplus meanings between 
montaged images according to the imagined motor responses of the coherent/schizophrenic 





 has been in this sense defined by its two-fold kinetic operations to create 
―suspensions of perception‖ (Crary, 2001); first by its mechanical operation to translate the field 
of perception into the images framed in each fragment of celluloid; second by its embedding 
imaginary motor responses of normative/schizophrenic subjects within the filmic texts as the 
software to reprogram attention. As the surplus value in cognition, attention reifies images into 
something bigger than real not because audiences add physical labor of motor response to the 
images but because they believe that someone behind the camera (such as a protagonist or hidden 
narrator) is moving his/her body to pay attention to the objects. Attention separated from the 
intentional motor responses of audiences in front of a screen is instead re-inflected through the 
mechanical or algorithmic relay of images, and turned back to the audiences as the attention 
already given to those images by the actions of imaginary others textually or statistically 
constructed (especially statistically in Google‘s PageRank algorithm). The cinematic as the mode 
of attention production in this sense operationalizes a theory of (re-)action which audiences need 
to internalize.  
On the other hand, the surplus of cameras in every corner of our lives and following 
every move we make, which found footage mobilizes to extract hidden narrative values from the 
peripheries of attentions, defines another productive mode of attention. ―The profound sense of 
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 Attention economy was suggested in the late 1990s as the concept to explain the source of ―scarcity‖ 
which governs the new economy of the cyberspace, whose oft-misconceived resource, information, is 
always ―abundant‖ and ―overflowing,‖ and thus impossible to be a ―basis of an economy‖ (Goldhaber, 
1997). On the other hand, the amount of attentions audiences pay to the information is always limited. In 
the subsequent works of the researchers such as Jonathan Crary (2001) and Jonathan Beller (2006) to 
expand the concept‘s coverage even to the media culture of the early twentieth century characterized by 
the abundance of images and spectacles, cinema has been discussed as a technique to convert the attention 
into the form measurable and exchangeable in an economy. For the overview of the theoretical discourses 
on attention economy, see Crogan & Kinsley, 2012. 
182 
 
helplessness and paranoia‖ (Och, 2015, p.209) characterizing the affects aroused in Blair Witch 
and Paranormal Activity is mainly attributable to the person behind the camera not taking proper 
actions such as panning and zooming-in to follow and re-center the anomalies at the edge. 
Something is haunting where our attention reaches but does not return anything to reconstruct a 
normative subject who would translate the sliding-by images into the rational movements of 
attention. What becomes productive for unfolding a narrative is instead the audiences‘ 
withstanding the images without taking actions in order to charge the circuit between a sensor 
and actuator with affective qualities until they are discharged through the multiple disordered 
vectors with arbitrary cuts, whose hidden connectivity should be re-found only at a meta-level. 
The new normative subject to rationalize the economy of attention in found footage is not the 
owner of the gaze behind the camera but the archivist whose job is to excavate the fragments of 
footage and reassemble them for display; such as the hidden commentator at the beginning of 
Blair Witch, who says ―In October of 1994, three student filmmakers disappeared in the woods ... 
A year later their footage was found.‖  
Let me call this new mode of attention production post cinematic, following Steven 
Shaviro, in that cameras are now the ―machines for generating affect, and for capitalizing upon, 
or extracting value from, this affect‖ (2009, p.3). The poltergeists as the sources of the paranoiac 
affects, whose exhibition values are rediscovered by the archivists at the meta-level, can be then 
understood as the metaphors for something hidden in the peripheries of our attention, which the 
attention economy recently attempts to monetize. In this respect, it is not a coincidence that, in a 
conversation on Paranormal Activity, Shaviro relates what the house is possessed by, namely 
―the demon in the PA movies,‖ to ―an immense collection of data‖ performed by the self-
tracking technologies in today‘s smart buildings (Grisham et al., 2016). Even though we have 
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ownership of all these machines, ―It isn‘t always clear who ‗owns‘ all the data.‖ Like the woman 
possessed by the demonic being omnipresent in the house of Paranormal Activity, our 
quantified-selves generated in real-time as our digital double from ubiquitous sensors are, he 
says, owned mostly by ―Google and Amazon‖ (Grisham et al., 2016). As Cheney-Lippold says, 
―In most instances of algorithmic identification, we are seen, assessed, and labeled through 
algorithmic eyes, but our reaction is often available only to be obliquely felt‖; ―we may very well 
feel we are being watched but never see what sees‖ (2017, p.24). However, in this re-
appropriation of the rhetoric of horror film criticism, the return of the repressed in cognition, 
Shaviro overlooks the fact that, in the film, the use of self-tracking technologies for the obsessive 
data collection is not the demon‘s means to possess the woman‘s body, but a part of her 
husband‘s attempt to persuade her that there is nothing paranormal. To rationalize the 
phenomena occurring beside the center of attention, he is willing to share what his camera 
recorded with a psychic, professional analyst for paranormal activities. However, what he 
rediscovers even after he ―lightened up the footage‖ artificially with video editing software is the 
fact that the ambiguous quality of the video typical for surveillance footage becomes even more 
ambiguous as he pays more attention to the periphery through a technological aid. As Sayad 
acutely points out, the husband‘s belief ―that by turning on the camera when an eerie presence 
haunts [his wife]‘s sleep he can tame and control it establishes an ironic pattern that underscores 
both the film and its sequels: the act of filming invariably backfires, granting the ‗monster‘ 
access into the characters‘ lives‖ (2016, p.52). The horror of found footage in this sense shows 
the irony of the recent democratization of sensor technologies and simple data processing tools. 
By retrieving these means of attention production, which support the recent streaming culture in 
which an audience seems to retrieve the power to direct even the attention of others to the action 
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s/he locally takes and broadcasts through a webcam, we also rediscover something para with 
which we have always shared our spaces; something embedded beside as the stain in the 
peripheries of attention and withdrawing further beside under our limited tools for data 
processing such as the digital zoom to enlarge the images already recorded. It should be re-found 
and re-archived at the meta-level to be reintegrated into the economy of attention. Put differently, 
something affective or post-cinematic in its mode of being appears from the grassroots and needs 
to be re-circulated in the higher level.  
 
The new low and high 
As Gillespie (2000) once pointed out, reality television programing in the late twentieth 
century already provided the platform for these affection-images emergent from ubiquitous 
sensors to be re-deployed in an institutional context, and we can examine this TV genre as 
having mobilized our affective concern over the peripheral for the emerging new attention 
economy even before found footage emerged as a film genre. 
Neither constructed around the semicircular movements of the camera in a studio nor 
chasing the actions of journalists, surveillance TV series such as World’s Wildest Police Videos 
(1998-2001) and Real TV (1996-2001) in Gillespie‘s analysis have a generic form as the 
collection of ―found footage,‖ as ―images produced outside of the entertainment television 
apparatus: workplace surveillance footage, police dashboard camera surveillance, hidden camera 
footage, amateur home video, and raw television news footage‖ (p.37). Whereas this seamful 
collage of low-tech videos inevitably contains inherent ambiguities, the stacked layers of 
audio—from ―on-camera soundbites from police officers, witnesses, victims‖ to an expert‘s 
comment weaving all of these reports from below together (p.37)—function in these series to 
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extract multiple vectors from the videos to then interconnect into a narrative describing images 
stuck within a city‘s sensor network as pathological and criminological such as hidden dangers 
of crime, vandalism, and terrorism. According to Gillespie, the legitimate and illegitimate uses of 
video cameras for the participatory bottom-up process of surveillance, often called 
―synopticonism‖ (Andrejevic, 2004) or ―sousveillance‖ (Cascio, 2005), have been defined. In 
Video Justice: Crime Caught on Tape (1997), a special on FOX, the voice of the narrator 
authorizes footage as a viable use of home video, ―a white man being harassed by neighbors 
about his homosexuality sets up a camera and records himself being brutally attacked‖; another 
is conversely categorized as the deviant use of video technology, ―a video made by several black 
youths as they gleefully drive around Los Angeles shooting paintballs at transients and 
pedestrians‖ (Gillespie, 2000, p.39). These two cases of camera movements, which I term 
withstanding without action and discharging through unorganized action, represent two poles in 
a continuum of possible actions a local sensor device could take, from a complete inaction to a 
completely disordered reaction, which also expose the affects stuck in-between perception and 
action of the city‘s ―artificial nervous system‖ (Hayles, 2016; Hill, 2008) in the forms of 
paralysis and haphazard responses. If the footage in these cases were intentionally selected to 
display something affective, unresolvable by a sensor‘s modular action, the editorial processes of 
reality television on the other hand emphasizes the necessity of the discursive control of the 
expert‘s voiceover to redeploy something para sensed from below in a sense-making narrative 
(which the amateur documentary producers in Blair Witch failed to do).  
The bottom-up process of surveillance is textually reconstructed by the stacked layers of 
audio and video in this TV genre, but it is not simply participatory or successful in democratizing 
the visual pleasure of the Panoptic observer. The bottom-up is rather re-interpreted as the 
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institutionalized route for the citizen sensors‘ concerns for the invisible dangers sneaking around 
their limited attention to be redirected to the authority accessible to a citywide sensor network, 
preventing them from jumping to the paranoiac delusion of a demonic network behind. (For 
instance, the husband‘s stepwise attempt to bring his footage to a psychic in a town, and then to a 
famous demonologist Dr. Johann Averies in Paranormal Activity is, despite his failure to do so, 
the only possible cure for his wife‘s paranoiac jump-to-conclusion
21
 regarding the poltergeist.) In 
this sense, the two modes of video technology, which Fiske calls videolow and videohigh, are in 
a new complicity in surveillance TV shows. And along the vertical pipeline through which the 
producer in the high extracts hidden narrative values from the videos in the low (or along the 
pipeline which distinguishes found footage as a film genre from surveillance TV shows in that 
the former‘s armature producer always fails to control these videos in the low whereas TV 
producer is always exploitive to these grassroots), affects are now not simply discovered but 
cultivated as the resources for the network‘s sustainable expansion. Regarding this affective 
quality of videolow, Fiske says;  
 
[L]ike the Rodney King video, their lower-quality images, poor but closely involved vantage 
points, moments of loss of technical control (blurred focus, too-rapid pans, tilted or dropped 
cameras), and their reduced editing all serve to reveal the discursive control that official news 
exerts over the events it reports. Videolow shows that events can always be put into discourse 
differently from videohigh, and this enhance its sense of authenticity (2002, p.389).  
 
                                                 
21
 Jump-to-conclusion is descriptive of the common pattern of conscious process observed in the 
delusional subjects suffering from paranoia, namely to draw a very improvable conclusion immediately 
after they see very ambiguous and insufficient hints (McKay et al., 2007). This pattern seems to be 
relevant to the patients‘ intolerability to seeing anything open to unknown relations, indescribable by 
known narrative closures (Mills, 2003).  
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For Fiske, the authenticity of low-tech video is due mainly to ―its user‘s lack of resources 
to intervene in its technology.‖ The user, or citizen sensor with ―a camera, but not a computer 
enhancer‖ could ―produce and replay an electronic image, but could not slow it, reverse it, freeze 
it, or write upon it,‖ and thus the images the user creates appear ―so authentic to so many 
precisely because he could not‖ (p.388). His definition of authenticity of mechanically produced 
images is distinguishable from that of Bazinian realism based on the images perceived and 
relayed purely by the mechanical action due to a human operator‘s intentional non-intervention 
(Bazin, 2005). Authenticity of videolow for him is rather a sort of affective value added to the 
footage due to the operator‘s inability or frustrated attempts to intervene in its hidden meanings. 
Redefined as these mechanical images charged with either meanings or affects according to 
whether they are successfully redeployed in a citywide surveillance network or still stuck in-
between a local sensor and actuator, found footages as videolow proliferating in the recent urban 
landscape turn out to interface two very different networks beyond our accessibility; first, there 
is the network of cameras whose simple and modular actions can be reassembled by an 
institutional agent in an editing room for reality TV programming, or control room for citywide 
security cameras (Sadowski & Bendor, 2019); and the imaginary network of demonic beings or 
terrorists the citizen sensors obsessively infer beyond their perceptibility. These two networks 
are symmetrical as the former‘s intervention in the low becomes more justifiable as people 
become more paranoid and jump to conclusions at the presence of these invisible evils behind 
the surface. The participatory and democratic form of bottom-up surveillance, which reality TV 
programming idealizes as well as monetizes, is in this sense driven by audiences‘ generalized 
paranoia, or their self-reflexive and gut feeling that there is always something non-representable 
left beside their technologically mediated attentions. In other words, for the bottom-up to be 
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agreed upon by the participants as the solution for their local issues, it needs to be speculated by 
them: everywhere is haunted by nowhere in which something demonic is embedded. It is always 
unclear who really occupies this nowhere since it constantly moves beside our actions to grasp it. 
However, for that precise reason, videohigh claims its right to videolow; or mediahigh in the 
upper layer of cloud servers, such as ―Google and Amazon‖ accessible to not only optical 
sensors including webcams but all kinds of digital sensors, claims ownership of data collected 
from a user‘s material lower layer insofar as the problems lurking in the space are too dispersed 
to be identified by our local action of zooming-in. The proper actions to exorcise them are still 
supposed to be programmed by the high capital, high technology, and high power with enough 
means to intervene everywhere in a simultaneous and timely manner just as the expert‘s 
voiceover in FOX‘s special redisposes all the lower layers of video and audio for a sense-making 
narrative. However, this authorized narrative or its ―Mass surveillance may be doing less to deter 
destructive acts [from the demonic] than it is slowly narrowing of the range of tolerable thought 
and behavior‖ without being reported to the authority (Pasquale, 2015, p.52). 
In this respect, the found footage both as a film genre and raw material for surveillance 
TV series reflects media systems‘ recent division into the new low and high, whose vertical 
complicity is strengthened by the problems whose symptoms are distributed too horizontally. For 
this complicity to be sustainable—in other words, for more symptoms to appear to be identifiable 
only through their redisposition in the high—the sensor technologies owned by individuals need 
to be post-cinematic in the sense of the term by which Shaviro means machines for generating 
affect. The most urgent problem for these sensors to put under their local surveillance is 
something perceived beside their restricted focuses and moving further beside as they take 
actions to catch up. For capitalizing upon, or extracting value from its constant sidling 
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movements at the bottom, the software in the top should be accessible to these local technologies 
to trace its escaping vectors (just as a human operator in a control room improvises a multitude 
of local actions with security cameras to reassemble the ambiguous hints distributed at the edges 
of each screen into something criminal happening in the city). Media‘s systems of visibility and 
statement are restructured along these autonomous sensors with simple modular actions, and 
their bottom-up process to make statements about what is going on in the space is no longer 
dependent on the normative actions of anthropomorphic paying attention, through which the 
mechanical, or algorithmic, relay of images used to be interpreted into something perceived by a 
hidden subject behind a screen. Instead, the only normativity of the actions in the editing room 
and control room is the flexibility in reassembling multitude small actions in a timely manner. 
There is nothing behind the cameras for us to internalize as the normative observer of what 
happens at the peripheries, only the modular actions of the sensors and their algorithmic 
interoperations, never anthropomorphized by the continuous editing because they are 
―operatorless‖ (Sayad, 2016, p.48).  
What then are these worldly problems always outside our attentions and thus represented 
as something demonic by the high? Regarding this question, the rhetoric of the return of the 
repressed is still helpful to describe the productive mode of repression in the recent attention 
economy. Attention as the surplus in cognitive production is not simply added to the images as 
―we sutured one image to the next‖ (Beller, 2006, p.9) according to the actions and choices 
performed by an imaginary normative subject such as the average user algorithmically 
reconstructs. What should be monetized further in the time where everyone is an editor of one‘s 
own attention in the customized software interface is the fear of the marginalized in their limited 
focus; the generalized concern for the fact that our too human attention leaves too many blind 
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spots. ―The sense of lurking danger is enhanced as much by our fear about seeing things as by 
our anxiety about what we do not see, and the generation of this uncertainty about whether or not 
we will see anything involves choices in framing‖ (Sayad, 2016, p.55 ). By speculative economy 
of attention, I mean this new structure of attention economy in which audiences‘ overvalued 
concerns over their inattention are speculatively reinvested into their overvalued hope for 
algorithmic attention. The following interpretations have been nominated for the demons 
occupying these blind spots overvalued by our inattention, or attention always-not-enough-paid: 
the danger of terrorism (Massumi, 2015), nonlinearity of environmental changes (Lanzeni, 2016), 
non-self-recognizable inefficient resource use (Strengers, 2016), and products you are likely to 
like but unlikely to pay enough attention (Thalere & Tucker, 2013). As the horror genre of found 
footage allegorizes, the urgency of this nowhere is overvalued as a person‘s local actions to 
detect it are frustrated repeatedly. On the other hand, the advanced software of surveillance, what 
the expert narrator in the surveillance TV show allegorizes, is supposed to exorcise this nowhere 
through its sophisticated redeployment of multitude sensors and actuators, which eventually 
illuminates the hidden dimension, hitherto felt only affectively, as measurable in terms of 
statistical patterns. The demons are discovered by the ubiquitous sensors and then re-invented as 
the problems to be solved by the ubiquitous actuators, just as the unresolved ending of 
Paranormal Activity leaves a problem resolvable by the interoperations of self-tracking 
technologies in Paranormal Activity 4. This is also the reason why, in the era of smart phones 
embedded with multiple sensors, we need to agree that the applications empowered by cloud 
servers also have the right to activate a phone for collecting data about what happen to the phone 
and its user.  
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John Durham Peters says: ―The cloud evokes ancient ideas of a heavenly record 
containing everything ever said and done, a record both worldly and infallible. If ever there were 
a target for old-fashioned Marxist demystification, this would be it‖ (2015, p.332). On the other 
hand, regarding the power of data clouds the supposedly omnipotent AI applications are based 
upon today, our resurrected faith in the cloud is rather our rational response to the re-discovered 
boundary of our restricted subjectivity; beyond which we encounter not only the demonic but 
lots of algorithmic beings communicating each other about the demons on behalf of their human 
users. 
 
Speculative economy of attention 
The recent achievement of miniaturizing sensor, processor, and actuator technologies to 
the point where they can be embedded in a variety of objects in various environments has 
popularized the adjective ―smart‖ as applicable to various social spaces of different scales 
(Crandall, 2010). Now our smart life stems from the awareness of our very standing at the 
interlocked boundaries of these spaces each re-divided into low and high; such as our 
physiological, domestic, and urban spaces tracked by different sets of sensors embedded in the 
lower layers of a Smart Cloth, Smart Home, and Smart City under the control of each different 
software application in the cloud servers. We can consider the middle between this new 
infrastructural low and software-running high as the space for the new market of speculative 
attention economy to be cultivated, in that the domains of our life, from a body to city, resituated 
in this grey area are now fully charged with the demonic; this is comparable to the various vital 
signals under wearable sensors and people‘s collective behaviors under citywide environmental 
sensors, elusive from our local monitoring but detectable through a network of distributed smart 
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objects. The more we feel affective to these flows beside our attention in our generalized 
concerns for dormant health problems, invisible dangers of violence, or distracting surpluses of 
information, the more attentions we might delegate to the software application which redirects 
our attention. ―Smart disclosure,‖ a policy to encourage ―the release of government information, 
corporate disclosures, and customer usage data in machine-readable form,‖ can in this sense be 
understood as a recent government-driven effort to re-direct this distracting tendency of digital 
flows into the algorithmic reorganization of attention through various ―choice engines‖ (Thaler 
& Tucker, 2013, p.49). But for these engines in the cloud to be smart enough to draw our 
attention back to the best choice out of many available consumerist solutions for our worldly 
well-being (such as better diet, healthcare, housing option, retirement plan), we first need to 
agree, willingly or reluctantly, with the disclosure of our own social network profiles, 
online/offline behavior patterns, and the scores of psychometric tests we take consciously or 
unconsciously online (Stark, 2018) both to the government and corporate agents and even to the 
third-party intermediaries as the prerequisite for all other smart disclosures. And it is through this 
delegation of attention investment to the attention engines that the problems, which the husband 
in Paranormal Activity attempted to catch in a single camera take, turn out to be in fact stretched 
along many different domains; just as your heartbeat under the 24/7 monitoring of your smart 
watch can also be an efficiency problem in the task to find the most optimal behaviors in your 
house/office/city as much as detecting terrorists becomes a problem to find irregular shopping 
behaviors online. In other words, the algorithms‘ redirection of our attention back to the urgent 
problems is potentially never-ending insofar as even a tiny pulsation such as your heartbeat could 
reappear in many different embodiments along the network such as your physical states not yet 
optimal to work out, sleep, have sex, and so forth. For these attention engines as well as 
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demonologists, a pulsation detected in one‘s body, cookies about user behaviors, or in a haunted 
house appears to be a topological object that they can stretch to any other problems virtually 
connected to this tiny symptom. Redeployed in the high, these worldly problems are put in the 
forms not only easy but also necessary to attend to because they are displayed as ―push‖ 
notifications on your smart phone and watch, or spoken directly by a smart speaker in your living 
room.  
The demonic, once the source for the rupture in our habitual identification with a 
camera‘s restricted POV in found footage, no longer ruptures the new attention economy since 
our paranoiac concerns for the invisible problems are now reinvested in the software in the high. 
Our new technological field of perception appears under algorithmic optics to be full of urgent 
problems, but what unfolds this problematic space out of databases collected from ubiquitous 
sensors is neither the simple action we take with our body and camera, nor the imaginary action 
of the normative subject. It is rather unfolded by the sidling movements of the demonic, now 
redirected to the network of smart sensors and actuators which translates these affection-images 
from the low into the images corresponding to the executions of software in the high. For 
example, the chaotic traffic congestions perceived in each intersection in the low could be 
recognized from the high as the images corresponding to the collective responses of drivers to 
the smart traffic lights distributed in a city (Xie & Wang, 2018); your irregular heartbeat 
perceived by the smart watch on your skin is translated into the image corresponding to your 
running pace guided by the fitness app in the cloud. In this sense, Deleuze‘s typology of 
perception-images, affection-images, and action-images along the images‘ circulation in a 
machinic nervous system has now another field of post-cinematic application in the wireless 
sensor and actuator networks (WSAN) in the IoT-based smart buildings and cities. Something 
194 
 
affective still emerges sporadically within the bottlenecks between sensors and actuators (or 
perceptions and actions) in the form of the temporal paralysis of software or abrupt discharging 
through the shutdown of software, reminiscent of Paranormal Activity and Blair Witch. But 
these horrible moments are also when the users are asked to invest their affective concerns into 
the bottom-up process of reporting errors in order to help the developers to update the software‘s 
capability to further capitalize on the elusive signals.  
Rather than being the surplus labor of cognition to add imaginary values to the images 
attended, our attention in this speculative economy is now capitalized indirectly as its investment 
delegated to the software ironically overvalues the urgency of problems hidden in the periphery 
of our attention. The software in the high on the other hand exploits the overvalued hope for its 
algorithmic preemption of the problems at the bottom as what justifies its permanent data 
collection practice. The motive power for the perpetuation of the attention economy of the past 
century was audiences‘ neurophysiological investment of desire to the images they consumed 
(Terranova, 2012). The speculative economy of attention is on the other hand perpetuated by the 
overvalued dangers to which nobody could pay enough attention; or the overvalued hope for the 
network of manifold sensors and actuators, which is supposed to redirect our attention back to 
these urgent problems. As Andrejevic acutely points out, ―Data mining is, in this regard, 
speculative as well as comprehensive‖ insofar as ―data is captured not solely for current use, but 
also to take into account the possibility of any and all future scenarios and technologies‖ (2013, 
p.78). The problems expected to lurk in our lives will be never resolved immediately after we 
purchase a smart watch and move into a smart home in a smart city. But our investment in these 
technologies is still justifiable insofar as their constant data collection promises a near future 
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where all these problems are data minable; and thus until this future comes we need to delegate 
our investment of attentions to these sensors everywhere.  
 
Chronicle 
Asymmetry can now be understood as the key term which describes the sensorimotor 
relation through which we are engaged with our surroundings. In mathematics, symmetry means 
the feature of an object or its properties invariant under certain transformation such as rotation, 
projection, and displacement. Take our field of perception as this sort of object under constant 
transformations. The world appearing symmetrical to our perception would be then restricted to 
the world of objects which return invariant or orderly-variant responses to the actions we take 
with our body and technological sensors under our control. However, the increased number of 
sensors we are accessible to would not guarantee our more symmetrical engagement in the world, 
because it would rather redraw the boundary between two worlds we are engaged symmetrically 
and asymmetrically. Even if we could control all the zooming and panning of the webcams and 
surveillance cameras, we cannot trace all the problems embedded in a space, not just because we 
cannot monitor all of them simultaneously but because some of them are traceable only by a 
sophisticated montage of the cameras‘ interoperations. (This advanced montage is comparable to 
the job of a criminal investigator who reconstructs the course of a disastrous event from the 
ambiguous hints distributed in the surveillance footages, but only after the event already 
happened.) These problems are asymmetrical to our simple actions but present to the advanced 
software in the high capable of reassembling the sensors‘ worldly operations. Their asymmetries 
are nevertheless felt as something affective in the low. Until these unknown problems are re-
symmetrified in the high, we thus need to withstand our staring nowhere without taking any 
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significant action. In this sense, it is the lesson of Paranormal Activity: do not attempt to 
communicate with the poltergeist, and do not play with an Ouija board before you contact a 
demonologist. What appears then as our common response to this restraining order is a ―paranoid 
worldview in which everything is hopelessly complex but, with the right (data) tools, can be 
made deceptively simple and explainable‖ (Hu, 2015, p.124). This obsession with hidden orders 
―buried beneath the surface‖ of ambiguous symptoms (122) is nevertheless rational insofar as it 
promises a future where all these esoteric meanings would be explained even though it is 
infinitely postponed until one discovers the proper algorithms, data analysts, or demonologists. 
For the audiences of the speculative economy, paranoia is even understood as ―a strong theory‖ 
since it appears to be ―capable of accounting for a wide spectrum of phenomena which appear to 
be very remote, one from the other‖ as resulted from ―a common source‖ of danger (Sedgwick, 
2003, pp.133-4). As Ulrich Beck already noted in 1980s, their paranoiac speculations about the 
latent dangers are ―oddly immune to the critique of science.‖ It is because these fatalistic 
speculations also earn ―their ‗truth‘ and their supporters not before science, but in interaction 
with [science],‖ such as environmental science, behavioral science, or data science; whose 
algorithmic procedures to identify the problems are now re-incarnated in the form of smart 
applications (1992, p.169). 
A person in found footage, standing behind his/her own camera without paying enough 
attention or taking proper action to the anomaly occurring at the edge of the frame, is therefore a 
perfect exemplum of the audiences for the new attention economy, whose persistent investment 
of attention to somewhere means their investment of undissmissable fears to somewhere else. 
For this person, the demonic is in nowhere to attend, or everywhere s/he fails to attend; so that its 
emergence from the peripheries is never rationalized through the anthropomorphized continuous 
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editing and thus needs to be put under the algorithmic perception through ubiquitous sensors. If 
our asymmetrical engagement to the surroundings is what justifies our decision to delegate our 
attention to the software to re-symmetrify them, the possibility to subvert this new hierarchy can 
be on the other hand thought of from the possibility that the local media users could hijack the 
software in the high as the means to redefine their affective surrounding not as demonic any 
longer but fully charged with potentiality as the Spinozian affect originally means.  
Josh Trank‘s Chronicle (2012), another found footage in the early twenty-first century 
can be examined with regard to this subversive possibility. Like many other entries in the genre, 
Chronicle takes the form of a personal record of supernatural phenomena which three teenagers 
experience after their encounter with an alien technology. The same aesthetic restriction of the 
genre, namely all cameras set-up, operated, and moved by a person standing on the same 
material footing, is consistently applied; but the styles of footages recorded before and after their 
encounter are significantly different due to the telekinetic superpower they earned from the 
encounter. This power enables a boy, Andrew, to control the movement and operation of his 
camera without physically touching it. In the early footages he records manually, the camera is 
thus always fixed or held in Andrew‘s hand (Figure 5.3), but this restriction is not simply due to 
his lack of a technological aid for the more sophisticated camera operations but his need to 
behave as if nothing is recording whenever someone unexpected gets into the frame such as his 
father, street gang, bullies, and the boyfriend of the girl he peeped at a party. He must withstand 
their harassments rather than warn them about the camera; otherwise they will take away his 
camera and break it. Both his inactions and failed actions leave something unresolved within the 
frame, felt only affectively. On the other hand, after earning the superpower, he does not need to 
be afraid of taking action not only because nobody can beat him up any longer but because the 
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cameras floating up in the air are still fully under the control of his telekinesis. The more skillful 
he becomes at using his power, the more cinematic his life appears to be in the footage. In the 
latter half of the film where his cameras‘ free floating becomes more sophisticated than any 
crane shot, the screen, once flattened as a two-dimensional plane typical of other found footage 
films such as Paranormal Activity, eventually appears to be crowded with lots of hidden objects, 
which are not ―lurking dangers‖ any longer, but aligned along the camera‘s unfolding a deep 
space reminiscent of institutional cinema.  
 
   
Figure 5.3: An inactive shot in the earlier part of Chrnoicle 
 
One afternoon after he first used his power to retaliate against bullying, Andrew alone in 
a junkyard talks to the camera; ―A lion does not feel guilty when it kills a gazelle. Right, you do 
not feel guilty when you squash a fly, and I think that means something. I just think that really 
means.‖ This ―something,‖ once felt only affectively due to the lack of proper action to 
dramatize it, gets to be concretized into his theory of ―apex predator‖ as his actions now reach 
everywhere; the camera starting from the close-up of his elated face slowly moves to a wide-
angle shot and, at the end of his monologue, it reveals the hidden telekinetic cause and effect 
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between the action of his hand to squeeze the air and the deformation of a junk car in the 
background. His mobilization of the telekinetic resonance between his surroundings and cameras 
is culminated in its climax for self-narrative when he confronts his buddy Matt in the night air of 
downtown Seattle. Ignoring Matt‘s warning against violence, Andrew hijacks tens of video 
cameras from the people in a building and surrounds his body with these cameras to record his 
rebirth as a super human from as many angles as possible (Figure 5.4), against the city‘s 
surveillance network which translates something affective in the air into the familiar narrative of 
breaking news (Figure 5.5). Like a reality television producer, Andrew mobilizes a random set of 
cameras speculatively wherever he goes with an expectation that there remain hidden dramatic 
values still embedded in his home, school, and city: the expectation that would be fulfilled 
afterwards by the anonymous editor who found his footages and re-edit them into a chronicle of 
the emergence of a superhuman/terrorist out of the affective.  
 
 





Figure 5.5: A surveillance footage in Chronicle 
 
Through the physical relocation of cameras from the low to high, Chronicle provides a 
magical scenario in which an individual‘s investment of attention to his own life through 
multiple self-surveillance devices guarantees a high return. The wager Andrew is betting on with 
the cameras overinvested with his superpower is not like Pascal‘s wager. According to Pascal, 
betting on an extremely improbable future event is justifiable insofar as the stake to lose is too 
high after it occurs by any chance; such as the existence of afterlife, or the possibilities that your 
house is really haunted, your neighbor is really a terrorist, the item Amazon recommends is 
really important to improve your life. Betting on these sorts of wagers is rational because to win 
the race is not for earning the reward but for losing nothing; if you win, you lose nothing, if you 
lose, you lose everything. Annie McClanahan (2009) points out that the popular narratives of 
catastrophic futures after 9/11have assumed these hidden dangers as the kinds for which nobody 
can be properly prepared with purely ―statistical models of forecast‖ given their too low 
probability (p.44). Instead, they can be preempted by proactive seeking for the possible links 
through which these yet-to-come events could really come. In the public understanding, these 
problems thus appear to be persuasive not because they look probable but because they sound 
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―plausible‖ in ―scenario thinking.‖ Speculation is the discursive means of individuals to imagine 
myriad possible scenarios of these hidden links. And people‘s paranoiac responses to their 
ambiguous surroundings with these overloaded speculations are, no matter how less probable 
they seem to occur in reality, sometimes enough to justify their speculative spending in 
algorithmic scenarios generated by smart applications if these scenarios are about catastrophic 
futures and they are at least plausible. As McClanahan says, ―when plausibilist predictions 
(output) are made to serve as actual evidence (input) [for the urgency of the problems], they 
produce a closed circuit of speculation whose external truth can never be confirmed‖ (pp.58-59). 
Nick Bostrom (2019), in his recent suggestion of national and global policy of risk governance, 
suggests that this sort of speculative investment to preempt an extremely less probable future 
scenario could be still rational if it is plausible that at least one of balls that we pick up from ―the 
urn of possible inventions‖ would be black. In other words, just one catastrophic case is enough 
to dismiss trillions of other non-harmful cases if it could result in a ―destructive event that is at 
least as bad as the death of 15% of the world population or a reduction of global GDP by >50% 
lasting for more than a decade.‖ And then, he says, 
 
even those who are highly suspicious of government surveillance would presumably favour a 
large increase in such surveillance if it were truly necessary to prevent occasional region-wide 
destruction. Similarly, individuals who value living in a sovereign state may reasonably prefer 
to live under a world government given the assumption that the alternative would entail 
something as terrible as a nuclear holocaust (p.4).  
 
On the other hand, Andrew‘s betting on the cameras is to earn everything, to claim his 
ownership over the data his cameras generate without gauging how many dramatic values are 
really embedded there. We can take his speculative investment of attention in Chronicle as an 
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allegory for the early quantified-self movement led by the technology gurus in Wired magazine 
such as Gary Wolf (2009, June), who delegated his attention investment to as many self-tracking 
devices as available to monitor ―every facet of life, from sleep to mood to pain, 24/7/365‖ from 
different angles. Their expectation of the reward from this experimental practice was also very 
high, namely to discover the hidden parameters of everyday life for its unprecedented level of 
optimization and efficiency. However, it did not take long for the air, once opened to their 
decision to deploy which sensors in which positions, to be black-boxed by the ready-made smart 
objects and the IoT applications, smart enough to redeploy themselves in the rightest positions 
not only to exorcize but also monetize the inoptimality and inefficiency in their users‘ life. In 
consequence, affect becomes once again the most immediate response of humans to the world 
under new media‘s 24/7/365 surveillance as well as to their own body revealed to be possessed 
by lots of unknown problems out of their conscious control. As reported by many self-tracking 
users today, ―a lack of ability to self-regulate,‖ or our asymmetrical engagement even to 
ourselves is what people find first from their selves quantified by self-tracking devices (Lupton, 
2016, p.62). This generalized asymmetry as the rediscovered human relation to one‘s own 
surroundings—whose hidden levels reappear symmetrical only to the advanced data mining 
applications—is the reason of ―an obsession, compulsion or ‗addiction‘ with one‘s data to the 
exclusion of other aspects of one‘s life‖ (p.64). 
 
What does the telekinesis in Chronicle mean as to the ubiquitous asymmetries? As a 
magical solution for these asymmetries, through which our subjective reality is shrunken and 
stuck within the manifold of inter-objective realities, the telekinesis seems to emphasize the 
necessity to give humans back the control over the wireless and simultaneous operations of 
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ubiquitous sensors and actuators. What could then be more real-life examples of this magical 
solution to put the commercialized air, or the data cloud asymmetrical to data donors, back under 
the control of an individual for his self-narrative? The open-source movement and increased 
computational literacy may provide the keys to re-open these black-boxed realities of smart 
objects. But, as Burrell says about the limit of the human ―code audit‖ for the ANN-based 
machine learning algorithms, the best even for the most computer-literate audiences to discover 
from the open-sources would be, in most cases, just the opacity inherent in ―the way algorithms 
operate at the scale of application‖ (2016, p.4). The attempt to re-symmetrify the data cloud, 
which our voluntary and nonconscious interactions with digital objects generate, and to make it 
transparent to our own uses for optimizing our lives seems to inevitably reach a compromise. 
The subjective reality re-demarcated by this most enlightened human literacy of datum also turns 
out to be the most dwarfed since its Kantian enclosure as it is now stuck in a niche of manifold 
smarter objects.  
Our insatiable dream of enlightening everything exhaustively is, however, still satiable 
ever after we reluctantly accept that there are hidden realities embedded in datum and we will 
never be fully accessible to them. This irony, which makes it easy to give up our fruitless pursuit 
for the self-enlightenment, is derived from a sort of ontologically reprogrammed ideology of 
today, the ideology no longer intervening in the condition of perception but pushing us to 
speculate about the beyond our restricted condition. The so-called Big Data is symbolic in this 
sense as a newly given big Other or a meta-object in the age of the Internet of Things. As an 
image of the non-representable totality, Big Data is not to cause the rupture of a coherent subject 
any longer. Instead, in its being a substratum of various smart spaces, Big Data encourages 
individual audiences to re-demarcate their restricted subjectivities along their obsolete human 
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literacy and reproduce their dwarfed boundaries by constantly projecting their paranoiac and 
ontological concerns about the existences beyond their boundaries. The world transformed into 
Big Data is supposed to hide an infinite number of correlations, inexhaustible by any human 
audits, but likely to be pattern-recognized some time or other if we let the smart objects continue 
to reassemble their inter-objective realities under different software applications. In other words, 
the IoT promises to further the project of the enlightenment through our rational wager on the 
agency of objects as nonhuman authors of ontologies. Under the new Enlightenment discourses 
of being smart in the current smart spaces, our paranoiac speculation about the problems in 
peripheries justifies our speculative investment in the futures, which the smart objects would 
bring after they infiltrate the finer-grained peripheries of our surroundings and fully enlighten all 
hidden orders embedded there.  
As the first two chapters of this dissertation examined through the cases of a smart 
vehicle and smart home, the ambiances of the current smart spaces are characterized by the 
imperceptible operations of the ontological objects in the IoT and their secret exchanges of 
inaudible signals. Our affective responses to these ambiances sometimes make them charged 
with hidden horrors. On the other hand, the other two chapters on the open-world videogames 
and brain-machine interfaces suggested how the same ambiances could also be charged with our 
expectations and hopes for the smart objects that would unfold hidden solutions for currently 
unknown tasks and quests. With these ambivalent feelings, humans—the IoT subscribers or 
service providers—should bet on their future. The stakes they pay would be their concerns either 
on the overvalued horrors of hidden problems or overvalued hopes for these problems‘ 
commodifiability; either hopelessly paying for their IoT solutions, or cultivating more horrors to 
convert them into the new IoT services. Our smart future and its promise of efficiency and 
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sustainability would be ever delayed to come to reality. This infinite delay is what we need to 
endure in the new phase of cognitive capitalism, which perpetuates itself through the trade-off 
between our speculations about unknown problems and their future solutions. While the totality 
of our hidden realities is constantly sliding under our discursive practices oscillating between 
paranoia and blind optimism, the smart objects embedded in the underlying continuum would 
unfold the actual futures. The smart futures, always remaining transitional, we would never feel 
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